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Abstracts 
The armed forces are maintained in two ways –in both the military way and the militaristic way. 
In this sense, every nation which has its own military has specific features of militarism, regardless of 
how dominant these features are over other parts of the society. The U.S. has its own type of militarism in 
the military and the society. In the United States, there is a belief that the US military should be number 
one in the world. This American public belief takes various shapes of military imperatives which connect 
every part of society with military and lead them to cooperate and support the realization of these 
imperatives. 
In Part I, the dissertation shows that military transformation in the post-Cold War era is an 
example that shows how American militarism works in American society. During this period, public 
opinion showed a positive and significant correlation with defense spending. Within the US military, 
American Militarism has led the Department of Defense and military services to the endless preparation 
for a future adversary in the situation of strategic uncertainty after the Cold War era. Defense related 
industries have strongly supported the military’s effort to be number one in military affairs. In the 
political arena, the congressional committee which is responsible for national defense seems inclined to 
be conservative in the matter of ideology – more conservative than the median in the House of 
Representatives.  
In Part II, the dissertation explores how American Militarism has influenced on the decisions of 
each legislator in the roll call votes on amendments regarding defense authorizations and appropriations 
bills. The result reveals that authorization process is more predictable than appropriation process. 
Furthermore, the result shows that the amount of PAC contributions to each legislator is a significant 
factors to determine legislators’ choices in roll call votes in authorization process even though ideological 
aspect of individual legislators ideology is still influential in decision making of each legislator.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction: US Armed Forces, Defense Policy, and Congress 
 
 “U.S. and allied air superiority can no longer be taken for granted,” Granger says. “If we hold 
fast together, the F-35, along with the F-22, will provide dominance in the skies for the next half-
century.” - Rep. Kay Granger (R-TX 12) 
"We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, 
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the 
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America."   - U.S. Constitution. 
 
The US Congress must authorize funding for all federal programs. Defense policy is one 
important area of federal policy1 that is under the control of the budgetary authority of Congress. 
Congress influences weapon procurement programs – one of the core parts of defense policy – through 
legislative voting in both the House and Senate. Furthermore, the results of these legislative actions 
determine the capabilities of the military service to perform their missions and the fate of various weapon 
procurement programs. Consequently, Congress plays an essential role in the US defense procurement 
process and, more broadly, in the process of developing US defense policy and national military policy. 
The process by which Congress authorizes new weapons programs can be especially controversial 
(Deering, 1989). 
                                                          
1 Federal (national) policy — a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the 
government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (source: DOD dictionary-JP 1) 
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Theoretically, one might assume that the defense policy needs to be purely based on effectiveness 
and rationality, since such a basis will lead a defense policy that best protects a country from external 
threats (Vagts, 1959; Millett, 1987). However, this is never the case, and recent congressional votes on 
specific weapon procurement programs show little evidence that Congress’ primary concern is military 
effectiveness. The history of legislative actions on the current F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program is one 
example of Congress not purely focusing on military effectiveness budgetary efficiency.  
Even though the F- 35 Lightning II is being developed as the next generation jet fighter (fifth 
generation), several evaluations of this jet fighter have been negative and not suitable for the time – next 
generation (Gearan, 2009; Trimble, 2010; the New York Times, 20102). First, several flaws found during 
test flights and experiments have raised concerns over the performance of F-35 (Government Accounting 
Office (GAO), 2006; the New York Times, 2010; Trimble, 2010a; 2010b; Warwick, 2011; Charette, 
2012). These concerns and flaws led to redesigns of F-35 and delays in production (Trimble, 2010; 2011; 
GAO, 2012; Regan, 2012). Second, the cost of development and production keeps increasing due to these 
delays (GAO, 2006; 2008; 2012; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2011; Trimble, 
2011). Third, despite negative evaluations, military buyers have not reevaluated their decisions to 
purchase the F-35. Three military services – the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have already 
determined to buy this jet fighter (Kovach, 2010; Tirpak, 2010; Thompson, 2010; Weisgerber, 2012; 
Department of Defense, 2012). Both chambers of Congress have resisted calls to halt the program and the 
Department of Defense still supports keeping this program alive (Gates, 2011; Flight International, 2012; 
Marshall, 2012). International buyers have also remained determined to purchase F-35s, despite negative 
reports (Ben-David, 2010; 2011; Hoyle, 2010; Trimble, 2010; Department of National Defense (Canada), 
2011; Chuter, 2012).  
                                                          
2 “Lockheed F-35 Fighter in Deficit Panel’s sight.” The New York Times, Nov. 10, 2010 
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Why haven’t potential buyers of the F-35 – foremost, Congress – changed their minds in the light 
of these concerns and what made them choose the F-35 initially?3 In order to answer why buyers still 
support the F-35 despite its flaws, it is necessary to consider the context in which the F-35 program has 
developed, evaluate the characteristics of the program as a part of defense policy, and analyze the 
positions and perspectives of major participants in defense policy such as the Department of Defense, the 
military services, Congress, and industries involved in manufacturing the F-35. Furthermore, I will focus 
Congress’ influence on weapon procurement programs including the F-35 program in this dissertation, 
primarily because of the key role that Congress plays in the weapon procurement process. 
1. Overview of the dissertation  
My dissertation will explore how Congress influences US defense policy. To evaluate the role of 
Congress, I will examine the legislative voting behaviors of members of Congress on annual defense 
budget. I will also scrutinize how Congress has influenced US defense budget regarding military 
procurement programs through congressional budget process.  
Conventionally, studies on legislative voting behaviors have focused on the results of 
Congressional votes in the two different levels within Congress – institutional level and individual 
legislators’ level (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Fiorina, 1989; Deering, 1989; Poole and Rosenthal, 1991, 
Shepsle and Boncheck, 1997; Krehbiel, 1998, Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Crespin and Rhode, 2010). The 
studies regarding the institutional level have been centered on the vote results made by Congress as a 
whole legislative institution in order to specify the conditions that generate passing or failing legislation 
(Deering, 1989; Poole and Rosenthal, 1991, Shepsle and Boncheck, 1997; Krehbiel, 1998, Cox and 
McCubbins, 2005; Crespin and Rhode, 2010). Meanwhile, the studies focusing on individual legislators’ 
level have dealt with attributes of each individual legislator in order to discover causal factors that 
                                                          
3 Several great weapon systems have been developed from deeply flawed R&D efforts and flawed procurement 
procedures. F-4 Phantom is an example.    
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determine individual legislators’ voting choices in roll call votes. (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Fiorina, 
1989; Cox and McCubbins, 2005).   
However, when it comes to specific policy domains such as defense policy, these factors seem 
too broad to explain or describe the legislative voting behaviors of members of Congress. In order to 
analyze Congressional influence on the defense policy, it is necessary to scrutinize the characteristics of 
the defense policy first. In addition, traditional factors that influence legislative behavior – such as party, 
ideology, and committee – need to be examined in the context of the defense policy. 
My dissertation consists of two parts. The first part of the dissertation will focus on scrutinizing 
the characteristics of the defense policy and shedding light on the relationships between the congressional 
votes and the defense policy. In this part, I attempt to approach the defense policy of the United States 
from the perspective of military transformation. On the top of this, I draw implications that an American 
Militarism in Congress has influenced the defense policy – specifically, on the military procurement 
programs.  
The second part will focus on how Congress has influenced the decision-making process 
regarding the military procurement programs. I first look at how decisions on defense budget were made 
at the chamber level. I then consider how individual members of Congress make decisions on roll call 
votes regarding defense policy issues.  
My dissertation is distinguished from the previous literature in the following points. First, my 
dissertation focuses on the military issues, specifically weapon procurement programs. Scholars in 
congressional studies have established theoretical foundations by studying the organization, roles, and 
behaviors in Congress with broad and general perspectives. Moreover, studies on specific policy areas 
have been executed on these theoretical foundations. However, military issues have not covered 
sufficiently within the literature, compared to other policy areas. Second, my dissertation covers the 
period after the Cold War. During the Cold War period, military issues got much attention in political and 
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academic arenas. Plenty number of studies on military issues have been executed during the Cold War 
period. However, after the Cold War ended, the research interests have shifted to other issues such as 
national economy, ethnicity and other social issues. By shedding light on the defense policy after the Cold 
War, I shows that there was a trend of military transformation during this period and Congress also had 
participated in establishing the current military powers of the United States by funding various weapon 
procurement programs. Third, this dissertation distinguishes two different phases of federal budget 
process - authorization and appropriation. It shows that influence of each factor in roll call votes is 
significantly differed in each phase of federal budget process. The difference of these two phases of 
budget processes should be considered in the future studies.  
2. Defense policy as a policy domain 
As the starting point of the dissertation, I contend that the defense policy can be divided into two 
parts in accordance with the two distinct challenges that defense policymakers deal with – external front 
and domestic front. The defense policy primarily functions to deal with foreign threats, but in order to 
function well, it should be supported by the public and needs to be based upon domestic foundations such 
as popular support and economic capabilities (Huntington, 1961; Janowitz, 1974; Hays et.al., 1997). 
Generally, defense policy can be defined as a broad course of action or statements of guidance for 
military institutions to deal with two fronts – external and internal – in pursuit of national defense 
objectives. 
The preamble of the U.S. Constitution spells out six purposes and goals that the United States of 
America should pursue as a nation. Common defense is one of them, which means to secure “the 
American people as a whole” from threats (Huntington, 1961). Considering the fact that there are other 
goals that primarily concern domestic issues such as a “more perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility, 
general welfare, blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity”, it can be concluded that the threats 
that are confronted by providing common defense should come not from inside the U.S. but from outside.  
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In order to provide common defense against the external threats, military institutions have to face 
the external front to protect their societies and foreign interests from the external threats. Defense policies 
to deal with the external front search for source of threats and develop military strategies, doctrines and 
technologies to respond to the external threats (Kaufman et.al., 1985; Hays et.al., 1997). These tasks are 
purely the jobs of professional soldiers, who are responsible for developing their own ways to fight 
against threats (Huntington, 1961; Sarkesian, 1999). Moreover, the professional soldiers do not need to 
negotiate with their principals while dealing with external threats4. What they need to do is find a logic 
that can persuade their principals such as citizens, the President, and members of Congress (Huntington, 
1961; Sarkesian, 1999). This is the core of military professionalism.     
Nonetheless, when it comes to building up the foundation of defense policy, the story is quite 
different from dealing with foreign threats (Kaufman et.al., 1985; Ripley et.al., 1992; Hays et.al., 1997; 
Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). Considering the fact that the foundation of defense policy comes from 
inside the United States, military institutions have to meet the challenge of the internal front on the way to 
building up military institutions’ capabilities to perform their institutional role, which is to protect their 
societies. First of all, most of the military organizations consist of U.S. citizens. Second, the defense 
budget that operates the military comes from the federal budget that is paid by the citizens. Third, most 
weapons that the military uses are produced in the U.S and U.S. industries. Last, the agency that is 
responsible for defense policy is overseen and controlled by the representatives of the U.S. public – the 
U.S. Congress.  
Building up the foundations of defense policy are purely political tasks that require promoting 
public support, making contracts with industries, and mostly persuading the Congress and the President 
(Ripley et.al., 1988; 1992). These are the core tasks of civil-military relations. Defense policies for the 
internal front seek to create favorable political environments, public climates and economic conditions 
                                                          
4 Sun Tzu, Art of War.  Chapter I; Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Book I. This does not mean military strategies are 
not influenced by public or representatives of people. It means that the logic on which strategies are based are 
more important than any other factors because military affairs are a problem of death and life.   
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within the society in order to build up the necessary military capabilities such as effective weapon 
systems, high quality human resources, and cohesive, sustainable, and well-functioning Organization.  
Consequently, in order to comprehensively understand defense policy, it is not sufficient to 
merely look at the execution of military strategies. We must analyze the inner dynamics of civil- military 
relations – the relationship between defense policy and its domestic foundations.   
If this is the case, how can we analyze defense policy in the framework of civil-military relations? 
If we approach civil-military relations broadly, we can draw three major relationships between military 
and civilian authority depending on how we define either military or civilian authority (Huntington, 1961; 
Janowitz, 1973). First, the relationship between society as a whole and its military members; second, the 
relationship between political authority and military agency (Herspering, 2005); third, the relationship 
between the representatives of the public and the military agency which is in charge of military affairs 
(Nielson, 2009). In the U.S., the first relationship can be visualized as the relations between the U.S. 
public and military as a whole; the second relationship could be the one between the President and the 
department of defense; the third relationship can be considered as the relationship between Congress and 
military organizations, including the Department of Defense and subordinate military services.   
In the first relationship, the main issues have been how the public perceives their military and 
how public opinions affect defense policy and military strategies (Burnstein et.al., 1978; Hartley et.al., 
1992; Groeling et.al., 2008) However, the effect of public opinion on defense is inclined to be indirect 
rather than direct, because there are various mechanisms that transmit public opinions to the military 
organizations (Burnstein et.al., 1978; Hartley et.al. 1992). Consequently, in order to understand the effect 
of public opinion on defense policy in detail, it is necessary to scrutinize these mechanisms that link the 
public to the military organizations.  
There are two main institutions that perform these mechanisms: the Presidency and Congress 
(Hays et.at., 1997). In the organizational aspect, the Presidency has executive power over all the military 
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organizations; the President can appoint the high profile military officials such as the Secretary of 
Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moe, 1999). Moreover, considering the fact that 
the President is the commander - in - chief of all the military, the Presidency is at the top in the aspect of 
military strategies, and the relationship between the Presidency and military can be the proper level of 
analysis for strategic issues (Deering et.al., 1989).5 
However, the President- military is not the proper level of analysis for defense policy as a whole. 
Some other issues that are closely related to the public or constituents – such as military procurement, 
Military Base Realignment And Closure etc. – have been checked and affected by Congress (Deering 
et.al.1989; Hays et.al.,1997). Moreover, even on strategic issues, Congress exercises authority by 
requesting executive branches to attend hearings and report the causes and consequences of related issues 
(Ripley et.al., 1992; Hartley et.al., 1992). Consequently, in order to understand the inner dynamics in the 
process of developing defense policy and civil-military relations, it is necessary to consider Congress as 
an influential actor in defense issues.  
 
3. Military Transformation and American Militarism 
In order to analyze civil-military relations and defense policies for the internal front, I consider 
the framework of military transformation. In the second chapter, I argue that recent trends of military 
transformation can be a driving force in developing defense policies for both the development of 
strategies / doctrines & technologies and build-up the necessary & effective military capabilities.   
Theoretically, each era of military transformation gave a birth to representative products of time 
period when they were drafted and pursued (Paret, 1986; Millett, 1987). For example, the military 
                                                          
5 Due to the professionalism in military affair, the President has a control over both strategic and structural issues 
in military affairs. But being compared to strategic issues, the structural issues are more inclined to be overseen by 
Congress, due to the fact that Congress has the power of purse to authorize budget for dealing with structural 
issues.     
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transformation of the Napoleonic period changed the relationship between the armed forces and the 
national society (Paret, 1986). The rise of nationalism in 18th century France transformed the armed forces 
into the military forces dedicated to their nations. It also allowed Napoleon to develop and lead the French 
armed forces to their full potential (Paret, 1986). Napoleon used these transformed forces brilliantly and 
gained one-sided military victories during the period (Paret, 1986).  
In the early 20th century, Germany attempted to transform its armed forces with industrialized 
technologies and doctrines optimizing for these technologies (Paret, 1986; Millett, 1987). During the early 
years of both the World War I and the World War II, the German armed forces gained swift victories by 
making use of new technologies and doctrines designed to integrate these technologies into military 
organizations (Paret, 1986; Millett, 1987).   
In the United States, military transformations have given birth to the development of 
representative weapon systems6 to equip the US Armed Forces. Since the end of the Second World War, 
the US armed forces have put enormous efforts and resources for maintaining the national status as a 
global military superpower. On the way to achieve this national objective, the U.S. attempted to transform 
its weapon systems and military organization into ideal shapes to respond coming threats and to suppress 
the adversary during of the time (e.g. During the Cold War., it was the Soviet Union.). The products and 
legacies of these attempts of military transformation have been the representative weapon systems of the 
periods (Kagan, 2006).   
By analyzing the trend of military transformation since the end of the Cold War, I discover the 
link between weapon procurement programs and the trend of military transformations: for example, F-35 
                                                          
6 Every weapon systems have their own cause – reasons to be created. First, one weapon system could be 
designed to respond to specific threats. Second, one weapon system could be created to test certain technologies. 
Third, one weapon system could be developed to realize certain military doctrines -- ways to fight in the battle 
field. If one weapon system has a specific cause to be created, the weapon system might be called as 
representative weapon system of the specific cause.  
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Joint Strike Fighter is a useful case study to explain how the military technologies that was borne out of a 
perceived transformation have influenced the military in the period after the Cold War.   
 
A. F-35: Product of Military Transformation after the Cold War 
Considering that F-35 is the representative product of the military transformation after the Cold 
War, analysis on F-35 JSF program lead us to discover the link between F-35 and the military 
transformation after the Cold War. 
According to the official websites and several media coverage on F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
Program7, F-35 has prominent features as a jet fighter that can be considered it as a representative weapon 
system of the military transformation. First, F-35 is the fifth generation jet fighter which was designed to 
feature stealth capabilities (Briganti, 2012; CRS,2011; 2012). Second, unlike other military jet planes, F-
35 is the Joint strike fighter which means that this jet fighter was chosen and will be purchased by 
different military services, meeting need of all (CRS,2011; 2012). This is against the traditional practice 
of military services. Third, F-35 is an international jet fighter that thirteen countries have chosen to 
participate in the development and they have planned to purchase the jet fighter (CRS, 2011; 2012). 
Certainly, this program is one fine example of representative weapon systems that contain the core of the 
recent military transformation.  
Furthermore, I attempt to search for the hidden driving ideational force that created the trend of 
the military transformation rather than just accept the trend as granted. One possible answer is the 
                                                          
7 https://www.f35.com/about/history (as of Feb. 28. 2015); 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/f35.html (Lockheed Martin Homepage; as of Feb. 20);  
https://www.jsf.mil/index/htm (as of July 2013: The website was removed); CNNmoney, 2001, Defense Dept. taps 
Lockheed-Martin for $200B Joint Strike Fighter, October 26, 2001: 6:09 p.m. ET 
(http://money.cnn.com/2001/10/26/companies/strikefighter/); Robert Wall and David A. Fulghum, 2001, 
Lockheed Martin Strikes Out Boeing, Aviation Week’s BUBAI 2001 (http://aviationweek.com/site-
files/aviationweek.com/files/uploads/2015/01/2001-%20Lockheed%20Martin%20Wins%20the%20JSF.pdf);  
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traditional American belief – specifically, since the Second World War – that its armed forces must be the 
first ranked and finest armed forces in the World (Vagts, 1059; Bacevich, 2005; 2008; Lewis, 2012 ). This 
belief has been a basic foundation to build-up and maintenance of US Armed Forces. Furthermore, it also 
has generated the critical link between military services and defense industries (Bacevich, 2005; 2008; 
Lewis, 2012). If this tenet of the American culture of war are fused into one element through the link, 
eventually these elements might generate heated debates on the Revolution in Military Affairs in the late 
1990’s and the early 2000’s.  
The debates were not confined to those who were involved in defense related affairs 
professionally but also was widely spread along the US public. What enabled these widespread debates 
was a cultural trait rooted in the American society (Vagts,1959; Bacevich, 2008; Lewis, 2012). 
Consequently, this cultural trait has sustained since the end of the Second World War. The belief and 
cultural tenets is unique American form of militarism developed during the Cold War and the militarism 
has influenced the American people who have grown to accept large defense budgets and the status of the 
most powerful nation-state on Earth (Bacevich, 2005; Lewis, 2012).   Considering the electoral 
connection between members of Congress and their constituencies (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Fiorina, 
1989), the American militarism could influence decision making process in Congress.  
 
4. Politics of Weapon Procurement Programs 
In the second part of my dissertation, I approach defense policy by analyzing the decision making 
process in the executive branch and the legislative branch. Furthermore, I clarify how defense policy 
connects to participants during the formation of defense policy. 
 In the United States, national defense is one of the institutional missions of the US government. 
The US Constitution gives the executive branch the responsibility of developing and executing defense 
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policy. The Department of Defense is the primary military institution that is in charge of American 
national security.  
<Figure 1-1. National Security Council> 
 
Source: http://faculty.nps.edu/dl/pfp/articulate/03_players/player.html 
The Department of Defense is the part of the executive branch of the US government and it is 
under the authority and direction of the President. The Department of Defense is run by the Secretary of 
Defense, who answers directly to the President. The President has the National Security Council (NSC) to 
advise him of security matters. The NSC consists of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and 
the Director of the National Intelligence (DNI), Chairman of Joint Chiefs, the NSC chief advisor to the 
President, and other parties selected by the President. 
On the other hand, the legislative branch of the US government has authority to approve and 
oversee defense policy drafted in the executive branch. Considering the legislative authority of Congress 
over governmental affairs, Congress is the second most influential participant in the development of 
defense policy. Congress has the authority to pass bills which define the authority and resources for the 
executive branch to pursue their policy goals. For example, the annual federal budgets, which define the 
amount of funds to be spent by the Department of Defense, are determined jointly by both chambers of 
Congress. 
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When the US government develops defense policies to deals with external fronts, the executive 
branch has the primary responsibility and policy initiative to develop the strategies and doctrines through 
the Department of Defense. Even though Congress can sometimes hold congressional hearings on the 
military strategies and doctrines, the roles and authority of Congress over this domain has been limited for 
several reasons (Deering, 1989). However, when it comes to developing defense policies for the internal 
fronts, the Congress has more influence. Congress establishes the authorized strength of the Armed 
Forces including the number of men, tasks, and equipment, etc. Congress also has to approve the 
promotion and approval of senior leadership of the military. Moreover, it approves the budget to pay for 
what it has authorize. Congress has the power of purse to control the Federal budget process (Huntington, 
1961; Janowitz, 1974; Hays et.al., 1997). When it comes to the issue of defense budget, Congress can 
influence the defense policy by drafting, amending, and passing the defense budget bills.  
 
5. Congressional Budgetary Process and Defense Acquisition  
Annual defense budget consists of three major parts: ‘maintenance and operation,’ ‘weapon 
procurement programs,’ and ‘Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)’ (Choshroy, 2011; 
Lindsay and Ripley, 1992). The budget items in the maintenance and operation category include the 
salaries for military personnel and the cost of maintenance and repair for already purchased equipment 
and existing organizations (Choshroy, 2011; Lindsay and Ripley, 1992). The items in this category have 
been considered as the minimum-essential cost for military organizations to perform their institutional 
roles. Traditionally, these items have been approved without serious debates or consideration except for 
some extreme cases such as post-war periods and financial crises.  
RDT&E is the stage to develop and test weapon systems that fit the requirements of the 
Department of Defense and each service (Choshroy, 2011; Lindsay and Ripley, 1992). Considering the 
fact that every weapon system of the US military have passed through this phase,  RDT&E can be 
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counted as a part of weapon procurement programs or at least, it is closely connected to weapon 
procurement programs (Choshroy, 2011; Lindsay and Ripley, 1992).  
Weapon Procurement Programs are the programs that were previously chosen by the US 
government in order to equip the US military. The US military chooses the weapon systems that fit to its 
requirements and Congress confirms the purchases through the budget authorization process (Deering 
et.al, 1997; Sinclair, 2005; OMB, 2008). Even after the budget authorization process, Congress can adjust 
the amount of budget through the appropriation process (Deering et.al, 1997; Sinclair, 2005; OMB, 2008).   
Considering the characteristics of budget categories, new weapon procurement programs receive 
a great deal of the attention from members of Congress.  This is in part because items in this category are 
closely connected to the economic benefits of members’ districts. Since each member of Congress seeks 
to maintain a positive electoral connection with their constituents, congressional interests in weapon 
procurement programs, might be more considerable than that on other areas of defense budget. In 
addition, military related industries involved in weapons procurement are likely to encourage members to 
seek funding for industries located in their districts, further increasing the likelihood of Congress wanting 
to remain influential in the process of making the defense budget. The defense industry recognizes the 
importance of the communities and constituents. Moreover, it acts to gain and maintain support for its 
programs.  
For example, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is a weapon procurement program to equip 
three of services8. This characteristic led the program to more complicated situation. Three services have 
been tangled into the program in order to fit the F-35 into their requirements. Moreover, more than 46 
states have economic connections with the program9. Since the F-35 ISF program is intricately connected 
                                                          
8 Christopher Drew, “Costliest Jet, Years in Making, Sees the Enemy: Budget Cuts,” in New York Times 
Published: November 28, 2012 (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/us/in-federal-budget-cutting-f-35-fighter-
jet-is-at-risk.html?_r=0) 
9 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “F-35’s ability to evade budget cuts illustrates challenge of paring defense spending,” in 
Washington Post on March 9, 2013 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/f-35s-ability-to-
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with industries in a large number of congressional districts spread across the United States, it is no 
surprise that the program has received a great deal of attention from Congress. Since the industries that 
produce it will provide jobs to constituents of members of Congress, there is an automatic incentive for 
members of Congress to support the development and purchase of certain weapon systems.  By analyzing 
the F-35 JSF program, I can show how Congress can be involved into military procurement programs. 
This Analysis will offer the background knowledge to understand Congressional influence on defense 
policy, specifically weapon procurement programs.   
Considering the facts described above, which factors are the most influential determinants on how 
members of Congress will vote on bills regarding military procurement programs? My thesis is that 
national security is but a secondary matter, and a unique form of American militarism10 exerts greater 
influence in the House of Representative. American militarism has four components: culture, economic, 
ideological, and political.    
6. Summary  
My dissertation is intended to provide understanding about defense policy and congressional 
influence on it. I contend that military transformation after the Cold War has fostered development of 'the 
state of the art' weapon systems and the current weapon procurement programs are the legacy of the 
military transformation of this period. I also provide evidence to prove that American militarism in the 
Congress is the ideational and cultural driving force on the military transformation. Furthermore, I argue 
that American militarism has existed as ideological element in Congress and it will be discovered through 
legislators’ roll-call votes on amendments to annual defense budget bills. Additionally, I also attempt to 
distinguish two congressional budgetary process - authorization process and appropriation process and 
                                                          
evade-budget-cuts-illustrates-challenge-of-paring-defense-spending/2013/03/09/42a6085a-8776-11e2-98a3-
b3db6b9ac586_story.html) 
10 American Militarism is a tendency to manifest the United States in a romanticized view of soldiers to achieve 
ideal goals of democratization and civilization; a tendency to see military force as the truest measure of national 
greatness; and a tendency to have oversized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. (Bacevich, 2005)  
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shed light on the difference between each other. I contend that authorization process is more likely to be 
under the effect of American militarism than appropriation process. I am confident that I can prove these 
arguments by approaching this issue from the perspective of institutional congress as well as that of 
choice of individual legislator. 
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Part I. Politics of Military transformation after the Cold War 
Chapter 2: Historical Overview of Military Transformation and the 
Development of Militarism 
After the Cold War ended in the late 1980’s, the US government has attempted to change its 
military strategy and force structure. In 1992, the Joint chiefs of staffs developed the Base Force Plan11 as 
a part of national military strategy. The plan was mostly about downsizing of the US military, but this 
plan suggested the four supporting capabilities as the necessary conditions for the military forces to be 
effective after downsizing. The Bottom - Up Review (BUR)12 in 1994 attempted to find the right force 
structure for the military strategy, and further mentioned the modernization of military forces to 
complement the force structure. The term of military transformation appeared for the first time in the first 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)13 that was released in 1997. Since then, military transformation had 
been the primary defense policy to prepare for the future until the Department of Defense recalibrated the 
focus of defense policy from military transformation to evolution of military forces in the QDR published 
in 201014. Although they have different titles, there is a sharing point: all of them were plans to transform 
the US military.  
                                                          
11Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 1992, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY of the UNITED STATES, pp. 17-22 
12 Les Aspin, 1993, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Department of Defense), pp. 27-32 
13 William S Cohen, 1997, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense), Section VII, pp. 39-
52; Department of Defense, 2001, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Department of defense), V. Creating the 
U.S. military of the 21st Century, pp.29-48; 2006, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Department of defense), 
Reorienting Capabilities and Forces, pp. 41-59; 2010, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Department of defense), 
the Evolution of the Forces in Rebalancing the Forces Guiding, pp. 17-48, 2014, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 
(Department of defense), Chapter III. Rebalancing the Joint Force & Chapter IV. Rebalancing the Defense 
Institution, pp. 22-52.  
14 Department of Defense, 2014, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Department of defense), Chapter III. 
Rebalancing the Joint Force & Chapter IV. Rebalancing the Defense Institution, pp. 22-52.  
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In this chapter, I analyze what these plans were designed to achieve and how different these plans 
differ from each other. On the basis of this analysis, I scrutinize policy makers’ motivations for 
developing these plans for the post-cold war era changes in the US military and how major participants 
interact in the pursuit of military transformation.  
1. RMA, Military Transformation, Military Reform? 
Before evaluating the aforementioned plans, it is necessary to clarify the definition of similar 
concepts. When a serious change in military affairs occurs, three similar concepts are used to describe the 
change: Revolution in Military Affairs, Military Transformation, or Military Reform.  
First, a revolution in military affairs (RMA) is the idea that dramatic changes in any number of 
variables of war lead to fundamentally and radically different approaches to the entire military structure 
and its modus operand.15In this definition, the cause of an RMA is “dramatic changes in variables of 
war,” and the result of an RMA is “fundamental and radical change of approaches to the military structure 
and the way to use the military.” It means that the perspectives on the effectiveness of military 
organization are changed by variations of factors that determine the character of war. However, this 
definition of RMA does not necessarily specify the final shape of military organization and the way it 
operates. Moreover, the direction of changes are primarily subject to those who initiate and carry on the 
change in the military structure and the way to use it. In other words, a RMA does not mean a specific 
plan to bring changes to military structure or its functions. Rather, RMA is a broad trend of change in the 
way to approach to military affairs.  
                                                          
15 Bernard Loo(Ed.), 2008,”Introduction: Revolutions in military affairs: theory and applicability to small armed 
forces,” in Military Transformation and Strategy: the Revolution in Military Affairs and small State (Routledge: 
London) pp. 1-11.  
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As opposed to revolution in military affair, military transformation means a specific plan to bring 
changes to military structure and its functions16. When a dramatic change in variables of war occurs, the 
plan to change depends on how a subject perceives the change in variables of war. To be a dominant 
player in the changed environment of war, a subject pursues a RMA by reorganizing past perspectives in 
military affairs. On the way to pursue RMA, the subject develops certain plans to transform its military 
that is suited to the changed environment of war. The specific plans can be considered military 
transformation. While RMA means a broad change of perspectives on military affairs, military 
transformation means specific plans of a subject to transform its military. For example, the American 
military transformation in the post-Cold War era was the plans of the US government to transform its 
military into the ideal of the RMA as a final in order to be a dominant player in the changed environment 
of war that was sparked by technological innovations in the end of the 20th century17.  
Military reform is another concept to describe a significant change in military affairs. Compared 
to military transformation, military reform is the plan to change or reform a system damaged by the 
defects which make the system non-workable as planned or not function as effectively as possible18. 
Military reform is the process to remedy the causes of malfunction by changing the entire system, while 
military transformation focuses on changing the military to function well in the changed environment, 
military reform pinpoints specific problems that ruin the effectiveness of military organization. In the plan 
of the United States’ military transformation, a number of military reforms were included to remedy 
problems discovered on the way to pursue RMA.  
                                                          
16 Bernard Loo(Ed.), 2008; Frederick Kagan, 2006, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military 
Policy (Encounter book); Michael Vlahos, 2003, Perspectives on Military Transformation: Toward a Global Security 
Force (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physic Laboratory) 
17 Frederick Kagan, 2006, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (Encounter book); 
Major, Aaron. "Which Revolution in Military Affairs?: Political Discourse and the Defense Industrial Base." Armed 
Forces and Society. 35, no. 2 (Jan 2009): p.333; Beier, J. Marshall. "Outsmarting Technologies: Rhetoric, 
Revolutions in Military Affairs, and the Social Depth of Warfare." International Politics. 43, no. 2 (Apr 2006): 266-
280. 
18 Winslow T. Wheeler and Lawrence J. Korb, 2007, Military reform: a reference handbook (Praeger: Westport CT) 
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Military transformation is the right concept for analysis, considering that this dissertation focuses 
on how the US government attempted to change its military and factors. RMA is too broad to 
conceptualize the changes in military affairs of one county – the United States –, because RMA is a kind 
of trend. At the same time, military reform is too narrow to define the changes in military affairs of the 
US government, because its plan does not focus on specific defects in its military organization. Thus, the 
Military Transformation is taking place in context of the RMA. For the remainder of this research, I 
define military transformation as a specific plans of a country to transform its military in order to be a 
dominant player in a new environment of war caused by dramatic changes of factors that determine the 
nature of war. 
 
2. Theories of Military Transformation 
Wars are the collisions of forces. They do not break out with only one side. They require at least 
two sides. Since death and survival are determined by results of wars, each side must defeat others to 
guarantee their survival. So, wars are competitions for surviving in nature. To defeat others, they have 
strong tools – military or army –, which must be stronger than others. In addition to that, it is necessary to 
maintain a level of military effectiveness sufficient to defeat others. Consequently, every military must be 
effective and strong.  
Theoretically, sufficient military effectiveness is not determined by one factor rather by various 
factors that constitute warfare and wars themselves19. The most significant of those factors also has 
changed throughout the history of wars, and the factors themselves have also changed20. In order to 
maintain the effectiveness of military forces, the factors of warfare must be understood and military 
organizations need to be changed when some significant changes occur in these factors.  The concept of 
                                                          
19 Bernard Loo(Ed.), 2008, pp. 1-11. 
20 Bernard Loo(Ed.), 2008, pp. 1-11. 
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RMA captures well impact of the changes in factors of warfare and how these changes deeply influence 
the way to evaluate the effectiveness of military organization. Through history, humanity has gone 
through RMA.  The three most notable were the transformation from hit and thrust weapon to chemical 
based weapon which is gunpowder21, from gunpowder weapons to nuclear weapons22, and the 
development of airpower23. All these three technological inventions significantly revolutionized the 
conduct of war.  
In practice, not every change in military affairs is considered as an RMA. It is still debatable how 
to judge whether significant changes in military affairs is an RMA. As an analytical framework, Eliot 
Cohen offered three criteria to examine whether a change in military affairs is an RMA24: to be 
considered as a RMA, first, it has to change militaries’ shape – organization and weapon systems; second, 
it has to change the processes of battles – the way militaries behave in the battle fields; third, it has to 
change the outcome of battles – what defines the winner and loser, and how militarily effective the winner 
is against the loser. With the framework of Elliot Cohen’s three criteria, it is possible to discover the 
impact of each change in military affairs on warfare and wars themselves. Even though there is no 
orthodox answer in the literature of military history regarding historical moment brought RMA like 
changes, there has been a consensus that the following two historical turning points can be considered as 
recent examples of RMA: Napoleonic warfare in the 18th century, German Blitzkrieg theory in the 
interwar period25.  
                                                          
21 Gunther E. Rothenberg, 1986, “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the 
“Military Revolution of the Seventeenth Century,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to Nuclear Age 
(Peter Paret ed.)(Clarendon Press, London), pp. 32-64  
22 Lawrence Freedman, 1986, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in in Makers of Modern Strategy: 
from Machiavelli to Nuclear Age (Peter Paret ed.)(Clarendon Press, London), pp. 735 – 778. 
23 Giulio Douhet, 1927, “The Command of the Air,” in Roots of Strategy Book 4 (David Jablonsky ed., 1999,) 
(Stackpole Books, PA), pp. 267 – 307. 
24 Eliot Cohen, 2008, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” in in Military Transformation and Strategy: 
the Revolution in Military Affairs and small State (Routledge: London) pp. 22 - 26. 
25 Bernard Loo(Ed.), 2008, pp. 1-11. 
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Both cases well satisfy the criterion. In the case of Napoleonic warfare in the 18th century, it 
changed the composition of military organization in France. The French Army of Napoleon consisted of 
citizens who were filled with loyalty toward France. The French Army was motivated by patriotism. This 
gave them an advantage over the mercenary army of other European states. Concept of citizenship 
mattered. These loyal citizens enabled the French Army to be organized into smaller units which were 
called divisions instead of corps26. The smaller the unit, the more mobile and agile the unit. The division 
system made the French army more mobile than any other militaries in Europe during the period of the 
Napoleonic war27. By combining infantry units with other arms such as artillery and cavalry into a 
division, the French Army maximized the effectiveness of various arms28. These changes in the French 
army also brought changes in doctrines and operations in the battle fields. The French army took 
advantage of the internal line of communication. The French Army moved their divisions faster than the 
Coalition Army’s reaction, achieving the relative superior rate of forces in the battle fields. By using 
combined arms tactic, the French Army defeated the Coalition Army. The outcomes were also lopsided. 
Even though the Coalition Army was much larger than Napoleon’s French Army, the French Army 
crushed the Coalition Army in most battles before the defeat at Moscow.  
  In the case of the German military during the Interwar period, the invention of the tank and 
airplane in the First World War and development of combined armed operational doctrine also known as 
Blitzkrieg revolutionized warfare during the Second World War29. The attributes of the tank30 –speed & 
mobility (quickly moving), protection, survivability (armored) , fire power, and surprise – were combined 
with the attributes of airplane31 – speed, fire power, freedom – in a coherent doctrine that maximized 
                                                          
26 Peter Paret, 1986, “Napoleon and the Revolution in War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to 
Nuclear Age (Peter Paret ed.)(Clarendon Press, London), pp. 123 - 132.  
27 Peter Paret, 1986, “Napoleon and the Revolution in War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to 
Nuclear Age (Peter Paret ed.)(Clarendon Press, London), pp. 123 - 132.  
28 Peter Paret, 1986, pp. 135 - 138.  
29 Michael Howard, 1986, pp. 584 – 588.  
30 Michael Howard, 1986, pp. 559 – 562. 
31 Giulio Douhet, 1927, “The Command of the Air,” in Roots of Strategy Book 4 (David Jablonsky ed., 1999,) 
(Stackpole Books, PA), pp. 276 – 277. 
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those capabilities. The German military was transformed into a mechanized unit equipped with armored 
vehicles with internal combustion engine which made possible the tank. The internal combustion engine 
increased the speed of the German mechanized units, and armored vehicles offered German soldiers 
protection from machine guns. These changes in the German military brought the concept of blitzkrieg32. 
Mechanized armored units broke through the enemy’s defense position with the close air support and 
artillery fire. By maneuvering mechanized armored units quickly into the deep rear area of enemy 
territory, the German Army attacked the center of gravity of enemy forces and paralyzed the enemy’s 
ability to resist. With the concept of blitzkrieg, the German military defeated the Allied forces of Britain 
and France in the early phase of the Second World War. The Allied forces could not effectively respond 
to the German offensive, and the British Army even abandoned their equipment behind and retreated to 
Britain at Dunkirk in 1939. 
In both cases, France in the 18th century and Germany in the interwar period effectively and 
successfully transformed their militaries into the new shapes and with their ideal shape and new concepts 
of operations. They also achieved swift military victories against enemies in larger quantity. However, 
these transformations in military organizations and doctrines did not happen by the effort of military 
alone. In both cases, there was social and political support from the national society. In the case of 
Napoleon’s French Army, the French Revolution prior to the Napoleonic war brought fundamental social 
changes within France, which eventually transformed the composition of the French Army and the 
capabilities of the individual soldiers33. The coup of Napoleon Bonaparte after the French Revolution also 
changed the political situation within the French society34. The French Army of Napoleon had the social 
and political support from the French people. In the case of Germany during the interwar period, there 
was an explosive mood of nationalism within Germany against the Treaty of Versailles and the harsh 
                                                          
32 Michael Howard, 1986, pp. 584 – 588. 
33 Peter Paret, 1986, pp. 138 – 140. 
34 Peter Paret, 1986, pp. 124 – 127. 
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economic environment that development after the Great Depression35. This mood of nationalism and 
hardship united the German people, and brought the Nazi party on the German political scene. Moreover, 
the re-armament of Germany was not possible without political support. The experience of the First 
World War and the threat of a two front war motivated the experimentation that resulted in Blitzkrieg 
operational doctrine36. The explicit expansion of re-armament was coincided with the rise of the Nazi 
party in power37.  Consequently, both cases might have not occurred without political and popular support 
from national society and the people.  
The RMA in the late 1990’s also satisfies the criteria of Elliot Cohen38. The transformation of the 
US military after the Cold War was the plan to change the US military’s shape and doctrines pursuant to 
the trend of the RMA. Considering these facts, the American military transformation after the Cold War 
must have been supported by the US public and politicians in Congress.  
3. Militarism in the United States 
In a society, political and public support for the military depends on the relationship between a 
society and its military. The relationship is defined by the roles of the military and the affinity between 
the military and its society39.  On the one hand, the military is an organization which has a unique role to 
manage armed forces in the society and to protect the society by the use of force in waging wars40. In this 
sense, the relationship between society and military is determined by how effectively and efficiently the 
military accomplishes its roles of managing and using armed forces. On the other hand, military is a part 
                                                          
35 Michael Howard, 1986, pp. 554 – 572. 
36 Michael Howard, 1986, pp. 572 – 594. 
37 Michael Howard, 1986, pp. 572 – 594. 
38 Eliot Cohen, 2008, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” in in Military Transformation and Strategy: 
the Revolution in Military Affairs and small State (Routledge: London) pp. 22 - 26. 
39 Samuel P. Huntington, 1959, The Soldier and the State (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA); Morris 
Janowitz, 1960, The Professional Soldier, (Free Press, Glencoe IL); James Burk, 2002, “Theories of Democratic Civil-
Military Relations,” in Armed Forces and Society/Fall 2002 Vol.29, No.1. (Sage Publication) pp. 7-10; Eliot Cohen, 
1997, “Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?: Civil-Military Relations,” in Oribis Spring 1997,pp. 177 – 186.  
40 Samuel P. Huntington, 1959; Morris Janowitz, 1960; James Burk, 2002; Eliot Cohen, 1997. 
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of society so that military has affinity with its mother society41. The military also shares core values and 
ideology of the society. The core values and ideology might be reflected in its military as the way of war 
and as the form of culture in military42. In this sense, the relationship between the society and the military 
is defined by how the society is reflected in its military.  
Considering that the military is a part of a nation – and it is an organization under a national 
government which is in charge of governing the nation –, each government of nations has political 
authority over the military in regards to building, maintaining and using the armed forces43. When a 
government builds military, it designs the military to well reflect the national ideology and constitution. 
When it maintains military, it wants the military to be ready for war by training and equipping efficiently. 
When a government uses its military forces, it expects the military to be effective enough to win wars.  
All these issues of exercising political authority over the military lead a national government to 
the expectations about how the military would perform what missions in the name of national defense. 
That expectation might be focused on pure military affairs with military purpose only, while these 
expectations are likely to be about more than pure military affairs.  
Vagts describes 'military way' as the way that a military is maintained with the philosophy that 
assumes that a military is performing its mission on the basis of pure military purpose - winning at war44. 
He further explains that military ways is marked by primary concentration of men and materials on 
winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with the least expenditure of 
blood and treasure – limited in scope, confined to one function, and scientific in its essential qualities45.  
On the other hand, he defines 'militarism' as a vast array of ideas and culture associated with military but 
transcending true military purpose by explaining that it may permeate all of society and become dominant 
                                                          
41 Samuel P. Huntington, 1959; Morris Janowitz, 1960; James Burk, 2002; Eliot Cohen, 1997. 
42 Samuel P. Huntington, 1959; Morris Janowitz, 1960; James Burk, 2002; Eliot Cohen, 1997. 
43 Samuel P. Huntington, 1959; Morris Janowitz, 1960. 
44 Alfred Vagts, 1959, “Introduction – The Idea and Nature of Militarism,” in A History of Militarism (Meridian 
Book), pp. 14-32 
45 Alfred Vagts, 1959, pp. 17 - 22. 
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over all industries and arts46. He further warns that militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and 
defeat the purpose of the military – rejecting the scientific character of the military way and displaying 
the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief47.  
In reality, military is maintained in both the military way and the militaristic way.48 The very 
nature of armed forces – including organization, size, technologies and dispositions – is determined by 
multiple factors such as political structure and situation, economic conditions of the country, level and 
quality of the threat in the security environment, disposition and support of the people, expectations of 
allies, strategic culture of the nation-state, culture of the individual services and technologies available at 
a given time. It means that any military has some features of military way which are scientific and related 
to military functions and other features of militaristic way which are too much distracted by social aspects 
other than true military purpose. In this sense, every nation which has its own military has specific 
features of militarism in the society no matter how dominant they are within the society. In general, 
features of militaristic ways are evidenced by “ceremonial appurtenance”, “anti-revolutionary”, 
“conservative ideology”, “imaginary individualism”49.  
The United States has militaristic features in the US military and American society. In the United 
States, there is a belief that the US military should be number one in the world50. Moreover, the belief is 
further extended in the idea that the U.S. Military can be an asset that promotes peace and prosperity in 
the world and the use of force can be justified by good causes such as democracy and human rights51. It 
has been reflected in several poll results asking the US public about the US military52. This American 
                                                          
46 Alfred Vagts, 1959, pp. 17 - 22. 
47 Alfred Vagts, 1959, pp. 17 - 22. 
48 Alfred Vagts, 1959, pp. 24 - 32. 
49 Alfred Vagts, 1959, pp. 14 - 32. 
50 Adrian R. Lewis, 2012, “2. Traditional American Thinking About the Conduct of War,” in American Culture of War 
2nd Edition, (Routledge, New York), pp. 23-37. 
51 Gallup polls on Military and National Defense. ((http://www.gallup.com/poll/1666/military-national-
defense.aspx) 
52 Further details on the poll results are in the pages of 32-24. 
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public belief takes various shapes of military imperatives which connect every part of society with 
military and lead them to cooperate and support the realization of these imperatives. First, the belief asks 
the society to maintain military superiority in every possible environment and circumstance on planet 
earth. Second, the belief asks the society to maintain the industrial bases that produce the weapons and 
technologies required for military superiority. Third, the belief asks the society to advance military 
science and technology, in order to produce the next Revolution in Military affairs. Fourth, the belief asks 
the society to maintain a professional All Volunteer Force which is not dependent on conscription or 
draft. Fifth, the belief asks the society to secure the United States of America without wars in the 
mainland continent. All these military imperatives asks each part of American society to participate in 
shaping American military forces.   
Within the US military, this belief has led the Department of Defense and military services to 
competition against the Soviet Union during the Cold War era and endless preparation for the future 
adversary in the situation of strategic uncertainty after the Cold War era. This trend of preparation for the 
future has been sustained even while the US military was engaging in two theater - level military 
operations in the Middle East after the attack of September 1153. In order to maintain the top position in 
military affairs, the department of defense and military services have brought new concepts of war 
fighting and have developed weapon systems and military doctrines that realize the new concepts of war 
fighting54. These efforts have been best embodied in the continuing pursuit of military transformation 
since the Second World War ended55.  
Defense related industries have well supported military’s effort to be number one in military 
affairs56. Defense industries have invested enormous amount of money in research and development of 
advanced military technologies and weapon systems. Even when these technologies were not 
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54 See Chapter 3. 
55 See Chapter 3. 
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sophisticated enough and incomplete, the US military has purchased them and encouraged defense 
industries to keep investing in Research and Development57. In this sense, the relationship between 
military and industries has been symbiotic rather than simple vendor – buyer relationship. When the US 
government planned a large scale build-down of armed forces after the Cold War, one of the main 
concerns was how to preserve the capabilities of producing military equipment and how to save industrial 
bases which enabled the US military to keep military superiority during the Cold War period58.   
In the political arena, Congress has been the main source of influence on military affairs. Even 
though foreign policy and use of force have been primarily under the influence of the executive branches 
such as the White House and Department of Defense, Congress has the authoritative power of funding 
military programs and governmental oversight regarding military and defense policy. Furthermore, issues 
in military affairs are under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees in both chambers of 
Congress. Most members of both committees have the experience of military service and come from 
regions which are connected with the military in aspects of demography or regional economy59. These 
attributes of committee members guarantee proper representation of regional interests and position of 
military services, while they also lead committee members’ decisions to be distracted by other issues such 
as regional economy and inter-service rivalry, rather than effectiveness of military forces, which also can 
be considered signs of militarism.  
4. Social and Political Context of the Military Transformation: What is 
the background of the military transformation?  
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The military transformation in the post-Cold War era was the plan to realize the ideals of 
Revolution in Military Affairs. The plan of military transformation was a large scale project and did not 
come out without political and public support. Despite it was primarily about to increase military 
effectiveness, it was also maintained in militaristic way. The links between military transformation and 
militarism in the United States are the plan of military transformation, Congressional responses to 
military transformation, and public opinion regarding military issues and military transformation.  
To transform ‘something’ means changing the object's characteristics into other forms with 
specific intention or targets to arrive. In order to discover the meaning of a transformation, it requires to 
trace what has been changed and to shed light on the specific goals planned to achieve. However, military 
transformations of military organizations and doctrines do not come out by the effort of military only. It 
requires social and political support from the national society. When studying a military transformation, it 
needs to consider the effect of environment in which the transformation is on the way. This can be 
domestic, social or international (global). Those factors of the environment can generate the driving or 
withholding forces behind the scene. 
The transformation of the US military after the Cold War was based on the concept of Revolution 
in Military Affairs, and it was the plan to change the US military’s shape and doctrines in order to follow 
up the trend of the RMA60. Considering these facts, it is probable that the US military transformation after 
the Cold War also had the social and political context that led the process of the military transformation.   
A. Congress 
One indicator measuring the political context of the military transformation is how Congress 
responded to the reports regarding the military transformation such as the Base Force Plan, the Bottom – 
Up Review Reports and the QDRs.  
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When the secretary of Defense and the chairman of joint chiefs bring national military strategies 
to Congress, the strategies have been presented in front of the committees of both chambers – House 
Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee61. Looking closely at how defense 
related legislative issues have been dealt in Congress, the committees have enormous influence on the 
military related issues. Most hearings have been held in the Committees and its sub-committees. Most 
issues are so military oriented, that other than members of the committees would not understand the 
issues comprehensively.  
B. Public opinion 
One indicator measuring the social context is the public opinion of American people. A couple of 
Gallup polling results on military issues well describe how the American public think about their military 
during the period of the military transformation – from 1992 to 2014. The first poll asked the American 
public if they were considering the US military as the number one in the World or one of the several 
leading militaries62.  
         <Figure 2-1. Gallup poll regarding number one military in the world> 
 
   Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1666/military-national-defense.aspx 
                                                          
61 During the period from 1995 to 2000, the House Armed Services Committee had been renames as the House 
National Security Committee.  
62 See Figure 2-1. 
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The poll covers from 1993 to 2013.  More than half of the respondents – the lowest was 50%, the 
highest was 64% – replied that they thought the US military was number one, while little bit less than half 
of them – the highest was 47% and the lowest was 34% – considered the US military as one of the several 
leading military powers. 
         The other poll asked how American public felt the strength of the US military – stronger 
than it needs to be, not strong enough or just right63. The Poll covered from 1990 to 2012. Around 50% of 
the respondents – from 41% to 64% – felt that the US national defense was about right and more or less 
than 10% of them – from 6% to 15% – thought that the national defense was stronger than it needed to be, 
while around 40% of the respondents – from 17% to 47%, the second lowest was 32% – answered that the 
national defense was not strong enough.  
   <Figure 2-2. Gallup poll about ‘military strong enough’ >  
 
  Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1666/military-national-defense.aspx 
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 The point to notice is that more than 30% of the American public – except for 17% in 1990 – 
have thought their military as "not strong enough" as well as almost half of the American public have 
considered their armed forces as not "number one" but "one of several." 
Another Gallup poll asked that if American public felt that it was important that the United States 
should be number one in the world military64.  The poll covered from 1993 to 2013. Around 60% of the 
respondents – from 59% to 70% – has felt that it was important that that the United States should be 
number one in the world military, while the rest of them – from 29% to 39% –thought that it was not 
important.  
<Figure 2-3.Gallup poll regarding ‘important to be number on military in the world> 
       
Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1666/military-national-defense.aspx 
These polling results tell us that the majority of the American public – around 60% – think their 
military needs to be the strongest one in the world; at the same time, considerable portion of the American 
public – around 30% – are not satisfied with their military.  These public beliefs can offer supporting 
arguments to the US government to build up additional military capabilities in order to keep the status of 
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"number one military in the world" and to satisfy the American public. These beliefs also can lead the US 
to an increase in defense spending, if the beliefs are recognized and accepted by influential political actors 
such as members of Congress, Department of defense, or defense industries and related interest groups.  
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Chapter 3. Militarism and Military Transformation – The US Military 
 
The Cold War was a competition between two superpowers - the United States of America and 
the Soviet Union. Each side considered the other as the prominent and urgent adversary, and they built up 
military capability to fight against each other. They spent enormous national resources to obtain 
technological superiority in the military field. In a situation like this, if one side disappeared as the 
consequence of competition, the other side might consider shifting the national priorities from military 
competition to other social areas such as education, welfare and commerce. Similarly, when the Cold War 
ended, it seemed inevitable for the United States to downsize its military. The United States did not have 
any reason to maintain large armed forces that were built to confront massive Soviet military forces. 
Nonetheless, the official documents released by the related government agencies such as the White House 
and the Department of Defense show that the US government considered other plans to change its 
military’s shape based on the broader picture of national security rather than just downsizing it – the 
United States attempted to transform its military65. The question is why the US government had to 
consider the military transformation even after the primary source of threat disappeared.  
Looking back at the international environment of the early 1990's, the US is not the only 
government to pursue transforming its military after the Cold War. Singapore did it, and Britain also did 
it66. Even some states who did not have clear adversary threats attempted to transform their militaries67. 
They shared one common feature: the Revolution in Military Affairs68. Nonetheless, in contrast to other 
national governments - whose primary concerns were their national economies; and who heavily focused 
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on cost-effectiveness of military spending - , the military transformation of the US government was too 
ambitious and quasi-imperialistic69. This is because the military transformation was not the plan for the 
imminent and existing threats but the plan for the unknown and unseen future challenges. 
Furthermore preparation for the future was not a function of real world threats but a function of 
forces within the United States70. It started with the development of the Base Force Plan. 
1. Base Force Plan 
During the Bush administration (1989-1992) – the first administration after the end of the Cold 
War-, the Armed services of the US military faced the pressure of downsizing after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The US military reviewed its status under the guidance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
staffs, General Colin Powell, and “the Base Force plan” was released as the product of the review 
process71. In the Base Force Plan, the United States changed its military strategy from the 2 and ½ 
strategy to the 2 major regional contingencies strategy72. To implement this strategy of regional 
contingencies scenarios, the Base Force was suggested as the minimum force structure to be maintained 
under the budgetary constraints and in the uncertain international environment of the 1990’s73. 
This strategic change began with the intent of Colin Powell who served as the assistant to 
President in national security affairs during the Reagan administration and became the chairman of the 
joint chiefs later in the Bush administration. He eye-witnessed the inevitable change within the Soviet 
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Union during his visit to Moscow with President Reagan74. He had confidence that it would not be 
necessary for the United States to prepare for global scale military conflict because the Soviet Union 
would not exercise a strong enough influence that could turn a regional contingency into a global scale 
conflict as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War period75. On this assumptions, he suggested shifting 
the focus of the US military strategy from global scale military conflicts to regional scale military 
contingencies76. He divided the whole globe into two regions – the Atlantic region and the Pacific 
region77. For the US military to perform effectively in these regions, he argued that the US military was 
required to maintain contingency force to respond to various military contingencies and strategic force to 
deter the use of weapons of mass destruction78. He and his team developed various contingency scenarios 
under the strategy for dealing with possible contingencies in these two regions – the Atlantic and Pacific 
regions79. The Base Force Plan mentioned the Persian Gulf and Korea as the most likely regions where 
regional military contingencies would break out80.  
This strategy – 2 Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) strategy – became the logic and the base 
line to determine the scale and structure of military forces to be maintained in the beginning of the Post-
Cold War period. The base force is the product of this deliberative process to determine the force 
structure to perform the ‘Two Major Regional Contingencies Strategy’ after the Cold War ended. 
However, the military, including Chairman Colin Powell, did not have a comprehensive picture 
of threat assessment for the coming years of the post-Cold War era81.  He argued that it was difficult and 
impossible to visualize all the sources of threat and to develop specific scenarios to respond to them in 
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situations of strategic uncertainty82. Instead, he and his team paid attention to the concept of warning of 
war that was discussed and developed in the Roundtable of Warning (ROW) in 198883. The ROW 
recognized the difficulty of determining precise warning times at the end of the Cold War and offered the 
identification of multiple warning patterns as the analytical tool which was applicable in a regional as 
well as a global context84. This new concept of warning gave the Chairman Colin Powell and his team the 
idea that if early warnings with proper quality are offered in advance, it is possible to respond to various 
situations with the reduced force structure85. When supporting capabilities for the Base Force were 
discussed, this idea about the early warning was later connected to the plan to use space as the essential 
part of Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C3I) and related to the series of Research 
and Development (R&D) to maintain technological superiority86.  
One point which needs to be mentioned is the impact of the Gulf War on the Base Force Plan. 
Scrutinizing the process of development of the base force concept, I focused on the fact that the Gulf War 
broke out in the middle of the process. The Gulf War broke out in October 1990 by the invasion of Iraqi 
forces into Kuwait, and it ended in February 1991. The Base Force plan was signed by the chairman of 
the joint chiefs, reported to the Secretary of Defense and the President, and released to the United States 
public on the 27th of January in 199287. Considering that the Gulf War brought a swift victory to the 
United States, it would have affected the Base Force plan which had been prepared in two years advance 
and was released in one year after the war ended. According to the Joint History Office of the Office of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the war itself did not make any significant change on the force 
structure that was suggested in the Base Force Concept88. In other words, the result of the Gulf War 
supported the restructuring program and gave the green light to pursuing the plan further into the designed 
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direction. It means that, at least, the Gulf War and its result satisfied the Joint Chiefs of Staff – the 
organization that developed the Base Force Plan.  
The Base Force plan did not end with the suggested force structure only. It also included further 
recommendations for the modification of the reduced force structure89. To maintain global stability in the 
21st century, the plan argues that further investment would be required for the Base Force Plan to perform 
effectively and for the reconstitution of the US armed forces in the event of global conflict90. The plan 
prescribes that these investments should focus on how to move the forces swiftly (transportation), how to 
use Space (space technology), how to retain reserve forces to regenerate forces (reconstitution), and how 
to maintain technological superiority (research and development)91. These recommendations show that 
the plan was not just suggesting an alternative force structure but also urging further military to achieve 
the transformation of the United States Armed forces.  
The Base Force plan was not the product of an ideal type of deliberation for developing defense 
policy. When the plan was developed, there were various and vague assumptions about security 
environment but no clear picture of threat assessment. A strategic uncertainty was prevalent in the late 
1980’s and the early 1990’s. Four facts were certain: first, the influence of the Soviet Union was not the 
same as it had been; second, the military was under the pressure of budget constraints; third, the military 
should be functioning well even after downsizing; fourth, technological changes particularly the 
development of stealth technology and precision weapons appeared to change the nature of warfare92. 
Under these circumstances, military services made enormous effort to prevent relentless downsizing by 
arguing that there were not clear evidences of the changes in threats from the Soviet Union93. In order to 
persuade military services about the inevitability of downsizing, the Joint Chiefs of Staffs attempted to 
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start formulating the requirements of military forces under the guidance of logic – or strategy – of two 
major regional contingencies, instead of a specific picture of threat assessment94. In the end, they offered 
the structure of the Base Force as the answer. 
However, the lack of a clear picture of threat assessment led the plan to two problems later: first, 
the force structure in the Base Force concept was too small to successfully fight two MRC scenario; 
second, the potential adversaries being assumed in the two MRC scenario did not have the same strong 
military capability as the Soviet Union had in the Cold War era95. In the first case, the problem could have 
led the US armed forces into an additional military build-up to accomplish the scenario. In the second 
case, the problem could have led the US Armed forces into a development of new military doctrine and a 
transformation of the US Armed forces.   
2. Bottom-Up Review 
Congressman Les Aspin, later the Secretary of Defense during the Clinton Administration, 
expressed negative opinions toward the Base Force Plan as the chair of Armed Services Committee in the 
House96. He pointed out that the Base Force was not the product of deliberations based on clear strategic 
goals and visible threats in the future97. He argued that the size and capabilities of the US Armed Forces 
should not be determined in a vacuum (without threat assessment) but based on the forthcoming threats. 
He insisted that a new force structure should require a series of reviews (e.g. the Bottom-Up Review 
(BUR)) on security environment, military strategy and military posture98. He further argued that the 
review would guide how to build the size and capabilities of the US armed forces99. The idea of building 
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new force structures to respond to new threats brought the concept of military transformation during the 
Clinton administration.  
The Bottom-Up Review was an attempt to reevaluate the validity of the whole content in the Base 
Force Plan, which was in the National Military Strategy of the United States in 1992100. The primary 
author of this document was the Defense Secretary Les Aspin, who previously had served as the chairman 
of the Armed Services Committee in House of Representatives. He explicitly mentioned negative 
expressions about the Base Force plan and claimed that the plan required a full scale review during his 
last years of tenure at the House101. After taking the office of the Secretary of Defense, he pursued a full 
scale review process on the military structure of the United States. The main purpose of the review was to 
evaluate how well the military strategy (the strategy of Two Major Regional Conflicts) matched with the 
force structure (the size of the Base Forces)102.  
When the report described the possible scenarios under the assumption of two major regional 
conflicts, the term of “nearly simultaneously two major conflicts”103 was used.  By continuing to use the 
term of ‘simultaneous’ two major conflicts, the report recognized the inevitability of the strategy of 2 
MRC. The report stated that the strategy based on ‘only one MRC scenario’ would put restrictions on 
strategic flexibility of the US military. The report further explained that it would be probable for potential 
aggressors to provoke the US militarily while the US was engaging with other country in a military 
conflict. While warning that this situation would lead the US into undesirable consequences, the report 
recommended the US military should prepare for more than one military conflict at one time.  
However, by using the word of “nearly simultaneously”, the report showed that the United States 
was not in the conditions that could allow the US military to maintain the size of forces which satisfied 
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the ideal requirement for the strategy of 2 MRC104. Even though the force structure for two RMC was 
chosen as the optimal option in the report, the chosen force structure in the report was not twice the 
quantity of the estimated force structure for one conflict in numerical aspect105. To explain this, the report 
brought the logic of balanced force mixes. The logic is based on the following assumptions: first, every 
component in military has its own purpose; second, it is difficult to choose the right force structure under 
strategic uncertainty, and focusing on a certain component will make entire military vulnerable to respond 
to unexpected threats; third, a component can compensate for the reduction of other components and 
substitute for others under various circumstances; fourth, it is possible to generate balanced force 
structures by mixing the capabilities of each components in military forces; fifth, the U.S has allies in 
both the Pacific and the Atlantic Regions who can contribute to US force structure106.  
While reducing the size of forces with the logic of balanced force mixes, the report raised the 
necessity for review of force modernization107. The report evaluated the principal weapons procurement 
programs and research & development programs. It pointed out that modernization programs needed to be 
readjusted because the programs were developed to respond to threats from the Soviet Union108. The 
report argued that modernization programs should be re-focused on preparations for what comes next 
instead keeping alive the legacy weapon programs that were designed to fight against the Soviet Union109. 
In addition to the future operational needs and the changing characteristics of unclear threats, the core 
considerations in the review process on modernization were to preserve the capacity of the military 
industrial base under the fiscal constraints and to develop technologies to provide enhancements to the 
capabilities of the US weapon system110.  
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The recommendations of the report were to stop the unnecessary weapons procurement programs, 
to continue the production of mission essential programs, and to keep investing in R&D programs that 
were necessary to respond to the existing threats and forthcoming ones. The essence of the 
recommendation was that almost all major R&D programs – except for the development of space lifter 
launch vehicles – survived : for jet fighters, A/F-X and MRF programs were merged into Joint Advanced 
Strike Technology Program111; for theater missile defense system, the decision was to continue all three 
major development programs such as Sea Based Upper Tier system, Corps SAM, and ascent/boost phase 
intercept capabilities, even though Corps SAM was deferred until 1998112; for national missile defense, 
the Department of Defense decided to fund Brilliant Eye missile tracking satellite113; for military satellite 
communication, development of advanced EHF satellites was decided to be continued114. All these 
programs were evaluated as necessary for the operational needs for the military strategies as well as 
beneficial for US defense industrial bases of the United States under the fiscal constraints in the early 
1990’s. In this sense, the report of the Bottom-Up review offered specific options of necessary weapons 
procurement programs for the strategy of 2 MRC, while the base force plan established the corner stones 
of military transformation by suggesting the strategy of 2 MRC.  
By evaluating the Base Force Concept and the Bottom-Up Review, I conclude that there was no 
foreseeable threat to the US after the fall of the Soviet Union and the US military was in the position to 
prepare for every possible scenario that might happen in the World. The two MRC scenarios was a 
guideline and a logic to set up the minimum size of military forces required in uncertain security 
environments.  Moreover, because there was no primary source of threat, the US government attempted to 
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adjust their military not on the basis of clear external threats but on the basis of capability to respond to 
the tentative scenarios – this is the capabilities based approach.   
The congressional evaluation on this report was controversial: On the one hand, the content of the 
report itself seemed not to satisfy the members of Congress; on the other hand, the review process in the 
report was considered as an essential and necessary step to develop national defense policy115. The result 
of deliberation on the Bottom-Up Review was the Military Force Structure Act of 1996116, which 
mandated a comprehensive report on a quadrennial review of military force structure – Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR).  When the House passed the Annual National Defense Authorization Act of FY 
1996, the House representatives inserted the Military Force Structure Review Act in the bill. The Act 
stated that the Bottom-Up Review had been criticized on points including its strategic assumptions, the 
recommended force level for the strategy, and the ways to fund the force structure117. Despite critical 
appraisal, there was the consensus in Congress that the review process of the Bottom-Up Review was the 
necessary step to develop national defense strategy and to determine the force structure of the US military 
under the strategic uncertainty since the demise of the Soviet Union118. In addition to that, the Act 
mentioned that more frequent comprehensive reviews of military force structure would be required due to 
the pace of global change119. The Act mandated the Secretary of Defense to report the result of 
comprehensive review of national defense one year after a new administration begins as the result of a 
presidential election120. Basically, the report that was mandated in the Act will be the outline of the 
defense policy of a newly began administration and the report will be published every four years, 
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matching the four year presidential term. The report is the Report of Quadrennial Defense Review, five of 
which have been published since the first QDR was released in 1997121.  
The military transformation of the US Armed Forces has been a critical issue of defense policy in 
these five QDRs. The term, the military transformation, appeared for the first time in the QDR 1997122. 
The military transformation got into the main policy objectives in the QDR 2001 and 2006123. In the QDR 
2010 and 2014, the military transformation itself was not described as a major policy issue but the terms 
of “Rebalancing” and “Evolution of Military Forces” appeared as the means to deal with the flaws of the 
military transformation and to manage the programs and projects that were set up for the military 
transformation124. It means that every administration since the Clinton administration considered the 
military transformation as a critical issue of defense policy, even though the position of each 
administration on the military transformation was quite different from previous administrations.   
3. QDR 1997 
The first QDR represents the national defense policy of the Clinton administration. The military 
strategy in the QDR 1997 was still based on the assumption of strategic uncertainty as were previous 
reports such as the Base Force Plan and the Report of Bottom – Up Review. Except for the large scale 
conventional wars that the US military had primarily prepared for during the Cold War era, there was a 
variety of small scale contingencies including peacetime engagements in crisis during the late 1990’s. The 
concept of full spectrum operations was developed to prepare for executions of various military 
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operations in the wide range of crisis spectrum125.  The Full-Spectrum Operations was the conceptual 
answer to the changing characteristics of warfare and uncertain security situations during the post – Cold 
War era: not to prepare for a single primary source of threats but to be ready to respond to various types 
of threats126.  
Nonetheless, the main framework for the force structure of the US military was the two Major 
Theater Wars (MTW) scenario which implies that the US military needs to maintain the force structure to 
execute more than one theater-scale military conflict simultaneously127. In this sense, the two Major 
Theater War scenario shared the same strategic logic with the two Major Regional Contingencies scenario 
that General Colin Powell brought up when he and his team developed the concept of the Base Force in 
the National Defense Policy in 1992 as well as the two Major Regional Conflicts building blocks in the 
Report of the Bottom – Up Review. Despite the similarity of the logic, the recommendations for the force 
structure in the QDR 1997 were distinguished from those in the previous reports in two senses. First, it 
focused more on the capabilities of the US military. The change of the term from “Major Regional 
Conflicts” to “Major Theater Wars” implies that the US military would not have the force structure that 
limited itself to specific regional threats but should maintain the capabilities and the force structure that 
enable the US military to perform military operations in more than one theater scale war no matter where 
a war takes place. This also means that the US military strategy departed from the threat-based approach 
even in regional scale to the capabilities based approach. Second, the QDR 1997 recommended that the 
force structure satisfied the requirements of the near term but also be transformed into the appropriate 
shape to respond to the future challenges. The QDR 1997 mentioned that the technological development 
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of the time would change the way to build the force structure and the force structure would differ from the 
ones that previous reports recommended128.  
Nonetheless, the concept of military transformation was still premature and vague when the QDR 
1997 was published. With regard to the urgency of military transformation, the QDR 1997 considered the 
Joint Vision 2010 as the guideline for the military transformation129. Even though the Joint Vision 2010 
contained critical elements of military transformation like joint-ness, full-spectrum dominance, and 
advanced technologies, this document was not a practical solution for military transformation but a broad 
conceptual description about warfighting with superior capabilities under strategic uncertainty. Along 
with the ideas described in the Joint Vision 2010, the QDR 1997 also emphasized the unpredictability of 
future security environment and the imperative to maintain military superiority130. With the assumption of 
unpredictable future, the QDR 1997 supported the concept of the full spectrum dominance which implied 
that the US military should secure essential capabilities for military superiority to perform any kinds of 
missions under any circumstances in the future131. The military transformation was the plan to obtain 
these capabilities and to develop appropriate methods to implement the required capabilities in the battle 
field.    
Even though the military transformation in the QDR 1997 was vague and premature, the QDR set 
out the critical conceptual bases for the military transformation. First, the QDR 1997 pursued the 
exploitation the Revolution in Military Affairs132. The QDR 1997 put the Revolution in Military Affairs at 
the center of the military transformation and considered it as the conceptual guideline that could lead the 
military transformation in the right direction and into the ideal shape. Second, the QDR 1997 contained 
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the vision of the US military to conceptualize the military transformation133. Based on the Joint Vision 
2010 which contained the vision of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, each service 
developed its own plan for the military transformation: Force XXI and the Army After Next for the Army, 
Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force for the Air Force, From the Sea and 
Forward for the Navy, and Marine Corps Operational Maneuver for the Sea for the Marine Corps134. 
Third, the QDR 1997 offered the force modernization plan that would function as the bridge between the 
force structure of that time and the one of the future. Even though the QDR recommended reducing the 
overall number of weapon procurement, it suggested replacing the aging weapon systems with the new 
weapon systems that were still in the stage of R&D.135  The QDR 1997 also saved several weapon 
systems by delaying the time of deployment and putting them in the R&D stage for more modification 
and research.136 In conclusion, the idea of military transformation was conceptualized in the QDR 
published in 1997 as visions of each military service and the Department of Defense, in order to realize 
the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs, even though it did not have specific and detailed 
programs or projects that represented the military transformation. 
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4. QDR 2001 
In the QDR 2001, what started as a vision in the QDR 1997 was developed into a comprehensive 
policy objective that had a clear blueprint for the future force structure.137 Military transformation became 
the center piece of the QDR 2001, which was the defense policy during the first term of the Bush 
Administration138. The QDR 2001 drew the legitimacy of military transformation from capabilities based 
approaches to force planning. The QDR 2001 argued that maintaining superior capabilities would be the 
only option to respond to various contingencies under the strategic uncertainty139. In addition to that, the 
QDR 2001 argued that the US military should develop the necessary military capabilities for the future in 
order to keep military superiority in key functional areas of military competition such as power 
projection, space and information140. In the QDR 2001, the military transformation was considered as the 
means of developing the necessary capabilities in these key functional areas and to change the force 
structure into the proper shape to exercise these capabilities.  
The framework of force planning in the QDR 2001 was to maintain the force structure that 
enables military operations anywhere in the globe, not focusing the specific regions such as North East 
Asia and South West Asia141. By changing the term from the major theater wars of the QDR 1997 to the 
major combat operations of the QDR 2001, the force structure in the QDR 2001 moved away from the 
regional based structure and took into the shape of more capabilities oriented structure142. This framework 
required information superiority for early warning, advanced network technologies for communication, 
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effective combat capabilities of forces for warfighting, and high mobility for force projection143. The 
QDR 2001 mentioned that the force structure of the year of 2001 was not adequate to satisfy these 
requirements so that it was necessary to transform the US military into the shape which fits a global basis 
of military operations144.  
 For the military transformation, the QDR 2001 focused on organizing force structure able to 
conduct joint operations anytime necessary145. The QDR 2001 also emphasized developing operational 
concepts to respond to emerging operational challenges and testing these operational concepts through 
experimentation and field exercises146. The center pierce of the military transformation in the QDR 2001 
was the development of capabilities: the layered missile defense for protection, sea & air – lift capability 
and ‘light but lethal expedition modular units for force projection, littoral vessel and new tactical aircraft 
for defeating anti - access and area denial threats, and new information technologies for information 
superiority147. Specifically, the QDR mentioned information operations, intelligence and space assets as 
the core capabilities of future forces for the transition to network centric warfare148. Differing from the 
previous QDR and other reports regarding military transformation, the QDR 2001 contained the 
Department’s specific intention to develop the military transformation into the plan with time line and 
clear goals149. The QDR 2001 specified the Office of the Force Transformation as the organization that 
would lead the process of the military transformation and it also offered the interim stage of 
transformation plans of the Services as well as the final goals of the whole process of the military 
transformation150. In conclusion, the military transformation in the QDR 2001 changed into the core 
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policy objective of national defense which had a comprehensive plan with the responsible organization to 
lead the process, the specific time line and the clear goals to achieve, the military strategies and doctrines 
to be the basis of military operation, military procurement programs and R&D projects to equip the armed 
forces, and budget plans to fund these programs and projects.  
5. QDR 2006 
The QDR 2006 still considered the military transformation as the core policy objective, even 
though the United States was engaged in two military campaigns in South West Asia: one in Iraq and the 
other in Afghanistan151.  It was emphasized many times in the QDR 2006 that the report was not a new 
start but under the momentum of the QDR 2001152. Specifically, in the matters of military transformation, 
the QDR 2006 mentioned that the QDR was the part of continuum of transformation in the Department of 
Defense and the focus of the military transformation was to provide warfighting capabilities for the future 
in the decades ahead153.  
The logic for the recommended force structure in the QDR 2006 was described in the concept of 
the wartime force planning construct. While describing the refined wartime force planning construct, the 
QDR 2006 explicitly mentioned that the Department should increase its capabilities to conduct operations 
against enemies who employ asymmetric approaches154. The QDR 2006 counted ‘homeland defense,’ 
‘war on terror & irregular warfare,’ and ‘conventional campaigns’ as the three objective areas of the 
wartime force planning construct155. For the objective of homeland defense, the QDR 2006 recommended 
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increasing the capabilities necessary to work with other agencies156 and provide homeland defense with 
unique functions of the US military157 including air and missile & maritime defense. For the objective of 
war on terror and irregular warfare, the QDR 2006 emphasized increasing intelligence capabilities to 
locate and track terrorists, strike capabilities to eliminate terrorist threats158, communication capabilities to 
share information and to connect with related agencies, and counterinsurgency capabilities to gain support 
and cooperation from indigenous forces159. For the objective of conventional campaigns, the QDR 2006 
proposed the strategy and the capabilities to wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns while 
selectively reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression160. The strategy also assumed 
the other case in which one conventional campaign might occur while the US was engaged in an irregular 
campaign with a long duration and a large scale161. Regime change was considered in the strategy as a 
possible option to deal with a hostile regime against the US162.  
The emphasis on increasing capabilities led the force planning construct to the military 
transformation. Rather than presenting its own version of military transformation, the military 
transformation in QDR 2006 focused on reorienting the capabilities and the forces for developing joint 
capability portfolios for the wartime force planning construct and future demand163. The QDR 2006 
offered ten domains of joint capabilities164 including Joint Warfighting Capabilities, Anti - WMD 
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capabilities, Joint Mobility for global engagement, and Capabilities for achieving net - centricity. Based 
on these ten joint capabilities domains, the QDR 2006 attempted to evaluate the ongoing process of 
military transformation that was initiated in the QDR 2001165. The lessons learned from combat 
experiences and demands from the combatant commanders were counted as important factors in the 
evaluation process166.  On top of the interim evaluation about the military transformation, the QDR 2006 
also spelled out the direction and tasks of military transformation for the future force structure. These 
directions and tasks were embodied in weapon procurement programs and R&D projects that would 
realize the visions of ten domains of joint capabilities: modular brigades with future combat system for 
Joint Ground Forces, insertion & extraction capabilities into denied areas for Special Operations Forces, 
the fifth generation jet Fighter program and UAV (Unmanned Arial Vehicles) for Joint Air Capabilities, 
Littoral Combat Ship programs and the Maritime Pre – Position Force programs for Joint Maritime 
Capabilities, continuing New Triad priorities167 and information protection policies168 for Tailored 
Deterrence and New Triad, establishing the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as the primary agency 
dealing with WMD and expanding CBRNE units  for combatting WMD (Weapons of Mass Destructions), 
procuring additional C-17 & C/KC-130 and C-5 modernization for Joint Mobility, the Space Radar 
program including other space enabling capabilities and E-10A technology demonstrator program for 
Joint ISR, the Global Information Grid program and the Transformational Satellite program for achieving 
net centricity, and the Global Force Management Program and establishing Standing Joint Forces 
Headquarters for Joint Command and Control169.   
                                                          
165 Department of Defense, 2006, “Reorienting Capabilities and Forces,” pp. 41 – 59. 
166 Department of Defense, 2006, “Reorienting Capabilities and Forces,” pp. 41 – 59. 
167 Department of Defense, 2006, “Reorienting Capabilities and Forces,” pp. 49 – 51. 
168 Department of Defense, 2006, “Reorienting Capabilities and Forces,” pp. 55 – 61. 
 
169 Department of Defense, 2006, “Reorienting Capabilities and Forces,” pp. 55 – 61. 
53 
 
 
 
 
6. QDR  2010 
Differing from the previous two QDRs, the QDR 2010 did not address the military transformation 
as the core policy objective. Instead, the QDR 2010 presented the four primary defense objectives which 
were drawn to manage the international security environment including the on-going wars in South West 
Asia170. The four primary defense policy objectives included prevailing in the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, preventing and deterring conflicts, preparing to defeat adversaries, and preserving and 
enhancing the All - Volunteer Force171. On the basis of the evaluation on the status of the US military 
forces in 2009, the QDR 2010 argued that it was urgent for the US military forces to be rebalanced to 
accomplish the four primary defense policy objectives172.  
The military transformation, which was initiated in the QDR 2001, was redirected to the plan of 
the evolution of forces as a part of the Rebalancing the Forces in the QDR 2010173. In the shortfall in the 
capabilities and capacity of forces, the QDR 2010 suggested the tradeoffs between programs that would 
redirect resources from lower-priority programs into the high priority programs174.  The QDR 2010 also 
forecast that there some cases would not be remedied through investment on new system or additional 
force structure and those cases would require greater investment on costly research and development 
programs or concept exploration projects175. To lead the initiatives to meet the future operational needs, 
the QDR 2010 presented the four capability areas – ISR, fighters and long-range strike aircraft, joint 
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forcible entry, and information network and communication – as the vectors of evolution of forces176. In 
conclusion, the military transformation in the QDR 2010 was the wrapping up phase of the military 
transformation initiated in the QDR 2001 and the process of searching for the new vectors that would lead 
the direction of another military transformation.  
7. QDR 2014 
The most recent QDR was published in March 2014. Comparing to the QDR 2010, the QDR 
2014 had a significant change in strategic assumptions. The QDR 2014 proposed the transition from the 
wartime strategy that focused on the on - going wars in South West Asia to the peacetime strategy that 
was prepared for future challenges177. While the QDR 2010 focused on winning two wars in South West 
Asia and balancing resource and manpower for the defense policy objectives, the QDR 2014 emphasized 
defending homeland and managing risks in the force structure caused by fiscal constraint and 
sequestration in the defense budget178.  
The QDR 2014 followed the same direction expressed in the QDR 2010 in the matters of the 
military transformation. As in the QDR 2010, the center piece of the QDR 2014 was the rebalance of the 
forces rather than the transformation of the US military forces179. As the wars in South West Asia went 
into the ending phase, the fiscal constraints became the critical factor to determine defense planning. The 
fiscal constraint began to influence every part of defense policy and bring significant changes into the 
force structure of the US military180. The QDR 2014 described the strategy for the conventional campaign 
as defeating a regional adversary in a large - scale multi – phased campaign, and at the same time denying 
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the objectives of another aggressor in another region181. The QDR 2014 also implicitly expressed a 
concern about the situation that a smaller military force under the fiscal constraint would strain the ability 
to simultaneously respond to more than one major contingency at a time182. It means that the US military 
considered changing the strategic guidance of ‘responding to two major campaigns simultaneously’ for 
the first time since the two major regional contingencies scenario was developed in the National Military 
Strategy in 1992.  
The fiscal constraint and sequestration level budget cut also affected the military transformation 
that remained as the major part of defense policy objectives since the military transformation was 
specified as the vision of the US military in the first QDR published in 1997. Even though the military 
transformation was not explicitly mentioned as the core policy objective in the QDR 2014 as well as the 
QDR 2010, the military transformation was still the major part of defense policy. Considering the fact that 
most programs of the military transformation were targeted to be mission operable by the year 2020183, 
these programs were still in the phase of research and development or production. The fiscal constraint 
and the sequestration level budget cut urged the Department of Defense to determine the fate of the 
procurement programs and R&D projects that were initiated to realize the vision of the military 
transformation184. The determination was done through the prioritization of programs. The following are 
the programs that were prioritized through the QDR 2014 decisions: F-35 JSF program, development of 
the long range strike aircraft with stealth capability and the KC-46A next generation tank/cargo aircraft 
for Air force;  selective upgrade of combat and support vehicles and investments in new technologies for 
Army; investments to start SSBN (X) submarine construction in FY2021, the Offensive Anti-Surface 
Warfare weapons, Next Generation Land Attack Weapon, Virginia Payload Module, and F-35 programs 
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for Navy; upgrade of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle and investment on capabilities that enables littoral 
maneuver for Marine Corps185.  
Instead of the military transformation, the QDR 2014 considered the innovation and adaptation of 
the forces as the paramount and central line of effort. The innovation and adaption in the QDR 2014 was 
defined as seeking innovative approaches to ‘how to fight’, ‘how to posture the forces’, and ‘how to 
leverage the asymmetric strength and technological advantages’186. When addressing the necessity of 
maintaining the technological superiority through developing new capabilities, tactics, techniques, and 
keeping procedures effective as well, the QDR 2014 presented energy efficiency, new technologies, and 
renewable energy sources as the objectives for leveraging the asymmetric strength and technological 
advantages187.  Even though the innovation and adaptation in the QDR 2014 covered the domain that has 
been considered as part of the military transformation in the previous QDRs, it is difficult to consider this 
policy agenda as a part of the previous military transformation or as another plan of new military 
transformation which can replace the previous military transformation. Rather, the innovation and 
adaptation in the QDR 2014 can be counted as an interim initiative to search the direction or concept for 
another military transformation in the coming future.   
8. Summary 
The US military transformation during the post - Cold War era was the attempt to transform the 
US military – including the military strategy, doctrine, force structure, and weapon systems – after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. The military transformation was based on the idea of Revolution in Military 
Affairs, which focuses on applying revolutionary advance of information technologies of the 1990’s into 
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the military sphere. It has been the core defense policy objective of the Department of Defense for longer 
than 20 years, from 1992 to 2014.  
It started with the Base Force Plan in the National Military Strategy published in 1992.  The Base 
Force Plan was the force structure that was required to maintain in order to conduct two major regional 
contingencies scenarios. The report of the Bottom – Up Review in 1994 assessed the validity of the Base 
Force Plan. While the report of the Bottom – Up Review agreed with the two MRC scenario as the logic 
of the force planning construct, it also suggested further reducing the size of forces and adjusting force 
modernization plan to the changing security environment. The report of the Bottom – Up Review 
included initiation of new R&D projects to equip the military forces as well as cancellation of 
unnecessary force modernization programs. Since 1997, the Department of Defense has published the 
report of the Quadrennial Defense Review every four years. These five Quadrennial Defense Review 
Reports contain the core contents of the military transformation. In the QDR 1997, the military 
transformation was presented as the vision plan of the Department of Defense and the military Services. 
Through the QDR 2001 and 2006, the military transformation was changed into the major policy 
objective which has a specific time frame and clear goals to be achieved.  As the wars in South West Asia 
came down into the ending phase and the fiscal constraint was aggravated, the priority of defense policy 
was moved from the military transformation into the rebalance of forces in the QDR 2010 and QDR 2014. 
In addition, as the due time for the military transformation comes, the Department of Defense and the 
Services have tried to search new concepts for another military transformation in the name of the 
Evolution of Forces and the innovation & adaptation of forces in the QDR 2010 and QDR 2014. 
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Chapter 4. Militarism and Military Transformation – Congress and Public 
 
 
In a society, political and public support for the military depends on the relationship between a 
society and its military. The relationship is defined by the roles of the military and the affinity between 
the military and its society.  On the one hand, the military is an organization which has a unique role to 
manage armed forces in the society and to protect the society by use of force in waging wars. In this 
sense, the relationship between society and military is determined by how effectively and efficiently the 
military accomplishes its roles of managing and using armed forces. On the other hand, military is a part 
of society so that military has affinity with its mother society. The military also shares core values and 
ideology of the society. The core values and ideology might be reflected in its military as the way of war 
and as the form of culture in military. In this sense, the relationship between the society and the military is 
defined by how the society is reflected in its military.  
Considering that the military is a part of a nation – and it is an organization under a national 
government which is in charge of governing the nation –, each government of nations has political 
authority over the military in regards to building, maintaining and using armed forces. When a 
government builds military, it designs the military to well reflect the national ideology and constitution. 
When it maintains military, it wants the military to be ready for war by training and equipping efficiently. 
When a government uses its military forces, it expects the military to be effective enough to win wars.  
All these issues of exercising political authority over military lead a national government to the 
expectations about how the military would perform what missions in the name of national defense. That 
expectation might be focused on pure military affairs with military purpose only, while these expectations 
are likely to be about more than pure military affairs.  
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Vagts describes 'military way' as the way that a military is maintained by the philosophy that 
assumes a military is performing its mission on the basis of pure military purpose - winning at war188. He 
further explains that military ways are marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on 
winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with the least expenditure of 
blood and treasure – limited in scope, confined to one function, and scientific in its essential qualities189.  
On the other hand, he defines 'militarism' as a vast array of ideas and culture associated with military but 
transcending true military purpose by explaining that it may permeate all of society and become dominant 
over all industries and arts190. He further warns that militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and 
defeat the purpose of the military – rejecting the scientific character of military way and displaying the 
qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief191.  Nonetheless, in reality, military has both characters of 
military way and militaristic way (or militarism). It is maintained in both ways.  
 In this sense, every nation – which has its own military – has a type of militarism which can be 
defined as a culture of war or military culture. The United States of America cannot be an exception. She 
also has a type of militarism – American militarism. The primary source of American militarism is the 
belief that the U.S. military should be number one in the technological aspect192. This belief requires the 
U.S. military to be maintained in a military way rather than in a militaristic way. The existence of this 
belief has been proved by several polls regarding public opinion about the U.S. military193. Furthermore, 
in a democratic country like the United States, a shared public opinion has political influence. In the 
                                                          
188 Alfred Vagts, 1959, “Introduction – The Idea and Nature of Militarism,” in A History of Militarism (Meridian 
Book), pp. 14-17. 
189 Alfred Vagts, 1959, pp. 14-17. 
190 Alfred Vagts, 1959, pp. 14-17. 
191 Alfred Vagts, 1959, pp. 14-17. 
192 Andrew J. Bacevich, 2013, “Wilsonians under Arms,” in The New American Militarism, (Oxford University Press, 
New York), pp. 1-9; Chalmers Johnson, 2001, “The Root of American Militarism,” in The Sorrow of Empire: 
Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (Metropolitan Books, New York), pp.39-66;   Adrian R. Lewis, 2012, 
“2. Traditional American Thinking About the Conduct of War,” in American Culture of War 2nd Edition, (Routledge, 
New York), pp. 23-37; 
193 Gallup, Military and National Defense (http://www.gallup.com/poll/1666/military-national-defense.aspx) 
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United States, a representative system in politics is the mechanism to transmit public opinion to political 
representatives.  
When the U.S. public share this belief, they also influence their political representatives - 
president in national level, senators and house representatives in state and congressional district level. On 
the other hand, the committee system in the US congress is the mechanism in which most business under 
a jurisdiction is dealt with in Congress. When it comes to military issues, most issues are under the 
jurisdiction of the armed services committees of both chambers. Considering that the committee system in 
congress is organized to offer professional and special information to all members of each chamber, the 
decisions in the chambers are under the influence of committees whose jurisdictions cover the issues.  
1. Committees’ Responses to the Military Transformation 
A. The Base Force Plan194 
During the post-Cold War era, the Department of Defense officials went through a complicated 
situation in which they were required to draft a comprehensive defense policy without prominent threats, 
under a fiscal constraint, and just after a military victory against one of the strong militaries – Iraq. The 
Senate Armed Services Committee held a series of hearings in 1992 in order to question the Department 
of Defense about the security environment being described as ‘strategic uncertainty’ and to discuss 
possible policy options for the U.S. Armed Forces to be militarily effective and fiscally affordable.  
The hearings – Threat Assessment, Military Strategy and Defense Planning – covered various 
issues such as security environment (Jan 22, 1992), nuclear weapons options (Jan 23, 1992), defense and 
federal budget (Feb 19, 1992), military strategy in Europe (Mar 2, 1992), and defense planning and force 
structure (Mar 20, 1992). The hearings related to ‘defense planning and force structure’ proceeded under 
                                                          
194 This is the summary of the hearings. United States Senate, 1992, “Military strategy, Net Assessment and 
Defense Planning and Budget issues,” in Threat assessment, military strategy, and defense planning : hearings 
before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, 
January 22, 23; February 19; March 3, 20, 1992. (U.S. G.P.O, Washington D.C.). 
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the subtitle of Military Strategy, Net Assessment, and Defense Planning and Budget Issues. The Base 
Force Plan was the main focus during the hearings, because the Base Force Plan had a specific meaning 
as a defense plan to set up a blueprint for the force structure of the post-Cold War era.  
The main witness was the chairman of the joint chiefs, General Colin Powell. He was quite 
confident about the Base Force Plan195. During the hearing, he kept arguing that the force structure of the 
Base Force Plan was a reasonable one to satisfy the national military strategy in the security environment 
under budgetary constraint196. In the drafting process of the Base Force Plan, his main focus was to 
suggest a proper force structure that would satisfy the military strategy under budget constraint197. The 
suggested force structure was much smaller than the force structure during the Cold War era198. Force 
reduction was inevitable due to the national economic crisis in the early 1990’s as well as the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The inevitability of force reduction urged General Colin Powell to develop a plan with 
which he could manage the process of force reduction at an affordable rate – from the Cold War force 
structure to the ‘new’ force structure for the post- Cold War era199.  
The main issues in the hearing were how to design the force structure and how to reduce the 
current force size to the ‘new’ force structure in a manageable way200. Before the Senate hearing, there 
was a debate between Congressman Les Aspin (D-WI) and General Colin Powell in the House of 
Representatives201. As the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Aspin 
criticized the base force plan as not reflecting the change of security environment in which the Soviet 
Union collapsed and the CIS was divided into 15 different states in 1993202. He further argued that the 
                                                          
195 United States Senate, 1992, pp. 457 – 461.  
196 United States Senate, 1992, p. 472. 
197 Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 1992, National Military Strategy of the Unite States. 
198 United States Senate, 1992, pp. 473 - 478. 
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199 United States Senate, 1992, pp. 467 - 468. 
200 United States Senate, 1992, pp. 485 - 490. 
201 United States Senate, 1992, pp. 490 - 493. 
202 These two events occurred after the National Military Strategy had developed in 1992. Congressman Les Aspin 
argued that the Soviet Union got weaker than assumed in the National Military Strategy in 1992.  
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force structure could be reduced more than the plan in the national military strategy of 1992, and the 
reduction should be determined based on the plausible scenarios that reflected the security situation of the 
time203. Furthermore, he offered the four options of force structure that were suitable for possible 
scenarios under the strategic environment of the time204. Eventually, House members voted to pass the 
defense authorization bill of 1993205 that would cover option C of Aspin's plans. Considering the fact that 
option C was a similar plan to the base force plan, it seemed that House members did not support the 
radical options but chose a more flexible one among Aspin's recommendations. Contrary to the aggressive 
reduction recommended by Congressman Aspin, Senator Wallop expressed doubts about the effectiveness 
of the force structure in the Base Force Plan206. Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) argued that force 
reduction was so fast and radical that the base forces would not satisfy “the Iraq equivalent capability”207. 
He also pointed out that once the force structure was reduced, the reconstitution of forces would not be as 
“idyllic” as it was described in the Base Force Plan208. 
Toward the criticism that the Base Force Plan did not reflect the security environment of 1993, 
General Collin Powell argued that even though the planners of the base force plan had not precisely 
predicted the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the plan assumed similar situations that were 
equivalent to the case of the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union209. He also criticized changing the force 
structure swiftly as inappropriate whenever any change in security environment happened, specifically in 
the era of strategic uncertainty210. Instead, he claimed that it was necessary to build up a force structure 
                                                          
203 Debate on National Defense – Hon. Les Aspin (Extension of Remarks – April 03, 1992) 
204 Debate on National Defense – Hon. Les Aspin (Extension of Remarks – April 03, 1992); United States Senate, 
1992, pp. 461-467. 
205 This vote was not scheduled on the hearing but during the authorization process for the annual budget. The 
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206 United States Senate, 1992, pp. 507 – 509.  
207 United States Senate, 1992, p. 507.  
208 United States Senate, 1992, p. 508.  
209 United States Senate, 1992, “Anticipating the Break-up of the Soviet Union,” pp. 510- 513; pp. 500-501; Senator 
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210 United States Senate, 1992, pp. 513- 518. 
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that might work effectively in various possible scenarios in the strategic environment of the post - Cold 
War era211. 
Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee also questioned the assumption about the 
roles and level of involvement that the allies would take in the strategy of Two Major Regional 
Contingencies212. They asked whether further reduction in force structure would be possible if the allies 
took more responsibilities and roles of combined operation plans in the regions213. Colin Powell 
responded that the US military should prepare unilateral operation plans in the situation of allies not 
working for the US due to domestic political situations214.  
The inevitability of force reduction led the hearings in how to build down the force structure 
without significant damage in the aspects of effectiveness and the quality of soldiers. The most 
highlighted issue was the personnel problem – how to reduce service members and civilian employees in 
the Department of Defense and each military service215. Despite the disagreement about the force 
structure, most committee members agreed that if the process were not managed in a “smart” way, large-
scale force reduction would cause serious social problems and affect the quality of forces in the end216. 
General Colin Powell advocated base force reduction as the right force for the future and claimed that 
further reduction below the Base Force Level would diminish the effectiveness of forces and the morale 
of service members217. He also pointed out that the military was a “very human organization,” so 
Congress should take care of the soldiers who left the military through the implementation of force 
reduction218.  
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Force reduction also led the members of committee to debate the Base Closure and Re-alignment 
issue and the industrial base issue219. Along with active military forces, the reserve component was also a 
target of force reduction. Senators Strom Thurmond (R-SC), who had military installations related to the 
National Guard, argued that the National Guard was more efficient than active components and that 
National Guard units could perform better by giving more support to them. He also stated that the plan of 
too much reduction in the National Guard would not gain support from Congress220.  
The committee members also questioned the effect of force reduction on industrial bases. They 
were concerned about losing the capability to manufacture equipment and weapon systems that had been 
developed during the Cold War era221. Specifically, B-2 bombers and Sea-Wolf class submarines were 
mentioned as the target of procurement reduction222. Considering the fact that those weapon systems were 
equipped with the most sophisticated and state of the art technologies of the time, closing important 
industrial bases such as shipyards and manufacturing facilities might undermine the industrial capacity to 
equip the military forces in emergencies. General Powell explained that the department would keep alive 
the facilities that were related to core technologies; and even if there were a reduction in weapon 
procurement, necessary parts of weapon procurement programs would be funded to keep them moving 
along as a part of Research and Development223.  
Senator John Warner (R-VA) raised the issue of four different air forces224 in the US military. He 
asked if these four different air forces were necessary; if it was recommendable to merge them into one 
air force. General Colin Powell answered that all four air forces have unique missions and roles for each 
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military service that they were supporting, and merging them into one air force would undermine military 
effectiveness during the mission225. 
Overall, the hearing was going quite smoothly. The Base Force Plan was evaluated as a “very 
strategy driven” document in the aspects of force structure and supporting capability for the force 
structure. There were some disagreements about which weapon depots or bases would be closed, but, 
mostly the committee members understood the security environment of the post-Cold War era and the 
strategy to deal with it in a big picture of national defense policy.  
B. Bottom –Up Review 
During the hearing on the report of the Bottom - Up Review in the House, almost every member 
of the House Armed Services Committee did not support the bottom up review226. The criticism was that 
the report was budget driven; the force structure did not match the strategy; it was based on a higher level 
of risk than the Department assumed; and it did not show a clear picture of how to prepare for the 
future227.  
The first criticism was that the plan in the report was ‘budget driven’ instead ‘strategy driven’228. 
Representative John Kyl (R-AZ) and Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO) pointed out that the report 
focused on how to reduce the force structure as much as not to compromise the capability that the U.S. 
Military could execute the two MRC scenario strategy229. Representative Kyl (R-AZ) argued that, by 
allowing only a slight margin – which means narrow strategic reserve – , this plan would put too much 
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burden on the current force structure and it would increase the fatigue of forces; eventually, the plan 
would compromise the capabilities of US military – if not today – in the long term230. 
Second, the committee members argued that the suggested force structure in the report was not 
enough to execute the military strategy231. Basically, the strategy for force construct was the Two Major 
Regional Contingencies that was also the strategy for force construct in the Base Force Plan. They warned 
that similar strategic goals with a reduced force structure led the force construct and military doctrine to 
be too complicated232. In fact, the report suggested three force construct options that cannot be understood 
without further explanation about the methodology used for the development of the options233. In 
addition, the representatives argued that the force structure was developed on the basis of ‘very’ 
optimistic threat evaluation that was narrowly focused on the security environment of the time234. 
Considering the strategic uncertainty that prevailed during the 1990’s after the Cold War ended, narrowly 
focused and too optimistic threat evaluations could not help but be harshly criticized during the hearing in 
the House Armed Services Committee.   
Third, Representatives Ike Skelton (D-MO) criticized the report for accepting a higher degree of 
risk than recommended in the Base Force Plan235. He pointed out that both plans were developed to 
satisfy the absolute minimum with the level of “Low to Moderate Risk” which was based upon the risk 
assessment from Joint Military Net Assessment236. During the hearing, Representatives Ike Skelton (D-
MO) and Representative Martin Lancaster (D-NC) also asked what caused the difference between the 
Base Force and the Bottom - Up Review Force in the matter of absolute minimum force structure with the 
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same level of risk assessment in the similar security environment of strategic uncertainty237. They further 
questioned if bottom up review force was developed on the basis of higher risk acceptance, and they 
argued that the higher risk level might link to the higher casualties on the ground238.  
Fourth, the committee members criticized the report for not having a clear vision for the future. 
When the chairman of the committee asked the second panel in the hearing if the suggestions in the 
Bottom –Up Review were proper proposals for national defense, all the witnesses of the panel expressed a 
concern that the suggestions in the report would be successful only in the short term – a couple of 
years239. John L. Peterson criticized the report for not offering proper options to deal with even five to 
seven years ahead and recommended having “a long range kind of strategy” that could deal with 
extraordinary changes in the 1990’s240. John E. Kring mentioned that there would be better way to build a 
force structure with the same condition that was described in the report241. Elliot A. Cohen witness argued 
that it was a very serious problem if fundamental issues of the post-Cold war era would not be solved 
with this document242. Altogether, they urged the Department of Defense to have “some kind of first order 
rethinking” while warning that it might be much harder to do a few years later243. 
They also discussed the concept of RMA and the impact of on-going changes in the field of 
technology244. Peterson argued that the world was going through revolutions in technology including 
information technologies, nanotechnology and energy technologies, and the changes in these technologies 
would change the landscape of war and warfighting245. They recommended transforming the US military 
into the shape that could contain the extraordinary changes in technology and respond to the threat 
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coming from potential future adversaries who might willingly use these technologies against the United 
States246.   
In the midst of harsh criticisms, there was one proponent for the plan who argued that the 
problem of the report was not the answer – contents of the report – but the question that was given to the 
authors –intent and purpose247. Krings pointed out that the authors were asked to write a plan that would 
satisfy the budget constraints, and further defended the report of the Bottom –Up Review by mentioning 
that the process to get to the answer was sound and proper; and the answer was the best one available 
under the specific assumptions of the report248. He concluded that the review process was excellent 
because it enabled accurate cost estimation to maintain force structure and analyze availability of force 
structure within the boundary of budget249.   
In the two party system of US politics, it is unusual that almost every committee member from 
both parties disagree with contents of a report and express negative evaluations on policies described in 
the report that was published in the name of a federal agency and an administration. Particularly, defense 
policy has been the domain in which the executive branch – the White House and the Department of 
Defense – has policy initiatives. In this perspective, harsh criticism toward the Bottom - Up Review was 
unusual. What caused harsh responses to the Bottom-Up Review was the intent with which this report 
was prepared as well as the specific policy contents contained in the report.  
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All the criticisms came from the purpose of the report. This report has ‘bottom up’250 in the title, 
and these words define the characteristics of the report251. In the bottom-Up budgeting process, all the 
units’ costs are calculated individually – so the cost for each part will be calculated only for the part itself. 
For example, a division of the army will calculate the operational cost for the division itself. If there are 
10 division in the army, there will be ten different cost estimates, each for a division. In order to develop 
the total budget in the bottom up process, the first task to be done is ‘doing the inventories’ to figure out 
how many units there are in a division force structure and how much cost is required for each unit. After 
that, the amount of budget will be calculated by adding up all the costs. This ‘bottom up’ process will be 
beneficial to discover unnecessary and hidden costs that can be neglected in a ‘top down’ budget process 
in which each unit might be considered identical. Seemingly, a ‘bottom up’ budget process has strong 
points to achieve financial benefit for the budget. Then, why were there so many criticisms regarding the 
report of the Bottom - Up Review? 
The problem is that the maximum amount of budget was already set up even before getting the 
cost for each part of the force structure252. In the situation that the budget boundary is below the 
summation of costs for units, the only option is removal of a certain part or parts of the structure and this 
leads to shortage of force structure. The Bottom – Up Review suggested further reduction in force 
structure from that of the Base Force Plan, because the financial status of the United States was not stable 
enough to guarantee sufficient budget for the force structure of the Base Force253. This was the intent of 
                                                          
250 By definition, ‘bottom up’ describes the method of system development to build a higher system by putting pre-
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case, it is essential to understand the characteristics of the pre-existing systems in order to understand the higher 
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the review and this intent was the reason that the report was budget driven, not strategy driven. All the 
criticisms came out of the budget driven manner of policy development.   
In addition to that, the military strategy was similar to that of the base force plan, which means 
that the military would function with smaller force structure for a similar strategy. The budget driven 
force reduction urged the Department of Defense to consider force construct options with higher level of 
risk that could increase OPTEMPO254 / PERSTEMPO255 and eventually the fatigue of soldiers. The high 
level of OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO has led to the lack of strategic reserve and it also demised 
strategic flexibility. This situation made the department of defense focus on not a variety of possible 
scenarios but specific scenarios that were regionally focused and based on the security environment of the 
time. Eventually, all these shortcoming did not allow the department of defense to develop a 
comprehensive plan about how to prepare for the defense policy of the future – military transformation 
which includes strategy, force structure and weapon systems.  
C. QDR 1997 
Since Congress passed the Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996256 requiring 
‘administration based defense review’ – the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) –, the Department of 
Defense released the reports of the Quadrennial Defense Reviews in 1997, 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2014. 
Each time, both chambers of the US Congress held the hearings on the QDRs before the committees 
which had jurisdiction over military and defense policy. The members of the committees inquired of the 
key witnesses – including members of the National Defense Panel, representatives from the Department 
of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staffs, and each military service – about military strategy, force structure and 
modernization programs.  
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Considering the fact that military transformation in the post-Cold war period was the core defense 
policy in the series of the QDRs, these hearings on the QDRs well expose the main issues that the 
committee members focused on and the responses of the members of Congress to the plan of the 
Department of Defense. The hearings also show how the Department of Defense rationalized the core 
assumptions and blueprint regarding the military transformation and advocated affordability of the 
execution plans that was chosen to achieve the military transformation.  
In the hearing on the QDR in 1997, the primary concern in the House National Security 
Committee was whether the QDR was budget driven or strategy driven257. This issue – strategy driven or 
budget driven – was the central debate point during the Congressional hearings on the Bottom-Up Review 
in 1993258. This was also the primary reason that Congress determined to mandate the Secretary of 
Defense to report the result of an administration-based defense review every four years. Several members 
of the committee referred to the Bottom-Up Review as the prominent example of budget driven defense 
review, while the Base Force Plan had been acknowledged as an example of strategy driven plan259. The 
problem of the budget driven policy document is that the basic assumptions could be unrealistic to build 
up a sound defense policy. Congress intended to design a defense review process to be led by a sound 
strategy rather than budget constraint when congress passed the military force structure act in 1995260. 
This issue also became the primary debate point during the hearings on the first QDR after the military 
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force structure act was passed. Secretary Cohen admitted that the QDR was developed under the 
constraint of a 250 billion dollar budget261.  
The committee members also questioned whether the force structure was adequate to execute the 
strategy of two MTW scenarios. Representative Ronald Dellums (D-CA) pointed out that the force 
structure in the QDR was not distinguished from the one in the BUR and requested reasonable 
provenience of the effectiveness of the force structure262. Phillip A Odeen, Chairman of National Defense 
Panel, responded that the size might be similar but the current force structure was proved to be effective 
through the effort during a four year period to find the path to make the version of force structure in the 
Bottom-Up Review operational in the strategy of two major theater wars263. Secretary Cohen further 
explained that the force size will be proper to execute the strategy of two MTW with force 
modernization264.  
The discussions regarding force modernization led the hearing on the QDR 1997 to the discussion 
about the vision of the military transformation. Because the primary criticism of the Bottom-Up Review 
was about the lack of preparation for the future, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs put 
enormous effort to escape from the same criticisms from Congress. A more capabilities - based approach 
was the solution. When the committee members questioned what made the QDR 1997 different from the 
Bottom-Up Review in the aspect of strategy, General Shalikashvili explained that the Department 
changed the national defense strategy from the two major regional contingencies strategy to the two major 
theater wars strategy265. The Department of Defense further explained that the two major theater war 
strategy was developed to respond not to the two specific regions such as Northeast Asia or the Middle 
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East but to any region where a theater level military contingency might occur266. By abandoning the 
regional based scenario and moving to the two theater war strategy, the Secretary of Defense argued that 
this strategy requires a universal force construct concept which is based on capabilities to execute a 
theater level war267. He said that the strategy of two major theater wars is a more capabilities - based 
approach than the strategy of two major regional contingencies268. The Secretary of Defense further  
presented ‘shaping,’ ‘responding,’ and ‘preparing’  as the three components of the national defense policy 
to realize the decision to make a balance between present missions and future security269.  
In the Senate Hearings, the chairman of joint chiefs presented the joint vision 2010 as the 
unifying vision based on revolution in military affairs270. He further explained that the component of 
‘preparing’ in the national defense policy was the plan to procure essential capabilities to modernize the 
armed forces into the shape that would be suited for the future security environment271. During his 
explanation, the Chairman presented the Full Spectrum Dominance as the final objective for the 
organizational change of the military transformation272. He further showed the operational doctrine and 
concepts of the vision 2010, which included dominant maneuver, precision engagement, joint forces, 
focused logistics, long range strike capabilities, and full dimension protections273. He specifically 
emphasized that all these new operational concepts and doctrines are based on information superiority, 
which means the ability to collect, process and distribute vast amount of information to our forces, while 
denying at the same capability to any potential enemy274.   
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The discussion about the military transformation led the hearings on the QDR 1997 to the issue of 
how to secure the expense that was required for military transformation. The Secretary of Defense stated 
that the QDR 1997 estimated the shortage of 10 to 20 billion dollars to fund the military 
transformation275. As the solution to cover the 10 to 20 billion dollars, the Department of Defense 
suggested reducing the force structure, closing unnecessary military installations and outsourcing the 
tasks that could be better performed through civilian institutions276. Regarding further force reduction, the 
committee members questioned whether the force reduction would undermine the capability to execute 
the two theater wars strategy. The Chairman of Joint chiefs answered that the force reduction would be 
focused on the non - deployed part of the forces, which was not required to execute the strategy. He 
further explained that this force reduction would not affect the operation and personnel tempos of the 
forces.  
With regard to closing unnecessary military installations, Senator Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID) 
complained that the solutions presented by the Department of Defense were putting too much pressure on 
Congress by asking to reduce the size of the national guard, solve the depot maintenance issues, enact two 
more rounds of Base Closure, while not asking the Services to terminate a major weapons system, tackle 
roles and mission redundancy, and address reduction in force structure277.  He further argued that these 
options brought too much political pain to the members of Congress while the Services avoided sharing 
the political pain278. The Secretary of Defense answered that the QDR 1997 was not designed to share 
political pain but it was designed to build the best possible force for the future. He further explained that 
the options such as two more BRAC rounds, 60/40 changes, and reduction in guard were the essential and 
necessary steps to get to the right force structure for the future279. He added that there would be a 
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legislative recommendation sent to Congress, which required the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 
absorb as much political pain as Congress280.  
In addition, to solve the fund shortage, the concept of revolution in business affairs was 
considered. The Secretary of Defense explained that the QDR1997 made significant adjustments and 
reforms in several weapon procurement programs281 and the Department of Defense considered bringing 
information technology into the Pentagon and changing department operations in the business area282.  
In conclusion, the committee members brought several issues such as force reduction, program 
reforms, and the plan of outsourcing, and they were mostly understood by the DOD witnesses and 
satisfied by the plans. In reality, the QDR 1997 did not have significant differences from the Bottom-Up 
Review except for the fact that the QDR 1997 had a clearer vision for the future – Joint Vision 2010 and 
the military transformation. By connecting these two vision plans with other issues, DOD satisfactorily 
defended the QDR 1997 and defense programs, and persuaded the committee to approve the policy 
directions in the QDR 1997. Specifically, they clearly explained the effects brought by the QDR 1997 and 
made them have a sense of affordability. 
 
D. QDR 2001 
                                                          
280 U.S. Senate, 1997, pp. 31-33. 
281 The Department of Defense considered several competitions between similar weapon procurement programs – 
the competition between JSF programs and Navy’s F-18 modernization program, the competition between more 
productions of C-17 vs. using commercial cargo planes. The Department also planned to reduce the target number 
of F-22 program andV-22 program. The Department further presented a reform of missile defense program, which 
including more fund for development of  NMD and Theater Air and Missile Defense system , slow-down of THAAD 
program,  at the same time considering  various assets to prevent further proliferation.  
282 U.S. House, 1997, p. 200. The plan of revolution in business affairs was based on the idea that the price will be 
go down with competition –competition between corporates, competition between public sector and private 
sector. When the Department of Defense considered outsourcing the functions that were performed by military, 
the plan included the privatization of maintenance depots, hospital, commissary, and housing. 
76 
 
 
 
QDR 2001 contained a more detailed plan of the military transformation. Military transformation 
was the core issue of the QDR 2001. It was also the pledge of the presidential campaign283. At the 
beginning of the House hearings on the QDR 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld announced that the Department 
of Defense was developing a comprehensive plan to take action for the military transformation which 
would change the military organization into the military forces for the future284. Considering the fact that 
the September 11 attack occurred between two congressional hearings on the QDR 2001, the September 
11 Attack is a factor that determined the characteristics of the QDR 2001285.  The hearing on the QDR 
2001 in the House of Representatives was held before September 11, while the hearing in the Senate was 
held after September 11. The timeframes of these events show that the QDR 2001 should have included 
the product of discussion on how to deal with the September 11 Attack.  
During both hearings on the QDR 2001, the main framework of discussion was how to balance 
between defense policy for the current time and defense policy for the future286. Representatives in the 
House put more weight on the policy initiative for the future – the military transformation, while Senators 
allocated more time to discuss how to respond to the September 11 Attack and prevent future terrorist 
attacks287. Even though the focus of discussion was tilted to the response to the September 11 Attack in 
the Senate, the Senate Armed Services Committee found that the military transformation also included 
policy initiatives to prevent asymmetrical and irregular threats from terrorists and confirmed that the 
military transformation was headed in the right direction288. Consequently, the military transformation 
was a common ground shared in both hearings. Moreover, the impact of the September 11 Attack on the 
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military transformation was minimal. Even though several items are directly addressing the following up 
responses to the September 11 Attack, testimonies of witnesses in both hearings and the QDR 2001 itself 
show a solid consistency in the policy regarding military transformation. 
The members of the committees focused on how to respond to the September 11 Attack. The 
committee members asked about the roles of military in the war on terror. Specifically, the debate focused 
on the organizational reform to support the homeland defense in the aspect of military289. The Under 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated that the department would submit a proposal to establish a permanent 
assistant secretary position for homeland defense who would be in charge of coordination with other 
federal agencies and replace the Secretary of Army, who was temporarily appointed to take the 
responsibility for the job290. 
Senator Jean Carnahan (D-MO) was concerned about how to respond to Chemical Biological 
Nuclear (CBN) threats on U.S. soil and asked if the military had enough capabilities to support civilian 
agencies in the event of CBN attacks on civilians291. Secretary Wolfowitz answered that National Guard 
units already had these capabilities and would enhance sufficient capabilities through the ongoing reform 
which embodied the department’s resolve on homeland protection292. 
The committee members asked about the affordability of the military transformation. Senator Jeff 
Sessions (R-AL) raised the issue of OPEMPO and PERSTEMPO that could be caused by the plan of 
committing 5% of military forces for new experimentation programs293. He further asked where the 
Department of Defense would find the funding source for the military transformation in the situation of 
responding to the current emergency after the September 11 Attack294. To the question about the impact 
of the September 11 Attack on the military transformation, Secretary Wolfowitz answered that there 
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would not be significant change in the plan of the military transformation295. He further argued that the 
September 11 Attack even confirmed that the direction of the military transformation was right, saying 
that the problem was that the military transformation had not been implemented quickly enough to 
prevent a catastrophe like the September 11 Attack296. In the end, Secretary Wolfowitz reported that the 
department of defense was preparing a series of policy initiatives to accelerate the military transformation 
in order to ‘transform’ the military into ‘the future force’297. By and large, it is believed that the 
September 11 attack did not have a significant impact on the military transformation.  
The QDR 2001 spelled out the strategy to deter aggressive adversaries with overlapping time 
frame298. Regarding this strategy, Senator John Warner (R-VA) asked how it was different from the 
previous strategy, saying that for some time, the United State has been operating with a requirement to 
fight and win two nearly simultaneous conflicts299. Secretary Wolfowitz answered that the United States 
still had a requirement to defeat aggression in any two regions in nearly simultaneous time frames300. He 
confirmed that the strategy of deterring aggressive adversaries with overlapping time frame was based on 
this requirement, explaining in detail that the Department of Defense evolved the concept of a decisive 
defeat as another step of defeat, which means ‘marching on to occupy enemy’s capital301.’ 
With respect to the force structure, Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) asked whether the current force 
structure was the appropriate size of military forces to execute the strategy302. Secretary Wolfowitz 
answered that the Department of Defense determined to take ‘status quo’ in terms of force structure after 
the Positive Match exercise that assessed the current force structure as roughly meaning the current 
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strategy303.  He further stated that the decision was not made because the Department of Defense liked 
status quo but because the status quo was the minimum requirement to avoid a point of serious strain in 
the force in the aspect of OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO304. In addition to that, Congressman Joel Hefley 
(R-CO) asked whether the air force was moving from a bomber centric to a fighter centric force, also 
requesting a proposal of merging four different air forces into one air force due to the duplication of 
capabilities305. General Shelton answered that the key force was to achieve balance between the fighter 
force for the air to air superiority, the close air support capabilities, and the bomber forces for the long 
range strike, while escaping the issue of merging proposal by avoiding direct answer to the question306.  
E. QDR 2006 
The hearings on the QDR 2006 covered two main issues: the military transformation and the 
Global War on Terror, which means the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Operation Iraq 
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom)307. When the QDR 2006 was released, what began in the 
name of the military transformation in the QDR 2001 was about to have a series of outcomes including 
the result of experimentations, the organization changes, and several decisions regarding the development 
of weapon systems. Clearly, the military transformation in the QDR 2006 was the continuation of the 
military transformation in the QDR 2001, with both of them moving in the same direction308.  
On the other hand, the year 2005 was the fourth year of the Global War on Terror which was 
initiated to respond to the September 11 Attack. Since the U.S. Military forces embarked on the first 
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military operation in Iraq, the area of operations was expanded to Afghanistan and the military operations 
in the Middle East were extended into irregular operations such as counter insurgent operations, nation 
building and other stabilizing operations. In order to fund the Global War on Terror, the U.S. Government 
heavily relied on supplementals, which is a type of emergency fund, differing from base budget309. 
These two vital issues were so essential that the Department of Defense had to balance between 
them under the situation of resource constraint, rather than abandoning either. The QDR 2006 was the 
document that contained the agony of the military to accomplish these two urgent missions – preparing 
for the future and engaging in the current military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq310. The opening 
remark of the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee well captured this characteristic of the 
QDR 2006311. Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-CA), the chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee, opened the hearing by stating that the QDR 2006 had several points of contradiction: first, the 
QDR 2006 contained the plan to transform the US military into more expeditionary units, at the same 
time requiring the military to be effective not only in combat mission but also in counter insurgency 
warfare; second, the QDR 2006 considered long range strike capability as the top priority while it planned 
to cut the active bombers which were still functioning in the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; 
third, the QDR contained the plan of reduction in force structure while it also pursued the modernization 
of military forces in the name of the military transformation312.  
There was an interesting rhetorical debate about the words that described the Global War on 
Terror between one committee member – Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) and Deputy Defense 
Secretary England. Representative Tauscher (D-CA) described the Global War on Terror and its warfare 
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as ‘unconventional,’ ‘unpredictable,’ ‘asymmetrical,’ ‘uncertain,’ ‘unknowable,’ ‘indirect,’ ‘irregular,’ 
‘complex,’ adaptable for the enemies,’ and ‘long for the long war, never ending, not knowing when it 
would be over’313. The committee member also pointed out the fact that the rubric of these words had 
been used to justify supplementals to fund military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan314. When the 
committee member further asked how to solve the war which was described by those words, Secretary 
England responded that the only way to react to this type of threat and warfare was preparedness, at the 
same time arguing those words had been chosen to describe the characteristics of the 21st century military 
conflict during the post - Cold War era, not for the Global War on Terror315.  
In addition to this rhetorical debate, several other members warned that these abnormal practices 
with defense budget such as relying on supplementals for the Global War on Terror and increases in the 
R&D investment might ruin the national financial status.   Representative Mike Conaway (R-TX) 
criticized the increase of R&D investment as ‘Risk Averse manner,” arguing that politicians were 
engaged in a race to see who can frighten the public most with this tendency seeming to translate into 
military budget as well316. Representative Gene Taylor (D-MS) argued that the national defense plan for 
the next four years – which means the QDR 2006 – did not take the war in Iraq into account because it 
primarily relied on supplementals317. He further pointed out that there has been hidden costs that were not 
covered by the base budget or supplementals, saying that several National Guard units including his unit 
were left behind in the priority of maintenance, replacement, and acquisition318. Dr. Lawrence Korb 
supported this argument by testifying that it would be necessary to move these supplementals into the 
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regular budget and view the national defense budget all together. He also argued that these supplementals 
were impacting the national debt319.   
Representative Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX) bluntly asked how the Department of Defense would 
manage several major acquisition programs that began during the Cold War, quoting a criticism that the 
QDR 2006 failed to kill any Cold War Weapon program320. Secretary England and Admiral Giambastiani 
answered that the Department of Defense considered canceling several programs but these decisions need 
to be made with the consideration of broad spectrum capability321. Admiral Giambastiani further 
explained that decisions regarding defense program should be based on continuing reviews with long term 
estimation and considerations, not with sudden cuts or massive new programs322. This issue was also 
covered during the Senate hearings. Senator Mark Brandt Dayton (D-MN) asked what recommendation 
the Department of Defense would make when ‘four dozen system developments’ were not affordable. 
Secretary England answered that the Department of Defense would make hard decisions based on 
analysis of the risk to be brought by decisions regarding these development programs323. 
As the US government deployed the units of National Guard and the reserve component, the use 
of reserve component in the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq got the attention of members of 
Congress. What made the deployment of reserve components a more prominent issue was the fact that the 
capability to respond to Hurricane Katrina was severely limited by the absence of the National Guard, 
who were supposed to be called up in the event of natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina324. 
Representative Joel Hefley (R-CO) questioned why the reserve component should be sent to the war 
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theater and which role the reserve component unit would take in the theater325. Representative Joel Hefley 
(R-CO) also pointed out that frequent call - ups of reserve component would destroy the family unity and 
job careers of the reservists326. Admiral Giambastiani answered that the Department of Defense 
considered sending the reserve component to slow down the OPTEMPO of the active component because 
the fatigue on the active component was at the point of threshold as the Global War on Terror was 
extended over a long period of time327. Admiral Giambastiani further explained that the Department of 
Defense would manage the deployment rotation rate down to under one tour per 6 year period for the 
reserve forces and one tour per 3 year period for the active forces, and the reserve component would take 
the low intensity missions such as nation building and stabilizing operations rather than combat 
missions328.  
Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) raised the issue of force size, specifically, the size of ground forces 
which include Army and Marine Corps329. He pointed out the fact that the Army would be reduced to the 
level of 48,000, asking whether this reduction would compromise the combat effectiveness of the ground 
forces by the increase of assigned missions to the reduced force structure330. Admiral Giambastiani 
answered that the Army was on the way of transformation to modularization, and further explained that 
the modularized Army would be more effective even after the force reduction due to the increased 
capability of a modularized brigadier combat team331. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) also questioned whether 
the force construct assumptions included the increasing demand for counter insurgent capability, referring 
to the 1-4-2-1 force construct332 assumptions.   The admiral explained that the 1-4-2-1 force construct was 
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developed on the basis of the assumption that the US military could do two major things such as 
supporting counter insurgency operations in a prolonged irregular conflict and while doing a conventional 
warfighting operation333.  
In addition, Representative Susan Davis (D-CA) from California asked what the expected risk 
would be in regard to the reduction of aircraft carriers, mentioning the retirement of USS JFK, which was 
the last version of non-nuclear aircraft carriers334. Secretary England answered that it would take two 
more years to have a new aircraft carrier and the gap of two years would be covered by increasing the 
surge rate of aircraft carrier fleets. He further explained that the retirement of USS JFK would make the 
Navy an all nuclear carrier force, which would be more beneficial335 than extending the life of USS JFK 
by spending more than 2 billion dollars per year for maintenance. 
After the September 11 Attack, homeland security became the top priority of national policy. One 
of the critical issue for the federal agencies was how to cooperate with each other and which area of 
jurisdictions would be assigned to which agencies. Most discussions were about how to cooperate in the 
area of intelligence. Furthermore, the members of the House Armed Services Committee gave attention to 
the mission and functions of the US Northern Command that was organized to take charge of cooperation 
with other federal agencies in the United States. Representative Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) asked what the 
role of the newly organized US Northern Command was and what it had been doing for the past four 
years, arguing that the primary purpose of the command had not been achieved336. Representative Gene 
Taylor (D-MS) added a question regarding what functions the Northern Command supplied during 
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Hurricane Katrina337. Secretary England answered that the Northern Command is in charge of U.S. forces 
during a time of crisis in America and is an integral part of the Homeland security of the United States, 
saying that he would submit a detailed report later338. At the same time, he also answered the 
Representative Taylor’s question, stating that the Northern Command offered communication capability 
and relief function in the coordination with FEMA during the Katrina disaster339.  
F. QDR 2010 
Considering the issues raised during the hearings on the QDR 2010, the military transformation 
was not the primary subject of the hearings. Rather, committee members of both chambers primarily gave 
their attention to the situation of budget constraint and its impact on weapon programs, military strategies, 
force structures, and some military personnel issues340.  
Regarding the situation of budget constraint, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) asked about budget 
items, specifically the category of Overseas Contingency Operations which had previously been named 
the Global War on Terror341. To the question about the purpose of Overseas Contingency Operations 
fund, Secretary Gates answered that the fund would cover the cost of ongoing military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq along with several supplementals342. He also added that as the military situation in 
these two countries improves, these funds would eventually move to the base budget, which means the 
department of defense’s peace time cost of operations343. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and Senator Carl 
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Levin (D-MA) expressed concern about a hasty transfer of war time budget into base budget by arguing 
that the transfer would compromise the capability of warfighting in the ongoing military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq344.  
The situation of budget constraint also impacted the military transformation which has been a 
corner stone of defense policy since 1997. The committee members did not explicitly mention the military 
transformation. Rather they discussed military acquisition reforms that were initiated by the Department 
of Defense to review the status of weapon programs and to suggest restructuring of several programs345. 
Main issues were the Joint Strike Fighter program, the Missile defense program, sea and air lift program, 
and long – range strike capabilities. All these programs constituted the core weapon systems to realize the 
military transformation that was described in the QDR 2001 and the QDR 2006.  
Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), and Senator Claire McCaskill (D-
MO) gave attention to the air lift capability because this would guarantee the US military’s ability to 
move operational theaters on time and to secure maximum effectiveness of combat power in the battle 
field without losing critical timings. They raised the issue of the closing of the C-17 production line, since 
the C-17s of the squadron have been worn out more than usual from assigning those C-17s to the 
missions beyond the normal operating rate346. They also questioned the witnesses about what caused the 
early wear - out of C-17s347. Secretary Gates answered that it was caused by the relatively small size of air 
fields in Afghanistan and Iraq that make them inaccessible to the C-5, another cargo airplane, eventually 
making the Air Force more reliant on the C-17s348. He also stated that the department of defense 
                                                          
344 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 4 – 10. 
345 1) C-5 and C-17: U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 4-10; p. 13; pp. 32 – 34. 2) F-35: U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 4-11; pp. 40-41. 3) 
long range bomber: U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 19-21. 4) Missile Defense: U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 4-11; p. 30; p. 38; U.S. 
House, 2010, pp. 31-34.  
346 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 4-10; p. 13; pp. 32 – 34. 
347 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 4-10; p. 13; pp. 32 – 34. 
348 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 4-10; p. 13; pp. 32 – 34. 
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considered various options including upgrading the C-5s and using commercial cargo planes in order to 
replace the worn out C-17s349. 
The purchase of the fifth generation jet fighter was another focal point among military 
procurement programs in the hearings. Primarily, the committee expressed a positive attitude to the JSF 
program reform in 2010 which included the option of cancelling the second engine of the F-35350. They 
evaluated the acquisition reform as appropriate remedy for flaws and cost overrun related to F-35. 
Nonetheless, the committee requested the Department of Defense’s further efforts to deliver F-35 to the 
Services at the time when needed in the future, while mentioning possibly more critical flaws in the 
program and the estimation of high operating costs compared to the current jet fighters such as F-18 and 
AV-8351. Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) and Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) asked if the Department of 
Defense reviewed the necessity of reopening the F-22 production352 line to substitute for F-35, which was 
not expected to be delivered on time, also addressing the coming of the Russian fifth generation jet fighter 
T-50 as a potential threat353. 
The long range strike capability was the essential part of the military transformation which put 
'getting global scale preemptive strike capability' as a central pillar of the plan. In the hearings on the 
QDR 2010, the focus was the next bomber project. Senator John Thune (R-SD) asked which role long 
range bomber would take in the military strategy of the QDR354. The secretary answered that the long 
range bomber would be an essential part of long range strike capability along with long range missile 
                                                          
349 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 4-10; p. 13; pp. 32 – 34. 
350 U.S. Senate, 2010, p.4. The original plan was to develop two separate engines for the F-35. It has been a lesson 
learned from ‘the great engine war’ in the 1980’s – monopoly in engine production would compromise the 
capability of air force in case of serious malfunction of airplane engines. (New York Times 1984) 
351 U.S. Senate, 2010, p.4. 
352 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp.13- 14; pp. 40 – 41. The F-22 programs was killed in Senate two days before a report of 
JET was released. This report contained evidence materials to prove that F-35 had several critical flaws and there 
would be cost overrun and production delays.   
353 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp.13- 14; pp. 40 – 41.  
354 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 19-21. 
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forces355. He said that the Department of Defense was considering the modification of the previous 
generation bombers such as B-2 and B-52 in order to fill the gap until specific decisions regarding the 
next generation would be made356. Furthermore, he explained that the DOD and JCS determined to 
develop a next generation long range bomber, while the specific directions had not been chosen yet357. 
The committee members questioned whether UAV style long range bombers had been considered358. The 
secretary and chairman of JCS replied that UAV was one of possible options, mentioning that more UAV 
pilots were graduated than pilots for conventional airplanes in the military359.  
Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN) pointed out that the Department of Defense was trying to save almost 
every weapon program under the difficult fiscal situation360. Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) further 
requested a balanced prioritization between programs in order to prevent several core development and 
modernization programs from being unfunded – such as JSTAR upgrade program, Ground based Missile 
Defense Program, PIM Paladin and FCV for the Army, and ship-based SM-3 for the Navy361. 
Specifically, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) pointed out that ship - based SM-3 would be the centerpiece 
of the sea-based missile defense program, considering the hesitation of Eastern Europe Countries to the 
installation of American missile defense systems in their soils362. He also expressed a concern about the 
fact that the ship - based SM-3 program would require the transfer of several AEGIS vessels which were 
assigned to other missions363. Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) further asked the Department of Defense to 
                                                          
355 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 19-21. 
356 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 19-21. 
357 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 19-21. 
358 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 32-35. 
359 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 32-35. 
360 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 34-36. 
361 1) PIM: U.S. Senate, 2010, P. 14. 2) JSTAR: U.S. Senate, 2010, p. 32. 3) GMD: U.S. Senate, 2010, p. 38. 4) SM-3: 
U.S. Senate, 2010, p. 14. 
362 U.S. Senate, 2010, p. 14. 
363 U.S. Senate, 2010, p. 14. 
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develop a comprehensive plan to manage the distribution of assets within the Navy in order not to 
degrade the Navy’s capabilities364.  
Along with weapon system, committee members requested specific reasons why the Department 
of Defense designated Mayport Naval Installation as another location of Home porting for nuclear 
carriers. The plan of the Department of Defense was to have an additional home port for nuclear aircraft 
carriers operating in the Atlantic Ocean, where the only home port for nuclear aircraft carriers has been at 
Norfolk, VA365. The primary purpose was to protect the fleet from terrorist attacks to the facility and to 
prevent a total loss of aircraft careers which could be predicted when putting all aircraft careers in one 
port366. Senator Jim Webb (D-VA) were against this plan, arguing that it would be inappropriate to have 
another nuclear career home port under the on-going difficult fiscal situation, considering the cost of 
installing the nuclear reactor maintenance facilities in the new home port367.  
In the part of military strategy, the committee members discussed how to balance between COIN 
and conventional warfare. In detail, Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE) gave attention to how to transfer the 
military operation to the local police and security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq368. As the combat 
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq went into the ending phase, the committee members agreed that it was 
necessary to withdraw the US forces from the Middle East and it would be more beneficial to transfer the 
missions of stabilizing operations to the local police or their security forces. However, there was a 
disagreement on the timing of withdrawal. The committee members questioned whether this was the right 
time to withdraw – if not, when would be the right time for withdrawal of forces369.  
                                                          
364 U.S. Senate, 2010, p. 22 – 24. 
365 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 24 – 27. 
366 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 24 – 27; U.S. House, 2010, p. 19 - 20; pp.32 - 33; pp.63 - 64. 
367 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 15 – 16. 
368 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 23 – 24 for Senator Wicker. 
369 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 3 - 4  for Senator McCain (R-AZ) ; U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 23 – 24 for Senator Wicker (R-
MS) ; U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 34 – 36 for Senator Bayh (D-IN). 
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Representative Mike Coffman (R-CO) expressed special concerns about how to increase and 
maintain the combat effectiveness of conventional forces which were designed to fight against regular 
forces of potential adversaries370. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen answered that the Department of 
Defense developed a plan to transfer the responsibility of the COIN missions to Special Forces Command 
who had been responsible for this type of operation and to send conventional forces back to their original 
area of responsibility – to prepare for conventional warfare371. To this answer, the committee asked the 
Department of Defense to consider how to match force structure to the strategy for the future when 
converting these conventional forces such as Army and Marine units into the war fighting units372.  
In the force structure, the size of ground forces and Navy were the primary subjects of the 
hearings. As the combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq went into the ending phase, Representative 
Lawrence Kissell (D-NC) in House and Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) expressed a concern about the 
large scale drawdown of military forces which had been assigned to the military operation in Afghanistan 
and Iraq373. They asked the Department of Defense to have a long-term comprehensive plan to manage 
the process of drawdown, while specifically referring to three different types of work force in the 
Department of Defense such as active soldiers, civilians, and contractors374.  
In addition, committee members of both chamber pointed out the fact that the total number of 
navy ships was far behind the goal of a 313 ship navy and questioned how the department of defense 
would make up the shortage of ships375. The size of naval forces became a significant force structure issue 
during the hearings because the QDR’s shipbuilding rate (10 ships per year) did not match the expected 
                                                          
370 U.S. House, 2010, pp. 24 – 25; U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 31 -32 
371 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 31 -32. 
372 U.S. House, 2010, pp. 24 -25. 
373 U.S. House, 2010, pp. 64 -65; U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 23 – 24.  
374 U.S. House, 2010, pp. 64 -65; U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 23 – 24 
375 Representative Gene Taylor (D-MS), Representative Robert Wittman (R-VA), and Representative Glenn Nye (D-
VA); Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS), Senator George Lemieux (R-FL), Senator Jim Webb (D-VA). U.S. Senate, 2010, 
pp. 23 – 24; p. 27; p.30;U.S. House, 2010, pp. 17-18; pp. 28 – 32. 
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shipbuilding rate (12 ships per year) to get to the 313 ship navy376. The issue was further spotlighted due 
to the recent crisis in Haiti377 and the emerging demand of additional vessels for realizing the ship based 
SM-3 system378. The chairman of Joint chiefs answered that the Navy has a 30 year ship building plan to 
achieve and maintain the 313 ship navy but the Navy could not get to the expected shipbuilding rate due 
to unexpected recent cost increase for the development of the littoral combat ship and other shipbuilding 
programs379. He further explained that the Department of Defense was going to take acquisition reforms 
to achieve the goal of the 313 ship navy and it would take around 10 years. He also advocated the goal of 
the 313 ship navy to meet the commitment in terms of global commitment, stating that the Navy was 
pressed and operating at a very high tempo, and the high operation tempo would quickly wear out navy 
capabilities380.  
Several personnel - related issues were also covered during the hearings on the QDR 2010. Both 
committees primarily paid attention to the issues of taking care of the veterans who came back from 
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. They mentioned serious mental illnesses such as PTDS as 
well as physical wounds which disabled soldiers381.  Members of both committees further asked the 
department of defense and the department of veterans to offer adequate and appropriate medical services 
to those who had these illnesses caused by the global war on terror. In addition to that, they pointed out 
the fact that one of the main causes of injuries to soldiers was IEDs, and deliberated how to solve the 
problem of IEDs382. The defense secretary answered that the department of defense developed the 
                                                          
376 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 23 – 24; p. 27; p.30;U.S. House, 2010, pp. 17-18; pp. 28 – 32. 
377 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 31 – 37; p. 27; p.30;U.S. House, 2010, pp. 56 – 57. One committee member asked which 
part of defense budget was spent for the relief mission in Haiti and what effect the mission brought on defense 
account and allocation of overall navy capabilities. The witness answered that a career battle group was 
dispatched due to expected demands on airlift capabilities for the relief mission but there would be no significant 
effect on aircraft career assets because the aircraft career would be back after unloading helicopters for the 
mission and the budget for this operation came was secured by the congressional decision on cash flow for the 
operation.  
378 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 13 – 15; U.S. House, p. 33. 
379 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 23 – 24; p. 27; p.30;U.S. House, 2010, pp. 17-18; pp. 28 – 32 
380 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 23 – 24; p. 27; p.30;U.S. House, 2010, pp. 17-18; pp. 28 – 32 
381 U.S. House, 2010, pp. 26-28; U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 9 - 12. 
382 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 12 – 13; U.S. House, 2010, pp.2; p.13; p. 42. 
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standing operations procedures to deal with the IEDs383. He further explained that MRAPs deployed to 
protect soldiers were significantly effective to reduce the damages from the IEDs384. Furthermore, Senator 
Clare McCaskill (D-MO) and Senator Mark Begich (D-AK), and expressed concerns about soldiers' 
overuse and addiction to OxyCotin, which had earned the status of legally approved pain killer385. They 
asked for further research to study the side effects of the medicine.  
Along with these issues, the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee criticized 
unnecessary contracts with PMCs (private military companies) as not following the proper budget 
spending procedure and wasting the budget. An example given was the Blackwater program, which was 
designed to provide navy sailors with training programs about how to defend themselves on board a 
ship386. The committee member pointed out that this task should have been under the responsibility of 
active soldiers, not a contractor, and the contract was not properly reviewed by the Department of Navy 
because the program was in the ‘operational and maintenance’ block funding, which was under the 
responsibility of the combatant commander387.   
In conclusion, differing from the hearings on previous QDRs, the military transformation was not 
the focus of the hearings on QDR 2010. Even though the items related to the military transformation were 
covered and discussed during the hearings, the primary concern was how to manage the defense program 
under the budget constraint. Committee members of both chambers examined the situation of the growing 
federal deficit and its impact on defense programs including various weapon systems which were part of 
the military transformations. 
 
                                                          
383 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 12 – 13; U.S. House, 2010, pp.2; p.13; p. 42. 
384 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 12 – 13; U.S. House, 2010, pp.2; p.13; p. 42. 
385 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 35 – 37. 
386 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 24 – 26. 
387 U.S. Senate, 2010, pp. 24 – 26. 
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2. House Armed Services Committee Composition 
In Congress, the bill is drafted by the committee in the related policy area, even though the 
determination of a bill – pass or not – is made in the chamber. Considering the fact that each 
Congressional committee has the responsibility and authority over the issues of its policy jurisdiction, it 
can be said that the Congressional committees are professional agents in their jurisdictions and the 
influence of those committees on law making – specifically drafting bills – is enormous. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to mention that the Congressional committees are not independent organizations that can exert 
their authority by themselves, but agents of the chambers of the US Congress and representatives from 
each political party. Consequently, in order to predict the drafts of bills that are created by committees, it 
is necessary to analyze how each committee is composed and how each committee represents political 
parties and the chamber. 
Assuming that all members of Congress have values of a certain factor (e.g. ideology) and can be 
evaluated in accordance with their relative positions in the factor space, it is possible to expect how each 
legislator votes on a legislative agenda (Poole & Rosenthal, 1991). Moreover, a bill satisfying the 
legislator of the median value in the space of the factor will be passed and become a law, because a 
simple majority is required for a legislative piece to be passed in a roll call vote in the US House of 
Representatives. If it is possible to find the preference of the median legislator on a specific issue or bill, it 
is also possible to predict votes of legislators and the passage of a bill. 
While the chamber of the US House of Representatives has authority to determine the passage of 
a bill by votes, the draft of the bill is the product of the committee which is responsible in the related 
policy area. The issue areas of federal policies are too diverse for all legislators to understand all the bills 
that are considered in the Congress. To handle the various issue areas effectively and professionally, 
entire federal policies are divided into specific policy areas and the Congressional committees are 
organized to deal with the assigned policy areas. Members of a congressional committee are likely to be 
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most interested in the related policy area as well as to be considered as professionals among members of 
Congress. Moreover, legislators other than committee members probably have difficulty understanding 
the details of bill in a specific policy area. In this case, the committee can lead the legislative process to 
the preference of the committee and it can draft a bill that well reflects the preference of the committee. 
Consequently, it can be said that the influence of committee members on bills under its jurisdiction is 
enormous. 
If the influence of committees on the legislative process is enormous, it is necessary to analyze 
how Congressional committees are composed and who has the authority to control the committees. 
Traditionally, three approaches are considered to analyze the composition of the Congressional 
committees. First, committees are organized to represent the preference of the chamber of the US 
Congress. Due to the fact that Congressional committees are under the control of the chamber, the 
preference of committees might be similar to the preference of the chamber (Gilligan & Krehbiel). 
Second, once a committee is established, it can exert a strong influence on the legislative process. 
Legislators make a lot of effort to be chosen as the related committee member to influence a certain policy 
area. Members of a congressional committee are likely to be most interested in the related policy area as 
well as to be considered as professionals among members of Congress. Third, committees can be 
organized on the basis of the majority party’s influence in the chamber (Cox and McCubbin,1993). One of 
the privileges that a majority party has is the authority to assign the chair persons of committees and to 
have earlier access to committee membership than the minority party. Consequently, the preference of a 
committee is more likely to be similar to that of the majority party. 
In order to examine how the House Armed Services Committee has been composed and whose 
preference has been represented through the committee, I implemented the following process. First, I 
extracted House members’ ideology score by using DW-Nominate Score from roll call data of each 
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Congressional term388. Second, I extracted the DW-Nominate score of the Armed Services Committee of 
each congressional term from the House data of each Congressional term by using the House committees’ 
membership data389. Third, I randomly compared the median value of House members’ DW-Nominate 
score to the median value of the House Armed Services Committee members’ DW-Nominate score. 
Fourth, I divided the House members and the House Armed Services Committee members into parties 
(Democratic and Republican), and analyzed how party members in the Committee represent each party by 
comparing the median value of each party to that of each party’s committee members.  
<Table 4-1. House vs. Armed Services Committee> 
 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 
House -0.163 0.206 0.211 0.195 0.251 0.342 0.392 -0.141 -0.184 0.446 
Committee -0.115 0.277 0.320 0.327 0.346 0.291 0.371 -0.109 -0.114 0.445 
R2-R1 0.048 0.071 0.109 0.132 0.095 -0.051 -0.021 0.032 0.070 -0.001 
Note: R1= Row 1, R2= Row 2, 
When I examined the difference between the median value of the House members’ ideology score 
and the median value of the House Armed Services Committee members’ ideology score during each 
Congressional term, the committee members’ ideology score median value is higher than the House 
members’ ideology score median value, except for the 108th, 109th,and 112th Congress390. It means that the 
median voter of committee members is more conservative than the median voter of House members, and 
the product of the committee is likely to be more conservative than the House members.  
I also divided the House members and the House Armed Services Committee members of each 
congressional term into parties (Democratic Party and Republican Party) and evaluated the ideology score 
of the members of each party in the House and in the committee.  
                                                          
388 I downloaded the data from the website of Voteview.com (http://www.voteview.com/dwnominate.asp)  
389 I downloaded the data from Charles Stewart's Congressional Data Page 
(http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html#2) 
390 Considering the fact that these Congressional terms have most conservative median voters during the whole 
period, it is necessary to interpret that the whole house chamber was conservative enough for the House Armed 
Services Committee to be more conservative than the whole house chamber during these congressional terms 
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When I examined the difference between the median value of the House Republicans’ ideology 
scores and the median value of the House Armed Services Committee Republican members’ ideology 
scores during each Congressional term, the Republican committee members’ ideology score median value 
is higher than the House members’ ideology score median value, except for the 110th and 112th Congress. 
It means that the median voter of committee members is more conservative than the median voter of 
House members, and the product of the committee is likely to be more conservative than the House 
Republicans.  
<Table 4-2. Republican Party: House vs. Committee > 
 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 
House 0.4080   0.4550   0.4820   0.4990   0.5265   0.5540   0.5630 0.6180   0.6550   0.6740 
Committee 0.4520   0.4995   0.5040   0.5030   0.5250   0.5870   0.5630   0.5630   0.6680   0.6670   
R2-R1 0.0512 0.0435 0.0220 0.0040 0.0015 0.0270 0 -0.0450 0.013 -0.0070 
Note: R1= Row 1, R2= Row 2, 
 
When I examined the difference between the median value of the House Democrats’ ideology 
scores and the median value of the House Armed Services Committee Democrats’ ideology scores during 
each Congressional term, the Democratic committee members’ ideology score median value is higher 
than the Democratic House members’ ideology score median value during the period from 1993 to 2012. 
It means that the median voter of committee Democrats is more conservative than the median voter of 
House Democrats. Considering the fact that conservative ideology coincided with an increase in defense 
spending, the House Armed Service Committee Democrats are likely to act or vote more favorably to 
defense spending than the non-committee House Democrats do. 
<Table 4-3. Democratic Party: House vs. Committee > 
 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 
House -0.3330  -0.3860  -0.3820  -0.3800  -0.3860  -0.3780  -0.3815  -0.3670  -0.3434  -0.3980 
Committee -0.2050  -0.2485  -0.2530 -0.2640  -0.3030  -0.2855  -0.3160  -0.3090  -0.2465  -0.3410 
R2-R1 0.126 0.1375 0.1290 0.1160 0.0830 0.0935 0.0655 0.0580 0.0969 0.0570 
Note: R1= Row 1, R2= Row 2, 
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When comparing Democrats and Republicans, the Democratic Party has wider gaps of median 
values between the House and the House Armed Services Committee than the Republican Party does. It 
means that the Democratic members of the House Armed Services Committee are likely to pursue their 
own position rather than representing their party in the matter of defense policy, while Republican 
members of the House Armed Services Committee are likely to represent their party with slightly more 
conservative legislative products. 
3. Public Opinion and Defense Budget 
Considering that Military Transformation is a defense policy to change the shape of the military 
into an ideal shape, the final products of the military transformation are changes and developments in 
organization, weapon and equipment, and military doctrines. It is the budget - defense budget - that brings 
all these changes and developments into reality. In a democratic society, public opinion is a significant 
source of influence on policy. If there is a positive public opinion to defense spending, the defense budget 
is likely to increase.  
 
According to the theory of democracy, every decision regarding the affairs of nations is 
determined by people (Dahl, 1973, 1989). If a nation chooses direct democracy, the people must express 
their opinions by casting votes on a certain issue. However, most countries do not choose direct 
democracy but indirect democracy. In indirect democracy, people participate in politics by electing and 
sending representatives to governmental institutions. What the political representatives are supposed to do 
in governmental institutions is to offer public services to the public by pursuing public policies (Oleszek, 
2011).  
Considering the fact that these policies are developed by the government in order to provide the 
public with commodity and services, it can be said that the public is the consumer of public policies and 
the government is the supplier of public policies. Moreover, assuming that normally the suppliers react 
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positively to the demand of consumers in the competitive circumstances like elections, the government is 
likely to react positively to the demand of the public and develop public policies that might satisfy the 
public391 (Fenno, 1963; Mayhew, 1974). 
 Additionally, as the public are more satisfied with the current public policies, the incumbent 
political representatives are more likely to be re-elected. Considering this fact, the political 
representatives might be responsive to the public opinion even between elections (Fenno, 1963, Mayhew, 
1974). In this case, it is possible for the public to affect public policies by expressing their opinion on 
public polices even during the period between elections. Consequently, the public can affect public 
policies by making choices on their representatives in elections and expressing their opinion between 
elections.  
In democracies, the impact of public opinion on public policies has been an important political 
issue. In the normative aspect, scholars support the idea that public policies should be determined and 
influenced by the public because a democracy has the freedom of political expression and free elections 
(Dahl, 1971, 1989; Page and Shapiro, 1983). On the other hand, other scholars have been skeptical to this 
idea while arguing that there are numerous obstacles between public opinion and public policies (Aldrich, 
1995; Wilson, 1990; Wright, 1996). They argue that the impact of public opinion has been blocked by 
various interest groups, and that the mechanism in elections has been ruined by the advantages of 
incumbent candidate (Mayhew, 1974; Ginsberg, 1990). However, Page and others found that a change in 
public opinion preceded public policy changes (Page and Shapiro, 1983). They interpreted this finding as 
the evidence that public opinion can impact public policy.  
If the impact on public opinion is considerable, the next issue might be how much public opinion 
influences the public policy change. Scholars approached this issue with the framework of responsiveness 
(Arnold, 1990; Lindaman and Heider-Markel, 2002). Some scholars focused on the relative significance 
                                                          
391 This thought can be also confirmed by the fact that the government is under the control of the political 
representatives elected by the public and these representatives are affected by the public through every election.       
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of related issues – issue salience (Jones, 1994; Lijphart and Grofman, 1984). They argue that as an issue 
is perceived more salient, policy makers are more likely to be responsive to public opinion about the 
issue. Other scholars further argue that interest groups and political actors can control public policy by 
giving prominence to certain issues and manipulating public opinion (Chong and Druckman, 2007).   
Some scholars dealt with how to read public opinion and how to reflect it (Dahl, 1989; 
Wildavsky, 1964). They asked if the absolute majority rule should be followed when reflecting public 
opinion – if a majority of the public do not want to change public policy, the current policy should be 
preserved (Dahl, 1989; Wildavsky, 1964). To answer this question, they attempted to divide public 
policies into two categories: one is the policies that require a majority to change the policies such as 
enactment of a law or repeal of a law; and the other is the policies in which the change is relatively 
minimal, not requiring the consent of the majority (Dahl, 1989; Wildavsky, 1964, Russette, 1992). They 
argue that, in the latter case, the majority rule is not appropriate to determine whether to reflect public 
opinion in policies, and policy makers should consider the shift in public opinion meaningful even when a 
the consent of the majority does not exist (Dahl, 1989; Wildavsky, 1964, Russette, 1992). 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider the fact that public policies contain numerous areas of 
policies and these areas are quite different from each other depending on their related issue areas. 
Specifically, policy areas such as defense and foreign policy, which deal with external threats and foreign 
affairs, have been believed to be determined by strategic and external factors rather than by public 
opinion (Huntington 1963; Janowitz, 1971).  
According to the previous research, defense policy deals with two fronts -- one for the external 
threats, the other for its domestic foundations. Along these two fronts, scholars have divided defense 
policies into three categories: strategic policy, crisis policy and structural policy (Huntington, 1961).392 
                                                          
392 The difference between strategic policy and crisis policy is unclear due to the fact that these two sub areas of 
defense policy deal with same aspect of defense policy (Huntington, 1961).  One possible way to distinguish one 
from the other is to focus on the phase each of them is related to. Strategic policy is more about to develop 
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Strategic policy and crisis policy primarily deal with the external threats while structural policy deals with 
the domestic foundations (Ripley, 1980).  
According to Huntington, structural policy issues are related to personnel, organizations and 
equipment procurement (Huntington, 1961; Kaufman et.al., 1985; Hays et.al., 1997). On the other hand, 
strategic policy pursues specific programs or deals with special situations. Those policies are initiated by 
external threats such as changes in the international security environment (Huntington, 1961; Ripley, 1980, 
Hays et.al. 1997). Additionally, crisis policy is about how to deal with the crises which occur with 
unexpected time and space (Ripley, 1980; 1988). Scholars have focused on the presidential use of military 
forces in the event of international crisis (Baker, 2001;Hetherington, 2003; Groeloing, 2008). Most studies 
attempted to analyze public opinion about presidential use of force  or the effect of change in public opinion 
during the prolonged period of crisis on the following changes of military strategies, including use of force 
(Baker, 2001;Hetheringotn, 2003; Groeloing, 2008).  
Some scholars argue that it is possible for Congress to influence structural defense policy such as 
the defense budget process – program authorization and budget authorization (Deering et.al, 1989). Hays 
et.al. argue that the influence of Congress has been increased in the defense policy decision-making process 
because defense policy is related to the federal budget process (Hays et al., 1997). Some scholars attempted 
to analyze how public opinion influences the scale of the defense budget (Hartley et. al, 1992, Rundquist 
et.al.,1999; 2002). 
Assuming that ‘public officials elected by public’ consider public opinion, it can be said that public 
opinion might be influential on all three areas of defense policy even though it deals with external threats: 
the President considers public opinion when he uses his power in crisis and strategic defense policies; 
members of Congress consider public opinion when they deal with budget issues in structural defense 
policies.   
                                                          
strategies on the basis of expectation on future contingency while crisis policy is about how to deal on-going crisis 
with strategies which were developed in advance.   
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In order to examine the effect of public policy on the defense budget, I developed the following 
three hypotheses and tested them with public opinion data from 1972 to 2011. According to Page and 
Shapiro’s research, changes of public opinion precede changes in public policy (Page and Shapiro, 1989). 
In the case of the incremental policy area, a majority is not required to change the contents of policy 
(Russette, 1992). Federal budgets can be considered an incremental policy area due to the fact that federal 
budgets are compromises and adjustments of dollar amounts rather than conceptualizations of issues. 
Moreover, budget changes with an incremental pattern. Considering the fact that one of the important 
parts of defense policy is to approve defense budget, defense policy – specifically, defense budget – also 
can be considered an incremental policy area. If defense budget is an incremental policy area, the public 
opinion about the defense budget might precede the changes of defense budget and influence the defense 
budget even without a majority of the public.      
Hypothesis 1: As public opinion changes in a positive direction, the defense budget is likely 
to be increased.  
On the other hand, the defense budget is a part of defense policy. Assuming that defense policy 
primarily deals with external threats, defense policy can be influenced by external threats and changes in 
them. If there are external sources of threats, defense policy will change in order to deal with the sources 
of threats. To respond to external threats, states need increased budget and defense spending is likely to 
be increased.  
Hypothesis 2: If there are sources of external threats, defense spending is more likely to be 
increased.  
Moreover, defense policy is affected by various domestic factors because its institutional and 
organizational foundations are based on its citizens and industries. One of the main factors is the national 
economic status. Considering the fact that defense spending is also a part of the national economy and 
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defense spending is connected to domestic industries, it can be said that the national economy status can 
affect the defense budget.  
Hypothesis 3: If the national economy status improves, defense spending is more likely to be 
increased.  
As the dataset to test these hypotheses, I considered the period from 1972 to 2011 as the sample 
years. The period covers the second half of the Cold War (1972 to 1992), the post-Cold War era, and the 
era of the Global War on Terror. The U.S. experienced various external changes as well as domestic 
changes. By analyzing this period, I examined the influence of public opinion and the state of war on 
defense policy, including defense spending.  
The dependent variable is U.S. defense spending. Considering that the research period covers a 
period of longer than 40 years, it was necessary to convert the amount of defense budget of each year into 
one standard. In order to measure defense spending, I converted each year’s defense spending by 
implementing Fiscal Year 2013 constant value of the U.S. dollar. Moreover, it was necessary to define 
U.S. defense spending specifically due to the fact that there are various different versions of U.S. defense 
spending393 - budget resolution, budget authority, and total obligational authority (Russett, 1992, Hays et 
al. 1997). Budget resolutions, the product of the authorization process, are the amounts of budget for 
programs that Congress will consider in the appropriation process (OMB, 2008). Budget authority, the 
product of the appropriation process, is the amount of budget that will be spent by the executive branch in 
the coming year (OMB, 2008). Lastly, total obligational authority is the actual amount of money that the 
                                                          
393 The various versions have been caused by the two different budget processes and the time lag between when 
an appropriation is enacted and when the budget is executed.  In the United States, in order for the federal 
government to pursue a certain program or policy, it is necessary to obtain Congressional approval on the federal 
budget.  The budget process consists of two different tasks - authorization and appropriation (OMB, 2008). In 
definition, authorization means the process by which the executive branch obtains the authority from the 
Congress in order to pursue a certain program or policy (OMB, 2008). The other task in the budget process is 
appropriation. Appropriation is the process to settle the annual budget – – how much money will be spent for the 
programs and policies during a certain year (OMB, 2008). Essentially, the authorization is centered on approving or 
disapproving a program and policy, rather than determining a certain budget for the program (OMD, 2008).  
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executive branch will spend in a given year and is calculated in accordance with various economic factors 
of the time (OMB, 2008). I used the total obligation authority, because this is the actual amount of budget 
that the Department of Defense spends in a given year, reflecting the national economic status of the year 
as well.  
 
The independent variables are public opinion of a given year, national economic status, and the 
state of war. The first and primary independent variable is the public opinion. In order to measure the 
public opinion, I use the result of four different public opinion polls such as Gallup, Cambridge social 
research, General Social Survey, and Roper survey. I searched the questions that asked about opinions on 
military spending during the sample period. I found five questions, most of which were about how each 
respondent feels about the amount of defense spending in a given year (See appendix). Among four 
choices from ‘too little’, ‘too many’, ‘right amount’, and ‘no opinion’, I focus on the percentage of ‘too 
little’ and ‘too many’. I treated ‘right amount’ and ‘no opinion’ as the opinions of those who are not 
interested in this problem or are satisfied with the current military budgets.  
         <Figure 4-1: ‘Too little’ and ‘Too many’ military spending (1972 to 2012)> 
    
      Source: Gallup (2969-2010) and General Social Studies (1970-2010) (See footnote 395,396) 
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Due to the fact that public opinion surveys are not taken regularly (e.g. quarterly, yearly, etc.), it 
is necessary to fill in the blank time period394. In order to fill in the blanks, I averaged two survey polls – 
Gallup395 and General Social Studies396 — that cover the entire sample period. Before averaging them, I 
checked the similarity between surveys from these two survey houses and they show a high degree of 
similarity. Consequently, it is possible to fill in the blank spots by averaging these two surveys.   
Considering the fact that defense spending is a part of federal budgets to be approved by the 
President and Congress, defense policy makers might pay attention on the White House and Congress. 
Due to the fact that ‘planning the federal budgets’ is closely related to the national economy status, the 
President and Congress might seriously consider the constraint of national debt when they approve 
defense spending. In order to measure the national economic status that might be influential on defense 
spending, I use the federal deficit of a given year as an indicator (see reference: dataset). Since this 
variable also covers the period longer than 40 years, I convert it into Fiscal Year 2013 constant value of 
U.S. dollar.  
In order to measure the external threats that might influence defense spending, I use the state of 
war. If a country is in a state of war397, the country is more likely to increase defense spending in order to 
respond or react to the threats coming from the war. After the Second World War, the U.S. was in the 
                                                          
394 General Social Studies surveys are taken bi-annual and Gallup had a missing period from 1972 to 1974. In order 
to fill these blank spot, I averaged the result of the two surveys.   
395 Gallup polls’ question (1969-2012): Q. There is much discussion as to the amount the government in 
Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we 
are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount? 
396 GSS (1970-2010) 
Q1. (We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm 
going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending 
too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.) Are we spending too much, too little, or about 
the right amount on... the military, armaments and defense? 
 
Q2. (We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm 
going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending 
too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.) Are we spending too much, too little, or about 
the right amount on... national defense? 
 
397 I used the divisions of era is commonly referred in the text book of international relations.   
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Cold War. In this period, the U.S. competed with the Soviet Union in the matter of military capabilities as 
well as other social dimensions, and considered the Soviet Union as the main external threat. After the 
Cold War ended, there were not any significant external threats even though there were some small scale 
conflicts and terror attempts until September 11 of 2001. Compared to other periods, this period can be 
considered a period of peace. However, after September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been in a state of war – the 
Global War on Terror. Considering the scale of military actions and military spending during this period, 
the Global War on Terror can be considered as a state of war even though the main threat to the U.S. is 
not a normal state like the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. I coded ‘1’ for the Cold War period and 
the Global War on Terror period, otherwise ‘0’.  
The dependent variable is the change of defense spending from 1972 to 2012. The independent 
variables are 1) averaged % of ‘too little military spending’ in surveys of two public opinion survey 
houses, 2) federal deficit of a given year, 3) whether or not the U.S. was in a state of war in each year. 
Considering the fact that the federal budget is passed in the previous year of the target year, it is necessary 
to apply a time lag between independent variables and dependent variable. I applied a one-year time lag 
(t-1) for all three independent variables and examined the effect of them on the next year’s defense 
spending (t). In order to examine the correlation between dependent variable and independent variables, I 
applied a linear regression model. 
            <Figure 4-2. Estimation model of defense spending > 
 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑡)𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1  ∙  % of ‘too little’  (t − 1) + 𝛽2 ∙  Federal Deficit  (t − 1) 
                                              +   𝛽3 ∙ State of War (t − 1) 
 
In order to examine the effect of the Global War on Terror, I changed the sample period into the 
period from 1992 to 2012 and ran a different model with the same variables. By changing the sample 
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period, I examine the change of the state of war, from the Post-Cold war era to the era of the Global War 
on Terror.  
When I examine the model, all three factors show positive relationships with defense spending in 
a broad sense. During the period from 1972 to 2012, the public opinion shows a positive effect on defense 
spending but it does not show statistical significance of 5% confidence interval (coefficient: 0.1836, p 
value: 0.1895; see table 1., % of ‘too little’ with entire sample period). However, it has a relatively high 
statistical significance even though it does not satisfy the 5% confidence interval, and it can be a 
meaningful factor that might affect defense spending in some specific situations such as a state of war. 
Consequently, it needs to be considered as a potential factor that can predict or estimate defense spending. 
<Table 4-4: Effect of Public Opinion and other factors on Defense Spending> 
 Model1(Entire Sample Period) Model2 (After the Cold war) 
 Change of Defense Spending Change of Defense Spending 
A. % of ‘too little’ 
0.18363 
(0.1895) 
0.5289 
(0.0043)** 
B. Federal Deficit 
0.01773 
(0.000571)*** 
0.00582 
(0.109) 
C. the State of War 
7.5517 
(0.048)* 
18.5805 
(1.71×10−5)*** 
Const. 
5.4927 
(0.2028) 
-1.4652 
(0.7108) 
Obs. 42 20 
        Note: *** >000, **>0.001, *>0.05 
Federal deficit has the highest level of statistical significant during the whole sample period but 
with positive correlation, which is opposite to the hypothesis (coefficient: 0.0173, p value: 0.000571; see 
table 4-4).  I predicted a negative correlation between government spending and federal deficit – if the 
deficit increases, defense spending might decrease in order to reduce the deficit. However, when the 
government faces important and urgent national security issues such as the Soviet’s threats during the 
Cold War and the Global War on Terror since 2001, the government is likely to increase defense spending 
even though more defense budget increases federal deficit.  
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I also examined the effect of a state of war. It has a positive effect and statistical significance of 
the 5% confidence interval (coefficient: 7.5517, P value: 0.048; see table 4-4). It confirmed the hypothesis 
in which the Cold War and the Global War on Terror have a positive effect on changes in defense 
spending.      
When I examined the model with a different sample period – the post-Cold War era –, all three 
dependent variables show a positive relationship with defense spending even though the specific results 
are different from the result of the entire sample period. Being different from the result of the entire 
sample period, public opinion had a positive effect and statistical significance of 1% confidence interval 
during the post-Cold War period (coefficient: 0.5289, P value: 0.0043; see table 4-4). The coefficient is 
four times higher than that of the entire sample model. It can be said that public opinion became a more 
salient factor after the Cold War than in the Cold War period. 
The Global War on Terror shows a positive effect and statistical significance of 0% confidence 
interval (coefficient: 18.58, P value: 1.71×10−5; see table 4-4). Compared to the result of the entire 
period, which includes the Cold War period as well as the Global War on Terror, this result is almost 
three times higher. Consequently, the Global War on terror has more impact than the Cold War did during 
the Cold War period.  
Examining its effect on defense policy, public opinion shows relatively positive and significant 
correlation with defense spending even though defense policy primarily deals with external threats and is 
planned and led by professional officials. However, public opinion’s influence is likely to increase in 
accordance with the intensity of external threats and changes of external environment. Public opinion has 
more impact in the period of transition from war to peace or peace to war. Moreover, considering the fact 
that the post-Cold War era and the era of the Global War on Terror are relatively shorter than that of the 
Cold War era, it can be concluded that public opinion is more influential in the case of short durations of 
external factors. 
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4. Summary  
Military transformation in the post-Cold War era is an example that shows how American 
militarism works in American society. Considering that Military Transformation is a defense policy to 
change the shape of the military into an ideal shape, the final products of the military transformation are 
changes and developments in organization, weapons and equipment, and military doctrines.  
In the political arena, Congress has been the main source of influence on military affairs. Even 
though foreign policy and use of force have been primarily under the influence of the executive branches 
such as the White House and Department of Defense, Congress has the authoritative power of funding 
military programs and governmental oversight regarding military and defense policy. Furthermore, issues 
in military affairs are under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees in both chambers of 
Congress. Most members of both committees have the experience of military service and come from 
regions which are connected with the military in aspects of demography or regional economy. These 
attributes of committee members guarantee proper representation of regional interests and position of 
military services, while they also lead committee members’ decisions to be distracted by other issues such 
as regional economy and inter-service rivalry, rather than effectiveness of military forces, which also can 
be considered signs of militarism.  
Congressional hearings on the official DOD documents regarding military transformation is one 
indicator to read the congressional response to the military transformation. The Base Force Plan was 
evaluated as a “very strategy driven” document in the aspects of force structure and supporting capability 
for the force structure. The committee members understood the security environment of the post-Cold 
War era and the strategy to deal with it in the big picture of national defense policy. During the hearing on 
the report of the Bottom - Up Review in the House, almost every member of the House Armed Services 
Committee did not support the Bottom-Up Review. The criticism was that: the report was budget driven; 
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the force structure did not match the strategy; it was based on a higher level of risk than the Department 
assumed; and it did not show a clear picture of how to prepare for the future.  
Differing from the report of the Bottom-Up Review, the QDR 1997 had a clearer vision for the 
future, contained in Joint Vision 2010 and the military transformation. By connecting these two vision 
plans with other issues, DOD satisfactorily defended the QDR 1997 and defense programs, and persuaded 
the committee to approve the policy directions in the QDR 1997. In 2001, even though the focus of 
discussion was tilted to the response in the Senate to the September 11 attack, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee found that the military transformation also included policy initiatives to prevent asymmetrical 
and irregular threats from terrorists and confirmed that the military transformation was headed in the right 
direction, as the House Armed Services Committee had confirmed before the September 11 attack. Even 
though several items are directly addressing the follow-up responses to the September 11 attack, 
testimonies of witnesses in both hearings and the QDR 2001 itself show a solid consistency in the policy 
regarding military transformation. The hearings on the QDR 2006 covered two main issues: the military 
transformation and the Global War on Terror. The focus of the hearings was how to balance between 
these two issues under the situation of resource constraint, rather than abandoning either. Differing from 
the hearings on previous QDRs, the military transformation was not the focus of the hearings on QDR 
2010. Even though the items related to the military transformation were covered and discussed during the 
hearings, the primary concern was how to manage the defense program under the budget constraint. 
Committee members of both chambers examined the situation of the growing federal deficit and its 
impact on defense programs including various weapon systems which were part of the military 
transformations. 
In sum, both committees responded positively to the military transformation and showed the 
tendency to support strategy driven plans – the Base Force Plan, the QDR 1997, 2001, 2006 –, which 
presented a blueprint for the coming years and guaranteed more investment in Research and 
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Development, while criticizing the report of the Bottom-Up Review and the QDR 2010 as budget driven 
plans.   
The composition of committees is another indicator that predicts possible legislative outcomes in 
a policy jurisdiction in Congress. Members of a congressional committee are likely to be most interested 
in the related policy area as well as to be considered as professionals among members of Congress. In this 
case, the committee can lead the legislative process to the preference of the committee and can draft a bill 
that appropriately reflects the preference of the committee. Since the ideology of legislators is an 
important factor in legislative voting and the fate of a roll call vote in House is determined by a simple 
majority, it is possible to measure the ideological composition of committees and further to predict 
possible legislative outcomes. During the period, the median voter of committee members is more 
conservative than the median voter of House members, except for the 108th, 109th, and 112th Congress; 
the median voter of committee Republicans is more conservative than the median voter of House 
Republicans, except for the 110th and 112th Congress; the median voter of committee Democrats is more 
conservative than the median voter of House Democrats. Considering the fact that conservative ideology 
coincided with an increase in defense spending, in most cases the House Armed Service Committee 
members/Republicans/Democrats are likely to act or vote more favorably to defense spending than the 
non-committee House members/Republicans/Democrats do, respectively. 
When comparing Democrats and Republicans, the Democratic Party has wider gaps of median 
values between the House and the House Armed Services Committee than the Republican Party does. It 
means that the Democratic members of the House Armed Services Committee are likely to pursue their 
own position rather than representing their party in the matter of defense policy, while Republican 
members of the House Armed Services Committee are likely to represent their party with slightly more 
conservative legislative products. 
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In a democratic society, public opinion is also a significant source of influence on policy. 
Furthermore, it is the budget - defense budget - that brings all these changes and developments of the 
military transformation into reality. Consequently, if the U.S. public opinion on defense spending is 
positive, the defense budget is likely to increase. When I examined the effect of three factors – such as 
public opinion, the Global War on Terror, and the federal deficit – on the defense budget during the post-
Cold War era, public opinion and the Global War on Terror showed a positive relationship with defense 
spending. According to the result of analysis in chapter 3, public opinion showed a positive and 
significant correlation with defense spending. However, public opinion’s influence is likely to increase in 
accordance with the intensity of external threats and changes of external environment. Public opinion has 
more impact in the period of transition from war to peace or peace to war than in the period of a 
continuing state of war such as the Cold War period. Moreover, considering the fact that the post-Cold 
War era and the era of the Global War on Terror are relatively shorter than that of the Cold War era, it can 
be concluded that public opinion is more influential in the case of short durations of external factors. 
In summary, militarism is a type of ideology that gives more value to military ideas than to 
civilian life. In general, militarism coincides with conservativism and individualism.  Considering the 
political environment inside Congress and the public mood reflected in public opinion, it is highly 
probable that there has been a unique type of militarism in the United States. In the political arena, the 
congressional committee which is responsible for national defense seems inclined to be conservative in 
the matter of ideology – more conservative than the median in the House of Representatives. Speaking of 
public opinion, the US public has shown a relatively high level of confidence in the military compared to 
other public service organizations. The Gallup polls asking about public confidence in the military since 
the year 2001 have shown that the US public has maintained their support for their military, even after the 
twelve years of military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The level of public support to the military 
has positively influenced defense budget increases.  
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Chapter 5: Militarism and Military Transformation - Defense Industries 
 
 
1. Defense Acquisition process: JCDIS398, DAS399, and PPBES400 
One of the objectives of the military transformation is to equip military forces with the advanced 
weapons systems that embody the required capabilities for the military transformation. These weapon 
systems are delivered to the military forces through the defense acquisition process, which consists of 
identifying required capabilities, development and procurement, and budgeting. Among these three 
components of the defense acquisition process, the military transformation brought significant changes to 
‘identifying required capabilities,’ and ‘development and procurement.’ The third component, 
‘Budgeting,’ which is referred to Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES), 
did not have significant changes since Secretary McNamara implemented the system into the defense area 
in the 1960’s401.                                   
The first part, ‘identifying required capabilities’ has been a task of the military including the Joint 
Chief of Staffs (JCS) and the Services. Even though the JCS has been an influential actor in the process of 
generating identification of required capabilities402, it was each military service that took primary 
responsibility to develop the requirements of new weapon systems. In the aspect of generating 
requirements, the best way to fit the requirements of the user – in this case, each military service – is to 
develop weapon systems that meet the specific needs of each military service403. This is the tradition of 
                                                          
398 Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System.  
399 Defense Acquisition System.  
400 Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Execution Process. 
401 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, 2010, “New Concepts and New Tools to Shape the Defense Program,” in 
How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969,  pp. 31-72 
402 Defense Acquisition University, 2004, JCIDS Overview Brief, slide 4-7 (https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-
US/32579/file/6180/JCIDS%2520Overview%2520Brief%2520Oct%252004.ppt) 
403 Defense Acquisition University, 2004, Slide 4. 
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military procurement and the reason for the existence of the three different military service departments 
such as the department of Army, Navy and Air Force. The military transformation brought a significant 
change to this traditional custom of military procurement. What the military transformation brought was 
the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) which was one of the top priorities of 
Secretary Rumsfeld404.  
                               <Figure 5-1. DoD Acquisition Decision Support System > 
 
                                 Source: Defense Acquisition University, 2004, JCIDS Overview Brief                                            
( https://acc.dau.mil/adl/enUS/32579/file/6180/JCIDS%2520Overview%2520Brief%2520Oct%252004.ppt ) 
 
The primary purpose of JCIDS is to support the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) to 
ensure that the requirement generating system of the Department of Defense serves appropriately for the 
defense acquisition system, which is the process to develop, produce, and acquire the required capabilities 
for the Armed Forces405. The JROC has performed in the defense acquisition process as the main 
                                                          
404 See Figure 5-2; Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8),2006, Capabilities-Based 
Assessment (CBA) User’s Guide Version 2, pp.4-5. 
405 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), 2006, pp. 22-24; 2013, JROC/JCIDS Updated 
Processes, pp. 4-7.  
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participant, generating the requirement of necessary capabilities and representing the Department of 
Defense and the Joint Chief of Staffs406.  Even though the JROC was in charge of oversight over the 
defense acquisition system, the JROC was not able to intervene in the process and exercise its authority 
effectively. Prior to the JCIDS, the Requirements Generating System (RGS) supported the JROC to 
manage the defense acquisition system. This system was based on the idea that each service is primarily 
in charge of the requirement generation407.  
In RGS system, the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment is supposed to support regional 
combatant commands to provide assistance in the Mission Need Analysis process – the first stage of 
requirement generation. Nonetheless, the RGS manual said that the joint team can step into the process 
not to lead the process but to see that responsible DOD components are identified to provide assistance408. 
This means that the joint team participation is not a mandatory but an optional condition. This system had 
not generated significant disagreement in the traditional defense acquisition process, but it did not fit well 
with the trend of the military transformation, which emphasized joint operation and capability based 
approaches. 
This uncomfortableness was well expressed in the memorandum that Secretary Rumsfeld sent to 
the Vice Chairman of the joint chiefs of staffs who was the chairman of the JROC409. In order to solve 
these shortcomings of the RGS, the Office of Secretary of Defense initiated several studies to develop a 
process management system to support the JROC's oversight mission on the defense acquisition 
system410. 
                                                          
406 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), 2006, pp. 22-24; 2012, JROC/JCIDS Updated 
Processes, pp. 4-7; Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2012, MANUAL FOR THE OPERATION OF THE JOINT CAPABILITIES 
INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM, p.2  
407Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staffs Instruction, 2001, “ Enclosure A: Requirement Generation System,” 
Requirement Generation System, pp. A-1-2; “Enclosure B: Requirement Generation Process” p. B-5;  Defense 
Acquisition University, 2004, JCIDS Overview Brief, slide 6,                                          
( https://acc.dau.mil/adl/enUS/32579/file/6180/JCIDS%2520Overview%2520Brief%2520Oct%252004.ppt ) 
408 Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staffs Instruction, 2001, “Enclosure B: Requirement Generation Process” p. B- 6 
409 See Figure 5-2 in the next page. 
410 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), 2006, pp. 4-7. 
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             <Figure 5-2.  Rumsfeld Memorandum Regarding Defense Acquisition> 
 
The product of deliberation within the department of defense and Joint Chief of staff was the 
JCIDS. Differing from the RGS, JCIDS more focused on the joint-ness and capability-based approaches 
to the defense acquisition system by producing the joint capabilities documents in the early stage of 
system development, which describes the requirement for the major defense acquisition program by 
responding to required capabilities rather than to specific threats411. The joint capability documents 
function as a guideline that leads the entire process of defense acquisition process412. Moreover, the 
JCIDS divides the joint capabilities requirement into specific joint capability areas and assigns a 
Functional Capability Board (FCB) to each specific joint capability area413. The JCIDS guarantees FCB to 
actively participate in the every single step of the defense acquisition process and to advise the JROC to 
generate the capability documents which prescribe the required capabilities for milestones of a defense 
program until the program enters the stage of initial operational capabilities.  
                                                          
411 Defense Acquisition University, 2004, JCIDS Overview Brief, slide 4-6,                                          
( https://acc.dau.mil/adl/enUS/32579/file/6180/JCIDS%2520Overview%2520Brief%2520Oct%252004.ppt). 
412 Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2012, “B: Document Generation”, p. B-1 - 4; B-9 - 14; B-27 – 39;  
413 Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2012, “G: Joint Prioritization,” pp. G-1 – 3; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 
2012, Joint Capability Integration and Development System.  
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                             <Figure 5-3. Interaction between JROC and DAS > 
 
Source: Defense Acquisition University, 2004, JCIDS Overview Brief                                            
( https://acc.dau.mil/adl/enUS/32579/file/6180/JCIDS%2520Overview%2520Brief%2520Oct%252004.ppt ) 
 
The JROC, with the support of JCIDS, interacts with steps in the defense acquisition process. In 
order to interact with the defense acquisition process, the JROC generates several capability documents 
such as Initial Capability Document (ICD), Capability Development Document (CDD), and Capability 
Production Document (CPD) which describe necessary conditions to evaluate whether a defense program 
satisfies the capability requirements of specific milestones of the program. With JCIDS, the JROC 
considers various ‘material’ and ‘non- material’ solutions to fill the capabilities gaps discovered through 
JCIDS’ capability based analyses414. The material solutions are specified in the Initial Capabilities 
Documents (ICD) which contains capabilities requirements of a defense acquisition program415. Based on 
                                                          
414 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8),2006, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) 
User’s Guide Version 2. 
415 Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2012, “B: Document Generation”, p. B-1 – 4; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction, 2012, “Enclosure A: Joint Capabilities Integration and development System,” in Joint Capability 
Integration and Development System, pp. A-1-4.  
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ICD, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) develops a concept decision that describes conceptualized 
features of the defense acquisition program in the ICD and reports to the JROC a mile stone – Mile Stone 
A(MS-A) – as a review of whether a material solution of a program fits the requirements in the ICD. 
After the review on the MS-A and further analyses on the material solutions of the program, the 
JROC prepares a Capabilities Development Document (CDD) that describes operational performance 
attributes of the acquisition program on the basis of technology developments416. The CDD specifies the 
technological requirements of an acquisition program and supports the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
to develop required technologies. As a review of the technology development phase, the DAB reports 
Mile Stone B (MS-B) to the JROC in order to decide whether the technological developments satisfy the 
capability requirements in CDD.  
When the review on the MS-B satisfies the JROC, the program enters the engineering and 
manufacturing phase. In this phase, the JROC prepares a Capabilities Production Document (CPD) that 
describes production attributes for a single increment of the acquisition program417. In an evolutionary 
program, an updated version of CPD is prepared for each increment to a defense acquisition program. In 
this phase, the DAB develops and tests prototypes of the defense acquisition program to satisfy each CPD 
for each increment to the program. When a defense acquisition program is matured enough to enter into 
the production and deployment phase, the DAB reports the Mile Stone-C to the JROC to determine the 
program’s maturation for production.  
Along with the JCIDS, the EA/SD was suggested as a defense acquisition strategy for the military 
transformation in 2003418. The EA/SD consists of two elements: Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral 
                                                          
416 Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2012, “B: Document Generation”, p. B-9 – 14; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction, 2012, “Enclosure A: Joint Capabilities Integration and development System,” in Joint Capability 
Integration and Development System. 
417 Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 2012, “B: Document Generation”, p. B-27 – 39; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction, 2012, “Enclosure A: Joint Capabilities Integration and development System,” in Joint Capability 
Integration and Development System. 
418 Kenneth Farkas and Paul Thurston, 2003, “Evolutionary Acquisition Strategies and Spiral Development 
Processes Delivering Affordable, Sustainable Capability to the Warfighters” in PM.  pp. 10-14.  
118 
 
 
 
Development. The evolutionary acquisition represents a strategy to approach defense acquisition, and the 
spiral development means a process to achieve the strategy of evolutionary acquisition419.  
<Figure 5-4.  Evolutionary Acquisition, Spiral Development, & P3I> 
 
source: http://www.secnav.navy.mil/rda/Policy/2002%20Policy%20Memoranda/041202acq.pdf 
Differing from the previous strategy of defense acquisition that pursued development of a 
complete system in one step, the evolutionary acquisition attempts to divide a system or a program into 
known parts and unknown parts420. The known parts are the portion of a new system that can be expected 
to be completed within a specified time frame, while unknown parts are the portions in which concepts 
and technologies are underdeveloped, so it is not possible to predict final outputs and timeline of 
completion421. For known parts, development proceeds with a foreseeable timeline and output. For 
unknown parts, the parts are divided into several increments. Each increment of the unknown parts 
upgrades the known part, once development of the increment is complete. 
By taking the evolutionary acquisition strategy, the military transformation could avoid 
unnecessary waste of time and funds which would be required to complete the unknown parts of a 
                                                          
419 Kenneth Farkas and Paul Thurston, 2003.  
420 Kenneth Farkas and Paul Thurston, 2003; Gary J . Pagliano and Ronald O'Rourke,2004, Evolutionary Acquisition 
an Spiral Development in Programs : Policy Issues for Congress (CRX Report for Congress).  
421 Kenneth Farkas and Paul Thurston, 2003; Gary J . Pagliano and Ronald O'Rourke,2004.  
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program422. This strategy was able to offer a relatively stable output to obtain the required capabilities for 
the military transformation by focusing on the known part in the beginning, and gradually upgrading the 
known part with each complete increment of the unknown parts. 
In order to pursue evolutionary acquisition strategy, the spiral development was suggested as a 
preferred process in 2003423. This development process has five steps: defining requirement, designing, 
coding-fabricating-integrating, experiments and tests, and assessing operational utility424. The process is 
applied to the development of the known part in a defense program and to each increment of the unknown 
part as well. The spiral development process is an interactive process that is to continue until the final 
product satisfies the requirement of each part or increment425. So, there can be more than one spiral 
development process in the known part and each increment of the unknown part in a program. Multiple 
spiral processes in a program development offer more opportunities for participants in a program to 
communicate with each other and to discuss possible risks that are expected during a program426. This 
process provides more chances to discover flaws and risks, then to remedy them in a timely manner 
within a single spiral process.  
2. Military Transformation and Industrial Base  
It is an inevitable fact that the United States industrial bases were the essential foundation of the 
US military power and a driving force for the United States to win the Cold War427. Since 1941, during 
                                                          
422 Kenneth Farkas and Paul Thurston, 2003; Gary J . Pagliano and Ronald O'Rourke,2004. 
423 The Under Secretary of Defense, 2002, Memorandum for Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development 
(http://www.secnav.navy.mil/rda/Policy/2002%20Policy%20Memoranda/041202acq.pdf); Kenneth Farkas and 
Paul Thurston, 2003. 
424 The Under Secretary of Defense, 2002; Kenneth Farkas and Paul Thurston, 2003; Gary J . Pagliano and Ronald 
O'Rourke,2004.  
425 The Under Secretary of Defense, 2002; Kenneth Farkas and Paul Thurston, 2003; Gary J . Pagliano and Ronald 
O'Rourke,2004. 
426 The Under Secretary of Defense, 2002; Kenneth Farkas and Paul Thurston, 2003; Gary J . Pagliano and Ronald 
O'Rourke,2004 
427 Kenneth Flamm, 2005, “Post-Cold War Policy and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base,” in The Bridge (NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING); Joel S. Yudken, 2009, MANUFACTURING INSECURITY AMERICA’S MANUFACTURING 
CRISIS AND THE EROSION OF THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE (Industrial Union Council, AFL-CIO); Barry D. 
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the Second World War, the production capacity of military arsenals was exceeded by the war-time 
demand of the US military428. During the Cold War, the Military-Industry-Congress complex was an 
indispensable option to maintaining military superiority to the Soviet Union and the WARSAW Pact429. 
This concrete complex of the Military-Industry-Congress was starting to be reconsidered, when economic 
conditions worsened in the 1980’s. Furthermore, a critical reconstructing of defense industries was 
required when the Cold War ended in the late 1980’s.  
The gloomy national economic condition required the US Government to reduce the defense 
budget as well as the size of the US military. The Department of Defense had to make decisions regarding 
various programs that had started during the Cold War, while the Department still needed the industrial 
bases to develop necessary weapon systems and to supply military goods. Defense industries were put in 
a situation in which they should choose one of two options – to abandon the production line or to find 
other ways to survive the crisis after the Cold War. Congress could not simply choose an ideal option that 
fitted economic conditions, because defense industries were a significant issue to senators and 
representatives from the states or districts whose local economies were closely tied to companies within 
defense industries.   
When this Military-Industry-Congress Complex was about to collapse, the Department of 
Defense requested the defense industries to pursue the consolidation between companies430. Furthermore, 
the Department of Defense and Congress worked together to lower the bars of restrictions on defense 
related technologies, which were banned to be released to the free market during the Cold War431. 
Congress built legislative grounds to release the ban on dual-use technologies which were able to be used 
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in civilian businesses432. The Department of Defense offered practical guidelines to discern between 
critical military technologies and dual-use technologies.  
In this situation, the Military Transformation brought significant benefits to defense industries 
which had a troubled time after the Cold War by offering two opportunities for innovation. The Military 
Transformation during the post-Cold War era was the visions and plans for the US military to pursue the 
Revolution in Military Affairs, exploiting advancements in information technology in the early 1990’s433. 
The Military Transformation required defense industries to develop advanced technologies for the 
network centric warfare434 that the Department of Defense developed to pursue the Revolution in Military 
Affairs. The core part of the network-centric warfare was to develop the network that could connect the 
nodes to share the information435.  Research on information technology and development of network 
systems436 were the innovative areas of defense industries.  
                                                          
432 US Congress, 1993, “Sec. 204. Funding for Defense Conversion and Reinvestment Research and Development  
Programs” in H.R. 2401- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, the 103rd Congress 
433 Transformation started with development of new way of war fighting (for example, Joint Vision 2010) and the 
technologies that could support the doctrines. After developing the doctrines and technologies, the military asked 
defense industries to develop and supply the required equipment and systems in order to transform the military 
into the organization suitable for the vision. If industries did not have the capabilities to produce equipment that 
the military needs, military transformation would not initiate. So, the military transformation was a symbiotic 
strategy to save industrial bases and transform the US military into a future force.  
434 This concept was developed within the US military as a way to achieve military transformation. It is contrasted 
to the platform centric warfare which focuses on the ability of each individual platform such as submarines, 
destroyers, and aircraft careers. A decentralized network of forces share information in order to engage targets 
more efficiently, precisely, and quickly from greater distances and from all directions. Network centric operations 
are expected to bring four key benefits such as increased speed of command, self-synchronization, advanced 
targeting and greater tactical stability. This concept has following features. First, the nodes perform as sensors 
with network to provide shooters and commanders with unmatched awareness of the battle space. Second, with 
precision guided munitions and shared information, it is possible to destroy targets with fewer shots. Third, this 
situation allows small U.S. forces to impose a disproportionate effect on adversaries. Fourth, fewer American 
assets are vulnerable to an enemy attack on particular platforms or areas with sensors, shooters, and their 
supporting infrastructure geographically dispersed within an overarching network. Fifth, smaller, lighter, faster, 
and less complex nodes are required to realize this doctrine. 
435 The concept of the Network Centric Warfare consisted of the nodes and networks. In the Network Centric 
Warfare, nodes perform as sensors to collect information and platforms to strike opponents. At the same time, 
networks connect these nodes to share the information with each other.  
436 It includes three levels of system integration such as weapon system integration, platform integration, and 
system of systems.  
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On the other hand, the Military Transformation also asked defense industries to develop advanced 
nodes and platforms that could perform in network systems. The Military Transformation innovated the 
nodes and platforms into two ways – disruptive innovation and sustaining innovation. Some nodes and 
platforms like Unmanned Aerial Vehicles were developed on the basis of new technologies and concepts 
to satisfy the requirements of network centric warfare, and they opened new fields of business437. These 
new fields of business required defense industries to construct new infrastructure for production and 
development, and this type of innovation – disruptive innovation438 – did not guarantee the privilege that 
traditional defense firms enjoyed.  
The Military Transformation also asked defense industries to modify the pre-existing platforms 
rather than develop whole new weapons systems. This type of innovation – sustaining innovations439 – 
asked to change the nodes and platforms into proper forms for network centric warfare, even though it did 
not require the abandonment of previous versions of nodes and platforms. Traditional weapon systems 
such as armored vehicles, jet fighters, and ships440 were still required to perform as nodes and platforms. 
Differing from the previous warfare, the network centric warfare required the nodes and platforms to 
perform as a part of networks.  
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ship designs would be modular so that these ships could be rapidly reconfigured for other missions even though 
they were optimized for missions in one environment.  
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The nodes in networks perform as a sensor to collect battle field intelligence and share the 
information through networks441. The platforms in networks were required to synchronize their 
performances in the battle fields by sharing information and communicating with each other through 
networks in order to increase combat effectiveness442. This requirement did not need the previous version 
of platforms which were expensive and vulnerable to asymmetrical threats because these platforms were 
equipped with all the devices and weapon systems in a unit. Rather, the network centric warfare required 
the deployment of more units which were less expensive but equipped with mission essential 
capabilities443. More units connected with each other through networks generate higher combat 
effectiveness than one unit with all the capabilities.  
Consequently, the military transformation based on the network-centric warfare offered three 
areas of business to defense industries such as development of new platforms and nodes, modification of 
traditional platforms, and network systems to connect these nodes and platforms. These were valuable 
opportunities for defense industries to survive the serious crisis in the early 1990’s, and for the United 
States government to maintain industrial bases for national defense.  
3. JSF444 F-35: Cold War Legacy or Representative of Military 
Transformation?  
A. Why does F-35 matter? 
F-35 is the jet fighter that has been developed and eventually will be purchased by the US 
military. This airplane matters politically, because several issues regarding F-35 have been considered in 
the US Congress, specifically in the process of determining the annual budget for the US Federal 
                                                          
441 Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, Andrew L. Ross , 2002; 2003; 2006, Buying Military Transformation: 
Technological Innovation and the Defense Industry (Columbia University Press: New York) 
442 Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, Andrew L. Ross , 2002; 2003; 2006. 
443 Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, Andrew L. Ross , 2002; 2003; 2006. 
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government445. In regard with the budget size, the F-35 JSF program has taken a large portion of the US 
defense budget. In 2011, $10.7 billion was allocated to the F-35 JSF program, which was the largest 
amount in the program budget446.  
Furthermore, one amendment related to the JSF program became a noticeable issue in the annual 
appropriation process in 2011. The amendment was about cancellation of the second engine development 
for the F-35, and the amount of budget for the F-35 in the amendment is 450 million dollars447. 
Considering the amount in the amendment and in the budget for the F-35 in FY 2011 ($ 450 million and 
$11 billion, respectively), the amendment as well as the F-35 program itself might have been a serious 
concern for members of Congress in regard to budget amount. In reality, the story of the amendment 
regarding F-35 was covered by prominent news media including the New York Times448. The Department 
of Defense released its own position449, and President Obama expressed his opinion450. So what made the 
F-35 program receive such political attention at that time? 
First, the F-35 is a unique and special military aircraft as a weapon system and cannot but get a 
significant level of attention from various interested parties including members of Congress. The F-35 
was developed to replace the jet fighters not only for the Air Force but also for the Navy and Marine 
Corps. The F-35 is much more capable and advanced than the jetfighters being replaced by the F-35 in 
regards to warfighting, avionics, and operating system software. The large amount of production and 
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advanced technology enticed defense industries; three military services focused on the advance 
capabilities of the F-35; the large size of the budget made Congress concerned about the JSF program.   
Second, the F-35 was a critical issue in Congress, considering the fact that an amendment 
regarding F-35 was drafted in Congress and passed through a roll-call vote during the Congressional 
budget process, specifically appropriation process451. The amendment was submitted to the annual 
appropriation bill of 2012 and it contained an adjustment of budget for the F-35452. Since a specific 
amendment was drafted for a certain weapon system and the amendment was processed by roll-call votes, 
it means that the weapon system was spotlighted during the Congressional budget process and the 
decision regarding the weapon system reflected the decision of each member of Congress.  
Third, the severe national financial situation in 2011 made each participant in defense policy 
more sensitive to any possible budget cut from defense programs which had been already qualified to 
continue, and members of Congress got interested in F-35 when the jet fighter became an issue in 
Congress. The primary issue of the F-35 in the 46th amendment to the defense appropriations bill FY 2012 
was whether the alternative engine was necessary for the F-35 program, which was designed as a single 
engine jet fighter.  
Fourth, members of Congress were interested in the F-35, because the F-35 has significant 
functions in the national military strategy. The three military services – such as the Air Force, the Navy, 
and the Marine Corps – planned to purchase more than 2,590 F-35s and these F-35s would be deployed to 
the missions such as air-to-air battle, close air support, and various strike missions453. Specifically, the 
advanced air-to-air combat capability was the essential part of national defense to ensure the air 
superiority that guarantees the freedom of action in other military operations, including long range 
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strategic bombing, ground operations, and naval operations. In other words, it means that F-35 was 
developed to perform significant strategic or specific tactical roles in the concept of US military strategy 
or national defense policy.   
These four arguments is merged into two main ideas: first, F-35 is important in the aspect of 
military affairs due to its unique features as a weapon system and its role in the military strategy; second, 
F-35 mattered in the political aspect – specifically, Congress – because it was under consideration in the 
Congressional budgetary process because of the external financial condition. 
B. F-35 as a weapon system 
The F-35 has the following features as a war-fighting aircraft. First, it is the fifth generation jet454 
fighter which is designed to replace the currently used aircrafts such as F-16 (Air Force), F- 18 (Navy), 
AV-8 (Marine Corps). The missions executed by the previous generations’ jet fighters will be on the 
mission list of F-35.  
Second, F-35 is a stealth jet fighter which means that the jet fighter can avoid the radar tracking 
from adversaries. The stealth technology was also implemented in other legendary jet fighters, such as F-
22 and in strategic bombers such as B-2 and F-117. Differing from these bombers which lack the air-to-
air combat capability, F-35 matches other jet fighters in regards to close air-to-air combat capability. 
 Third, F-35 has a situational awareness system455 that offers information superiority to other jet 
fighters. This system enables F-35 to function with more clear vision of the battle situation in which the 
jet fighter conducts its missions. In addition to situational awareness456, F-35 is designed to share data and 
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information that each unit gathers with other units. It means that F -35 was developed to perform as a part 
of a network that connects available assets in a combat situation.  
Fourth, F-35 is Joint Strike Fighter457 which means that F- 35 will be purchased and used by more 
than one military service including Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. This is against the tradition of 
weapon acquisition in which each service developed its own weapon system. It is still debatable that 
different requirements from different military services can justify each military service’s rationale to 
pursue development of a jet fighter independently from other military services. At least there is a sharing 
point: they all want to have the best jet fighter to maintain air superiority while doing military operations.  
C. A-X/A/FX and MRF: the Origins of the F-35  
Developing a new jet fighter was not new at all. The beginning of F-35 was not different from 
other legacy jet fighters. At the beginning, the primary purpose was the development of a jet fighter that 
could replace the legacy jet fighters such as the F- 16 for the US Air Force, the F-18 and A-6 for the US 
Navy, and the AV-8 for the US Marine Corps. These legacy jet fighters are tactical jet fighters which are 
responsible for maintaining air superiority and applying airpower in maritime warfare and land warfare458.   
Air superiority has been one for the top priorities in the US Military since air power became a 
significant factor in military affairs459. To be superior in the air, to have air superiority, means having 
sufficient control of the air to make air attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and, on the other 
hand, to be free from the danger of serious enemy air incursions460. Furthermore, air superiority is the 
enabling factor that guarantees success of other components of airpower.461 On a strategic level, a 
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strategic air force cannot penetrate into enemy territory without having air superiority. On a tactical and 
operational level, an air force cannot guarantee sufficient and stable support to naval forces or ground 
forces in the absence of air superiority.  
Once air superiority is attained and maintained, airpower can be applied in ground operations and 
naval operations. For ground operations, airpower can destroy, disrupt, divert, or delay the enemy’s 
surface military potential462. Air power also provides direct support to help friendly surface forces in 
contact with enemy forces carry out their assigned tasks463.  For naval operations, air power is extended 
into maritime environments and assumes various tasks encompassing sea surveillance, anti-ship warfare, 
and protection of sea line of communication464.   
All the legacy jet fighters were developed to perform either one or both of these two missions to 
maintain air superiority and to support other operations. A-6 and AV-8 have been deployed to primarily 
perform Close Air Support mission for Navy or Marine Corps465. F-16 and F-18 have been deployed to 
maintain air superiority but they also have equipped sufficient capabilities to perform other supporting 
missions like CAS and air interdictions466. However, differences in operational environments led the US 
Air Force and the Navy to develop separate jet fighters for similar roles and functions. The Marine Corps’ 
operational environment required the capability of vertical take-off and landing467, and led the Marine 
Corps to acquire AV-8. The carrier-based operational environment required Navy jet fighters to equip 
specific capabilities or devices such as twin engines, landing gears with stable positioning, and hook 
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arrest gear468. These capabilities are not necessary to Air Force jet fighters but are essential capabilities to 
operate in maritime operations based on aircraft carriers. A-6 has stable and wide landing gear and twin 
engines, and F-18 has all three capabilities. On the other hand, operational environments ask the US Air 
Force to focus on air-to-air combat capabilities such as air maneuverability469, rather than to be concerned 
about aircraft carriers. This operational environment led the U.S. Air Force to develop F -16. 
When all of these legacy jet fighters were required to be replaced, each military service proposed 
to acquire their own next jet fighters which were fit to the services' operational environments. The U.S. 
Air Force proposed the Multi-Role Fighters (MRF)470 program and the Navy initiated the Advanced 
Attacker/ Advanced Attacker/Fighter (A-X/A/FX)471 program. Along with them, the Defense Advanced 
Research Project Agency (DARPA) prepared to develop a next generation concept of vertical take-off and 
landing aircraft technologies (Advanced Short Take-Off/ Vertical Landing Program: ASTOVL)472.  
 
D. JSAT and JSF: Joint-ness and Industrial Bases 
When the Cold War ended, economy rather than security started to drive defense industries and 
weapon development programs. The services began to initiate weapon development programs jointly. 
When the Navy proposed A-X/ A/F-X program to replace A-6, the Air Force participated in the 
development program in order to replace F-111473. Moreover, the economic environment in the early 
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1990’s did not allow the services to proceed to develop all these jet fighter programs. Furthermore, the 
security environment did not offer specific reasons to develop all these jet fighters or to replace outdated 
weapon systems. However, the US government had to maintain the industrial bases that produced military 
equipment during the Cold War era, because the United States still needed to maintain the military forces 
which could engage globally and these industrial bases were also critical economic bases to the US 
national economy474.  
The Department of Defense recommended defense industries consolidating companies and 
merging into several representative companies within similar industry fields475. Sixteen aircraft 
manufacturing companies were merged into five companies at the end of the 1990’s476.  Furthermore, the 
Department of Defense canceled similar defense programs and merged them into fewer representative 
programs477. In order to save the merged programs, the Department of Defense put the programs into the 
Research and Development phase and encouraged the foreign governments and defense industries to 
participate in these programs. MRF program, ASTOVL program and A-X/A/F-X program were canceled 
and merged into Joint Advanced Strike Technologies (JAST) Program in 1993478. Later, the Common 
Affordable Lightweight Fighter Program (ALWF), which was initiated by DARPA and the Navy to 
develop a VTOL jet fighter for the Marine Corps, was merged into JAST program in 1994479. JAST 
program was developed into the Joint Strike Fighter program in 1997. After the X-35 – which is a 
prototype of F-35 – was chosen as the winner of competition for the JSF program, eight countries decided 
                                                          
474 John Deutch , 2001, “CONSOLIDATION OF THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” in Acquisition Review Quarterly ; 
Kenneth Flamm, 2005; Joel S. Yudken, 2009; Barry D. Watts and Todd Harrison, 2011 
475 John Deutch , 2001; Kenneth Flamm, 2005; Joel S. Yudken, 2009; Barry D. Watts and Todd Harrison, 2011.  
476 Kenneth Flamm, 2005. 
477 Les Aspin, 1993, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Department of Defense) 
478 Under Secretary of Defense, 1994, CHARTER for the JOINT ADVANCED STRIKE TECHNOLOGY (JAST) PROGRAM 
(Department of Defense), pp.1-4 
479 Under Secretary of Defense, 1994 
131 
 
 
 
to participate in the development of F-35 JSF program which was entitled as a ‘fifth generation jet 
fighter’480.  
 
E. The Fifth Generation Jet Fighter: where does it come from? 
Looking back the origin of the concept of the fifth generation jet fighter, this was not a concept 
that had a commonly shared base within the communities of the Air Force and related industries. There 
were a couple of systems that offered different ways to classify the generations of jet fighters. In 1990, 
Dr. Hallion offers the system of the six generations of jet fighters481. This system is based primarily on the 
engines that equipped the jet fighters. Each generation of jet fighter has a turbo engine equivalent to a 
generation of jet fighter. The system also matches the series of jet fighter acquisition plans of the US Air 
Force. Basically, The US Air Force attempted to develop the next generation jet fighter when new threats 
appeared or a new jet fighter was developed by the opponent – which means the Soviet Union482. 
According to this system, F-35 and F-22 will be the seventh generation jet fighters, if they are considered 
as the next generation fighters.  
The other system has the four generations instead of the six generations of Dr. Hallion’s 
system483. This system is based on the comprehensive capabilities of jet fighters484. Moreover, this system 
focuses on the capabilities that are easily understood to those who do not have professional and technical 
knowledge about the jet fighter. This is the reason that the system has been more commonly mentioned as 
                                                          
480 https://www.f35.com/about/history (as of Feb. 28. 2015); 
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the reference to generations of jet fighters. The concept of the fifth generation fits to this system. In 
conclusion, F-22 and F-35 can be the seventh generation in the system of Dr. Hallion, while they are 
considered as fifth generation jet fighters in the other system. 
Even though many sources referred to F-22 and F-35 as the examples of the fifth generation jet 
fighter, there was no concept like the fifth generation of jet fighter when these jet fighters were 
determined to be developed. As I searched the related documents released around the time period in 
which both jet fighters were developed, F-22 was mentioned only as the “next” generation jet fighter not 
the “fifth generation” fighter485. Moreover, the objective of F-22 development was less fancy than the 
current specifications of the fifth generation jet fighter. F-22 was conceptualized and developed under the 
program of the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) in the late 1980’s486. The primary purpose of the ATF 
program was to replace F-15 in order to maintain air superiority, since the Soviet Union successfully 
developed jet fighters such as MIG-29 and SU-35 that could match F-15 in air-to-air combat 
capabilities487. Literally, the first jet fighter considered as the fifth generation jet fighter was the byproduct 
of competition for air superiority during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in 
the late 1980’s.  
After the Cold War ended, there was no change in the necessity for a next generation fighter that 
could help the US Air Force maintain air superiority. F-35 is the one of the programs to secure the air 
superiority of the United States in the post-Cold War era. F-35 originated from the programs of the Joint 
Advance Strike Technologies (JAST). From the beginning, F-35 was quite different from F-22 in several 
aspects. While F- 22 had a clear source of threat to oppose, F-35 did not have a clear objective to fight 
against except the broader goal of maintaining of air superiority488. In this situation, the term of “next” 
                                                          
485 James S. Browne, 1997; Michael J Costigan, 1997; Devin L Kate, 2003. 
486 James S. Browne, 1997; Michael J Costigan, 1997; Devin L Kate, 2003. 
487 James S. Browne, 1997; Michael J Costigan, 1997; Devin L Kate, 2003. 
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generation does not mean just some descriptions of generational changes that the new jet fighter would 
achieve, but a mirror image that the new jet fighter had to struggle with. The JAST program is an example 
of a capability based approach in the transformation after the Cold War because the development of the 
JAST program was pursued to achieve capabilities under uncertain threats. Moreover, when JAST was 
developed as a concept of jet fighter technologies, the economic aspect was considered as an important 
part. To reduce the cost of development, the concept of joint-ness and international cooperation 
significantly affected the whole development process489. This is also different from the case of F-22 in 
which the economic factor was not the primary concern. 
Considering the development process of these jet fighters, I argue that F-22 and F-35 did not have 
a clear connection with the concept of the fifth generation jet fighter when they were under consideration 
of development. Rather, the concept of fifth generation was introduced later when these jet fighters 
became its first operational members. Now the question is who did this and how this happened.  
Several sources mentioned that the concept of the fifth generation jet fighter was coined during 
the mid-1990's by Russia, who attempted to develop jet fighters that could match the F-22, which was 
described as an example of the fifth generation of jet fighters490. Giovanni de Briganti further argues that 
this concept, released to the media by the Russian aviation companies who had financial problems after 
the Cold War in the late 1990’s, eventually became popular491. Lockheed Martin also started to describe 
F-22 and F-35 as the fifth generation jet fighter around the year of 2004 almost 10 years after this 
                                                          
489 The Department of Defense, 1993, the Report of Bottom-Up Review; William S. Cohen,1997, Annual Report to 
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company won the contract for the development of the F-35492. Congress also began to mention the term 
“fifth generation jet fighter” in the bills related to jet fighter procurement in 2004493. In conclusion, I 
argue that the concept or the term of the fifth generation did not originate from the intentions of the US 
Air Force, who developed the concept of the weapon procurement programs, but it was brought by the 
potential opponent – the Russians – as a way of defining the objective of competition for military 
superiority against the US. I further argue that Lockheed Martin intended to use the term of the fifth 
generation as a catchphrase and sold the concept as well as its products – F-22 and F-35 – to the US 
government including Congress.  
 
F. Military Transformation, American Militarism and JSF F-35 Program  
From the perspective of weapon acquisition process, it is controversial to argue that the JSF F-35 
program is a representative weapon development program of the Military Transformation. First, the JSF 
program was not a product of the Joint Capability Integration and Development System. Even though this 
program was named as a ‘joint’ program, it was a merger proposal of several jet fighter development 
programs initiated by each service. Considering various flaws discovered in the design phase, the 
specification and requirements had not matured sufficiently before the program entered into the 
development phase.  Moreover, the Department of Defense determined to develop the F-35 even before 
the JCIDS was in effect.  
However, the F-35 has the features of the Evolutional Acquisition and Spiral Developments. The 
program was divided into the known part and the unknown part. The known parts were the engine 
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development, the stealth technologies, and radar systems. These technologies and devices were already 
developed and implemented for several predecessors. Even though maturations and modifications were 
required, these technologies were expected to be completed within the appropriate time frame.  The 
unknown part included the situation awareness system, the data sharing system, and the operating system 
including the helmet mounted display. Specifically, the F-35 applied a block development approach for 
the operating software program, which includes five blocks from the version of training configuration to 
the version of full warfighting capability494.  
On the other hand, the program shows a clear connection with the industrial bases. This 
connection led the JSF F-35 program to American Militarism which can be featured as ‘overly 
ambitious,’ ‘not efficient,’ and ‘not reasonable.’ There are five evidences which show that American 
Militarism has influenced the development of the Joint Strike Fighter.  
First, the purchasers – Congress and the Department of Defense – have not exercised the proper 
authority over the merchandiser – Lockheed Martin and its associates –, even though there have been 
significant flaws in the program495. It means that the one who is going to buy could not make sound 
decisions on a reasonable basis. The department of defense and Congress were reluctant to take action on 
the program when several significant flaws occurred. The Government Accounting Office had warned 
about possible program failure and cost overrun, and recommended restructuring the JSF program almost 
every year since 2001496. During the development period, the Department of Defense had not seriously 
considered these warnings and recommendations, and reluctantly responded to them with minor changes 
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or non-action, continuing to show confidence about the original development strategy and plan497. Even 
though the Department of Defense re-planned the JSF program three times during this period, all these 
changes were initiated only after the program faced incurable problems498. The Department of Defense’s 
inaction caused the program to miss out on opportunities for timely remedies in the JSF program. 
Furthermore, considering that all these Government Accounting Office’s reports were drafted to report to 
Congressional committees499, Congress had partial responsibility for the cost overrun and delivery delay 
of the JSF program. 
Serious technical flaws were found after the program entered the system development and 
demonstration phase500. These flaws led the program to massive changes in its airframe design. Massive 
changes in the design caused a delay in release of a prototype and test flights, and eventually a serious 
delay in production and delivery of the F-35s to the services501. All these factors generated a large amount 
of cost overrun for the development of the joint strike fighter. Even though the department of defense 
proposed an entire restructuring of the JSF program in 2010502, there has been no clear evidence that the 
department of defense and Congress made proper decisions to remedy the flaws of the program decisively 
and properly when those flaws occurred. The restructuring was done only after the program confronted 
serious disarray. Consequently, it means that these purchasers did not engage the program responsibly. 
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Department of Defense chose the X-35 as the winner of the Joint Strike Fighter program. The primary reason was 
the lack of weapon containing space. It happened in the F-35 variant B (the Navy Model), it impacted all the other 
variants’ design because all three variants of the F-35 shared the airframe.  It means that the Department of 
Defense decided to start the program even before a match between the customer’s requirements and the 
resources and technologies for those requirements.   
499 All the reports included in the footnote 511 have the title of “Report to Congressional Committees, United 
States Government Accountability Office.” 
500 GAO, 2005, TACTICAL AIRCRAFT: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter Program with Different 
Acquisition Strategy, pp.5-6 
501 GAO, 2005, p.9, and p. 11. 
502 Jeremiah Gertler, 2014, CRS Report: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, pp. 28-30; GAO, 2010, JOINT STRIKE 
FIGHTER: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time, pp 22-24. 
137 
 
 
 
Second, the program did not satisfy the requirements of the final consumers - the Air Force, the 
Navy and the Marine Corps. Within the Air Force, there have been continuous objections to the 
development of the F-35503. In the warfighting aspect, pilots requested buying more F-22s rather than 
developing the F-35, arguing that F-22 guarantees better performance in air-to-air battle situations504. In 
addition to that, the Navy has kept insisting that F-18 E/F would be a better choice than the JSF in regard 
to survivability and timely replacement of the retiring jet fighters505. Specifically, the Navy was skeptical 
of the single engine jet fighter because it reduces the survivability of pilots when jetfighters operate with 
aircraft carriers. Furthermore, when the department of defense released the plan to develop the sixth 
generation jet fighter, the Navy announced that the sixth generation jet fighter would be replaced with the 
F-18 E/F, not the fifth generation jet fighter506. It is another evidence that the Navy has not recognized the 
F-35 as a proper replacement for F-18. Consequently, the services are not satisfied with the F-35 as their 
fifth generation jet fighter or a proper replacement of the retiring jet fighter. 
Third, saving the industrial base and keeping it competitive in the international markets has been 
a critical interest of the U.S. Government, and it was the environment in which the JSF program began507. 
Even though the defense industrial base thrived during the Cold War era, the defense industry faced a 
series of challenges even before the Cold War ended. The primary reason was that the US industrial bases 
had been losing competitiveness in the global market in the 1980’s. It happened in almost every industry, 
including electronics, automobiles, air planes, and even finances. It does not mean that the US industrial 
bases were totally broken up but that the US was losing the world power status with regard to industrial 
capabilities in the 1980’s. Considering that defense budget was one of the sources to keep the industrial 
bases vital, this situation was more aggravated during the post-Cold War era due to reduced defense 
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budget508. In this situation, it was crucial to save the industrial base for manufacturing advanced weapon 
systems and keep them competitive both in the market and in the war fighting capability, in order to 
maintain technological superiority. To protect manufacturing capacity, the US government considered 
recommending consolidation within industries and partnership with foreign business partners509. This 
option required the US government – both the executive branch and the legislative branch – to decide to 
release ‘dual - use technology’ to the private sector, which had been previously prohibited to share with 
non-defense related companies or foreign companies. To stay competitive in the defense industries, robust 
research and development programs for new technologies were considered510. Even when the Department 
of Defense determined not to produce weapon systems, the department attempted to save the programs by 
putting the programs in the research and development section for technological maturation. 
The JSF program is one program which contributed to saving the US industrial bases. When the 
Department of Defense encountered the situation of canceling the programs that sought new tactical jet 
fighters for the Air Force and the Navy in the early 1990’s, the department put these programs in a 
research and development program to seek technologies for the next generation jet fighter, which was 
titled as “Joint Advanced Strike Technologies,” instead of canceling the programs511. The JAST program 
was later turned into the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 program. In addition to that, foreign countries were 
encouraged to participate in the development of the F-35. Foreign investment in the development of the 
F-35 covers almost 20 percent of total development cost ($4.375 billion / $25 billion)512. Moreover, there 
are more potential buyers who are willing to purchase F-35s, including development partners such as the 
United Kingdom, Italy, Netherland, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Norway, and Denmark. Foreign 
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investment and potential buyers in the JSF program are sources to save the industrial bases of the United 
States513.  
Fourth, the title “the fifth generation” did not come from any Services of the US military. The 
title was the catch-phrase of Lockheed Martin to sell F-35 to customers including the US military and 
other foreign partners. What the services used to describe a new jet fighter had been ‘a next generation’ 
jet fighter514. The US military had not numbered the generation of the jet fighter program before the 
development of F-35. What the Services did was to develop a next generation jet fighter to defeat 
enemies’ current jet fighter. Originally, the title came from Russia, who tried to sell its new jet fighter in 
the late 1990’s515. The Russian Weapon Corporation started to use the title of “fifth generation” jetfighter 
and the term was widely accepted throughout the international jet fighter market516. The Lockheed Martin 
Corporation used this term as a catchphrase for the new jet fighter which eventually would replace the 
legacy jet fighters such as F-16, F-18, A-6, and AV-8517. Now, the Department of Defense, Congress and 
military services are using the term of the fifth generation jet fighter to describe a family of advanced jet 
fighters518. It means that the US government bought the catch phrase of the fifth generation jet fighter and 
gave it the meaning of advanced jet fighter. Furthermore, when the Department of Defense recently 
                                                          
513 Moreover, it is necessary to shed light on the fact that there was already a fifth generation jetfighter – F-22 
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fifth generation aircraft was used in the report. Before the year of 2004, the term “next generation” was used in 
the annual DOD reports.  
140 
 
 
 
released a new jet fighter development program, the Department called it “the sixth generation” jet fighter 
instead a next generation jet fighter.  
Fifth, the decisions regarding the development of the F-35 were made without a solid 
technological basis. Specifically, it was too premature for the JSF program to enter the system 
development and demonstration (SDD) phase in 2001519. The decision to enter the SDD phase has been 
criticized as “signing a contract before a test flight520” and “against the tradition of business in defense 
industry521.” This premature decision led the program to the first restructuring in 2003 which was mostly 
about the redesign of airframe to secure more room for armament and reduce the weight caused by adding 
armament. Furthermore, the JSF program’s concurrency of technology advancement, program 
development, test, and production is substantial522. So it is highly probable that failure in one part can 
impact other parts of the program and lead the whole program to failure. In fact, the program 
development without technological maturation caused the increase in development cost and the depletion 
of reserve funds523. The depletion of reserve funds led to the second program restructuring in 2007, which 
contained the plan of entering the production phase while test flights were going on524. This flaw in the 
program was caused by the conflict of the program’s two main objectives – technological advancement 
and replacement of legacy jet fighter. The ambitious attempt to achieve both objectives became serious 
threats to the program. 
The Department of Defense recently released an announcement of the sixth generation jet fighter 
development initiative525. The concept of the sixth generation jet fighter makes the JSF program obsolete. 
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According to the released information, these two programs have shared features in avionics and stealth 
capability526.  Compared to the JSF program, the sixth generation jet fighter has significant differences in 
weapon systems and operating software programs – a directed energy weapon system and the addition of 
unmanned operating option527. Considering the two programs share capabilities in avionics and stealth 
technology while they are distinguished in weapon technology and operating software, it would have been 
a better option to invest time and resources in technological maturation while upgrading other legacy jet 
fighters to fill the jet fighter gap and then leap directly to the development of the sixth generation jet 
fighter. 
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Part II. Congressional Decision Making Process 
Militarism is a type of ideology that gives more value to military ideas than to civilian life. In 
general, militarism coincides with conservativism and individualism528.  Considering the political 
environment inside Congress and the public mood reflected in public opinion, it is highly probable that 
there has been a unique type of militarism in the United States. In the political arena, the congressional 
committee which is responsible for national defense seems to be inclined to be conservative in the matter 
of ideology – more conservative than the median in the House of Representatives. Speaking of public 
opinion, the US public has shown a relatively high level of confidence in the military compared to other 
public service organizations. The Gallup polls asking about public confidence in the military since the 
year 2001 have shown that the US public has maintained their support for their military, even after the 
twelve years of military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to that, I argue in the previous 
chapter that the level of public support to the military has positively influenced defense budget increases.  
However, these arguments do not explain what happens in each congressional district but rather 
what happens at the national level due to the following reasons. First, the House Armed Services 
Committee is responsible for the jurisdiction regarding national defense. The committee is the right unit 
of analysis to examine the ideological inclination of the House as a whole, but it does not represent the 
choices of each member of the House of Representatives. Second, the participants in the polls that I refer 
to in the previous chapter do not represent the position of each congressional district’s constituents. 
Rather, they were a sample to represent the whole American population. Both the ideological composition 
of the committee and polls at the national level are not the proper units of analysis to examine the effect 
of both ideology and public opinion on decision - making of members of the House of Representatives.  
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In order to scrutinize the influence of these factors on the decision-making process of each legislator – 
house members in congress –, the two factors of ideology and public opinion are required to be modified 
into proper form that can show their effect on each legislator’s decision-making process. In addition, it is 
required to put these factors in the context of previous studies and to find their meanings within the 
literature. 
Researchers have approached the legislative decision-making process with the two perspectives – 
Congress as a political institution and Congress as the place where individual legislators express their 
thoughts.  Previous literature has focused on the fact that Congress is an institution to be managed by 
several rules that define the parliamentary procedure of the US Congress, including the decision making 
process and other important business such as hearings. On top of the studies on individual legislators’ 
voting behavior, researchers have attempted to analyze the effect of rules that define the voting procedure 
in Congress. These studies show that it is possible to predict the result of a roll call vote by analyzing 
individual legislators’ voting patterns and the rules that define the parliamentary procedure regarding roll 
call vote.  The quorum to determine the result of a roll call vote in Congress is an example of these rules. 
  The previous literature also recommends using factors such as ideology, party, and committee 
membership to explain the decision-making process of legislators in Congress. When it comes to 
individual legislators, ideology and partisanship are the primary factors which influence legislators’ 
choices in roll-call votes. Furthermore, these factors also function as a linkage between constituents and 
their representatives. A few studies reveal that electoral connection between constituents and candidates – 
no matter whether they are incumbent candidates or challengers – generates desire for legislators to be re-
elected and leads them to synchronize their political attributes with constituents.  
In addition to that, the legislative decision-making process can be an economic issue when the 
Congressional budgetary process is involved. Specifically, defense budget is a discretionary budget which 
requires annual authorization and appropriation bills passed in Congress. In this case, national defense is 
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more than just an ideological matter. National defense has economic aspects and has influence over the 
national economy, including all level of administrative districts such as county, city and state. The 
congressional district is one of the administrative districts where national defense might influence the 
local economy. Electoral connection opens the possibility that several economic participants in defense 
policy such as defense industries can exercise influence over the legislative decision-making process 
through lobbying or political donation to legislators.  
            Plan of the Part 
In the following chapter, I describe in detail how previous theories and research programs 
examined the voting behaviors of members of Congress on the defense budget bills. 
Furthermore, I introduce the result of a pilot study – which examined the effect of traditional 
factors on the passage of amendments – as an example to show a mechanism in which the 
traditional factors may influence the Congressional decision-making process.  From the literature 
review and the pilot test, I shed light on the finding that the authorization process and 
appropriations process are quite different from each other, even though they are subordinate parts 
of the Congressional Budgetary Process, and further propose contributions that this dissertation 
can make to the literature.   
In chapter VI, I describe the data and the methodology that I use for the dissertation. I 
implement a linear regression model for analyzing the data which includes voting results of 
individual legislators and the contents of amendments regarding annual defense budget 
authorization and appropriation bills of the period from 1993 to 2012. The data also contains 
military contracts data, donations from Political Action Committees, and other economic factors.  
In chapter VII and VIII, I analyze the result of the model, draw implications, and address 
the problems and limitations of this research.
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Chapter 6. Congressional Decision-Making and Budgetary Process 
 
The research topic of this dissertation is congressional influence on defense policies. Before 
getting into the topic, it is required to investigate how previous studies have approached this topic. 
Congressional influence on defense policies has been studied with the following three perspectives: 
defense policy as a federal policy, Congress as a political institution, and the federal budget process that 
includes authorization and appropriation processes. In addition, I analyzed how factors like party status, 
vote predations based on ideology determine the fate of amendments and how differently these factors 
influence the vote results in authorization process as compared to appropriations process. 
 
1. Defense Policy as a Federal Policy 
As I stated in the first chapter, defense policy deals with two fronts -- one for external threats, the 
other for its domestic foundations. Along these two fronts, scholars have divided defense policies into three 
categories: strategic policy, crisis policy and structural policy (Huntington, 1961).529 Strategic policy and 
crisis policy primarily deal with the external threats while structural policy deals with the domestic 
foundations (Ripley, 1980).  
According to Huntington, structural policy issues are related to personnel, organizations and 
equipment procurement (Huntington, 1961; Kaufman et.al., 1985; Hays et.al., 1997). Generally, Congress 
makes the final decision on each policy agenda of structural defense policy through the formal legislative 
process, even though policies are initiated by the Department of Defense and its services (Ripley, 1980). 
Previous studies focused on congressional budgetary authority over the defense budgets and the connections 
between defense budgets and constituents. (Rundquist et.al, 1996; 1999; 2002; Thorpe, 2011)  
                                                          
2. The difference between strategic policy and crisis policy is unclear due to the fact that these two sub areas of 
defense policy deal with same aspect of defense policy (Huntington, 1961).  One possible way to distinguish one 
from the other is to focus on the phase each of them is related to. Strategic policy is more about to develop 
strategies on the basis of expectation on future contingency while crisis policy is about how to deal on-going crisis 
with strategies which were developed in advance.   
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On the other hand, strategic policy pursues specific programs or deals with special situations. Those 
programs and situations are initiated by external threats such as changes of the international security 
environment (Huntington, 1961; Ripley, 1980, Hays et.al. 1997). Additionally, crisis policy is about how 
to deal with the crises which occur with unexpected time and space (Ripley, 1980; 1988). Scholars have 
focused on the presidential use of force in the event of international crisis (Baker, 2001;Hetherington, 2003; 
Groeloing, 2008). Most studies attempted to analyze the impact of presidential use of force on public 
opinion or the effect of changes in public opinion on the following changes of military strategies, including 
use of force during the prolonged period of crisis (Baker, 2001;Hetherington, 2003; Groeloing, 2008).  
Because strategic and crisis policies require the responsible agencies of policies to react with 
professional skills and knowledge within a relatively short time, the president and the Department of 
Defense have the authority to initiate actions, even though Congress has the final decision authority (Ripley, 
1980). Considering the fact that these policy areas are classified for professional soldiers, these have been 
not the subjects of negotiation or bargaining in Congress but one of persuasions required to gain support 
from Congress (Huntington, 1961, Hays et.al. 1997). Congress also has been inclined to defer to the 
executive branch’s initiatives on military strategies in defense policy.  
On presidential and executive branches’ strong initiatives in strategic issues, Deering comments 
that it is difficult for Congress to influence the execution of defense policy, especially strategic issues, 
because execution of defense policy is entirely up to professional soldiers and military organizations 
(Deering et.al, 1989). As a consequence, he argues that the only areas in defense policy in which Congress 
can assert its influence are budget related areas such as program authorization and budget authorization 
(Deering et.al, 1989).  
Hays et.al.(1997) argue that the influence of Congress has been increased in the defense policy 
decision-making process because defense policy is related to the federal budget process. Referring to the 
fact that a budget can be effective after passing the process of authorization and appropriations, they argue 
that it is necessary to analyze how military-related actors, such as Congress, the Department of Defense, 
and each service, interact with Congress during the processes of authorization and appropriation (Hays et 
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al., 1997). Some scholars attempted to analyze how public opinion influences the scale of the defense 
budget (Hartley et. al, 1992, Rundquist et.al.,1999; 2002). 
Rundquist and Carsey attempted to apply the distributive politics theory to defense spending, 
arguing that it is problematic to understand defense spending as simply a public good for the national 
security (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). They developed a model that includes party, committee, ideology, 
benefit to constituencies, and universalism as independent variables. Then, they applied it to defense 
spending from 1963 to 1995.  They concluded that defense spending can be accurately examined and 
predicted using distributive politics theories, and that defense spending is one of the target areas over 
which most members of Congress desire to exert their influence (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). 
In addition to that, other studies analyzed how Congress affected certain defense procurement 
programs such as missile defense and SDI (Strategic Defense Initiatives) (Lindsay, 1990; Rundquist and 
Carsey, 2002). While doing these projects, most scholars analyze how each member of Congress votes for 
the specific programs and which facts determine their voting behaviors (Lindsay, 1990; Higgs, 1988; 
Twight, 1989).530 
 Some defense specialists attempted to analyze defense budgets in the aspect of connection with 
national economic status (Choshroy, 2011; Lindsay and Ripley, 1992). They found that the budget of 
RDT&E (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) has been hidden from detailed scrutiny largely 
because it is politically safe for members of Congress to support research, while defense procurement 
programs have been scrutinized by both public and Congress (Choshroy, 2011; Lindsay and Ripley, 1992).    
 
As the result of literature review on defense policy, I can conclude that the most significant area of 
defense policy over which Congress can exercise its authority is structural defense policy, specifically the 
                                                          
530 In Congress and Defense Policy, Barry S. Rundquist et.al used Prime Contractor Award as measurement of 
defense budget in order to find the specific amount of budget that benefitted the certain states or district 
(Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). 
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defense budget. Moreover, it is necessary to analyze the budget items which include RDT&E as well as 
procurement programs by which legislators can benefit their constituencies. 
 
2. Congress as a Political Institution 
Institutionally, Congress has authority and power to approve the federal policies pursued by the 
executive branch. Considering the fact that defense policy is one of the federal policy areas affected by 
congressional influence, it is necessary to understand how Congress makes decisions to use its authority. 
This issue has been studied and analyzed within the framework of the political institutions of the 
American government (Deering et.at., 1997; Poole and Rosenthal, 1991; Krehbiel, 1998;  Rundquist and 
Carsey, 2002;  Cox and McCubbin, 2005 ).  
A. The Process in which a Bill Takes in House531 
Before getting into the case, it is necessary to understand the process through which U.S. House 
of Representatives deals with proposed bills. First, one of Representatives or Senators submits a bill to his 
chamber with his own sponsorship. The bill will be given its legislative number and referred to the 
committee, which has a jurisdiction over the area related to the bill, by the House Speaker. Second, once 
the committee receives the bill, the members of the committee modify the bill through the processes of 
public hearings and markup sessions. After that, the members of the committee determine whether or not 
it will report the bill to the floor. If the committee determines to report the bill, it sends a committee report 
which has a title and a number that includes a prefix of ‘House Report532’ to the floor.  Third, when a bill 
arrives at the floor of the House, the bill enters the process of debates and amendments. The debate 
process is the process in which members of House are discussing whether or not the contents of the bill 
are eligible for the purpose of the bill. If a bill is determined not to be eligible to pass, the bill moves to 
                                                          
531 John V. Sullivan, 2007, How our laws are made, Washington D.C : USGPO 
532 John V. Sullivan, 2007, pp.15-18. 
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the process of amendments. The amendment process is the process in which members of House are 
discussing and determining which part of the contents of a bill is required to be changed, how it needs to 
be modified, and whether this change will be made through votes. The votes can take the form of several 
types such as roll call votes, voiced votes, etc. Fourth, after completing all these processes, members of 
the House determine to pass the bill by a vote. 
In the congressional decision-making process, the amendment process offers non-committee 
members opportunities to propose changes to bills reported by the committee of related jurisdiction. Even 
though special rules regarding amendments in House prohibit non-committee members from proposing 
amendments from the House floor in most cases, the amendment process is a stage and time for 
legislators to express their positions and opinions which are not likely to be considered during the draft 
stage of a bill. Moreover, voting in House performs a critical role to determine the fate of an amendment. 
Voting in House also gives opportunities for legislators to express their position to legislations by 
choosing ‘Nay,’ ‘Yea,’ or ‘present.’ Differing from voice votes, the choice of a legislator is recorded in a 
recorded vote, which also requires another one fifth of quorum (44 members) to be proceeded after the 
decision to proceed a voice vote. When an amendment is on a recorded vote, it means that the amendment 
is quire controversial to be determined by a voice vote. In this sense, recorded vote – roll call vote– are 
the very means to indicate how legislators considering a bill and related amendments, and to reveal 
legislators’ specific positions and opinions to the public or their constituents.  
The studies on Congress have examined the congressional decision-making process in three 
perspectives: committee based, party based and chamber based perspectives.  These three perspectives 
differ from each other depending on how principals in Congress control Congressional Committees 
(Deering et.al., 1997). Committee-oriented perspective assumes that committees have sufficient 
autonomous authority to pursue their goal without significant interference from chambers or parties, each 
committee leading legislative affairs of its jurisdiction with strong initiatives by following committee 
members’ preferences. The majority party-oriented perspective assumes that committees are mere agents 
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who just follow the directives or decisions from the majority party. The chamber-oriented perspective 
assumes that committees are inclined to comply with what each chamber’s majority coalition wants, 
rather than doing what the majority party wants when the majority party cohesion is weak.  
Distributive politics theory is one example of how these three perspectives can be applied into a 
specific area – Congressional budget process. Distributive politics theory offers the framework to 
understand how each legislator acts in Congress in order to give budgetary benefit to his constituency.  
This theory is based on the assumption that legislators are inclined to “organize Congress and [then], 
create and implement policies so that they can better direct benefits to their constituencies, to get 
reelected” (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002).533 All three perspectives prove this assumption (Rundquist and 
Carsey, 2002). 
In order to predict voting in Congress, Krehbiel developed a spatial theory on the basis of the 
assumption that the median voter has the pivotal power to determine whether a bill passes or fails 
(Krehbiel, 1998). He assumes that each legislator has his own preference that can be converted into a 
position in a uni-dimensional policy space, and argues that it is possible to predict the possibility of a 
gridlock by finding the median voter and the position of a policy on the uni-dimensional space (Krehbiel, 
1998). After applying this theory to Congressional voting behavior, he suggests partisanship, ideology, 
constituencies and committee as possible significant factors that determine legislators’ preferences. 
(Krehbiel, 1998).  
Cox and McCubbin examine the power of the majority party with the concept of agenda-setting 
power (2005). They assume that each committee has the authority to choose the positions of policy 
agendas on its jurisdictional policy area, and conclude that the majority party can exert the delegated 
                                                          
533 Rundquist and Carsey attempted to bring the distributive politics theory to defense policy.  By criticizing the 
previous literature that had considered defense policy as a policy area that is too important for distributive politics 
to affect, he argues that it is necessary to analyze defense policy – especially procurement programs — with 
perspective of distributive politics (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). 
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agenda power by designating its party members to the influential offices of each committee (Cox and 
McCubbin, 2005).  
Poole and Rosenthal further develop the median voter theorem into multi-dimensional spatial 
models. After analyzing the results of all roll call votes since 1789 using multi-dimensional spatial 
models, they argue that even though it is possible to use various dimensions, most roll call vote results 
can be explained by party loyalty and ideology. They consider the ideology as the primary factor that 
determines the voting behavior of each member of Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991). In addition to 
that, they further expect that if other specific dimensions are applied for short term predictions, it will be 
possible to explain voting behaviors and voting results in the US Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991).  
 
The literature review regarding Congress as a political institution points to the significance of 
partisanship, ideology, and influence of committee in determining the votes of legislators (Poole and 
Rosenthal, 1991, Krehbiel, 1998, Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Crespin and Rhode, 2010). Among them, 
partisanship and ideology are factors that determine the vote of each legislator – yea or nay –, while 
influence of committees is mostly related to the process (drafting stage) or the product of process (the 
bill) (Deering, 1989; Shepsle and Boncheck, 1997; Cox and McCubbins, 2005).  
If a legislator is influenced by his party, which can exercise influence through agenda setting and 
committee appointments, he might follow the choice of the majority of his fellow party members (Cox 
and McCubbins, 2005). On the other hand, if she mostly follows her personal ideology when voting on a 
roll call vote, she might vote based on whether the bill or amended bill is closer to her ideology. (Poole 
and Rosenthal, 1991; Krehbiel, 1998). Furthermore, in the House of Representatives, the rules of the 
game require the simple majority of 218 votes to secure passage of an amendment. Consequently, it can 
be concluded that these three factors can influence both the passage of an amendment and the individual 
votes on the amendment.  
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A. Partisanship (Party politics)  
The previous research shows that party can exercise influence on its members through agenda-
setting power and committee appointment authority (Deering, 1989; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997; Cox and 
McCubbins, 2005). If political parties matter in the legislative process, each legislator is likely to vote in 
compliance with his party. In this case, the degree of party unity in the vote is high in either a negative or 
positive direction for the amendment. Consequently, if political parties influence members, the degree of 
party unity is high. When a majority party determines to pass a piece of legislation, the members of the 
majority party are likely to act together in a positive direction for an amendment. On the other hand, when 
the majority party determines to defeat a measure, the members of the majority party are likely to act 
together in a negative direction on an amendment. Specifically, when the majority party has control over 
the related committee and the committee does not want to change its bills (Krehbiel, 1998), the majority 
party may act together to defeat amendments. The Rice number is an index to measure the party unity of 
both majority party and minority party. (See Figure 6-1.) 
RICE𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑖  = |
AYES𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑖 − NAYS𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑖
Total Votes 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑖
| 
Figure 6-1. RICE Cohesion Score 
 
 Moreover, when the gap between majority and minority is not large534, there is a possibility that 
the minority party can affect the result of a roll call votes even though the minority party cannot 
determine the result of a roll call vote by itself. When the majority party does not act together in a roll call 
vote, the minority party can control the result of a roll call vote by acting together. Consequently, it can be 
said that the result of a roll call vote is determined partly by the minority party, even though the majority 
party controls a majority of seats (more than 218 seats in House). Considering the theory of party politics, 
                                                          
534 The largest gap was 78 and the smallest was 10. The mean was 23?.  
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the most significant factor that determines the passage of an amendment is whether the majority party 
unifies and how strongly the majority party acts together.  
 
B. Ideological Position of Individual Legislator 
Institutionally, legislators choose between two versions of legislative pieces – an original bill and 
a draft of amendment to the original bill– in the amendment process (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991; 
Krehbiel, 1998). When a legislator chooses one of them, he will choose the one that is the most preferred 
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1991, Krehbiel, 1998). If the ideology is the main factor that he considers when 
making a decision, he will choose the one that is closer than the other in terms of ideology. 
Assuming that ideology535 is the most significant factor that determines the voting in Congress, 
the sponsor of a bill might consider fellow members ideologies when proposing an amendment. If he 
intends to change a bill by passing the amendment, he might consider how many legislators prefer an 
amended bill to the current, un-amended bill. Assuming that legislators maintain consistent ideological 
positions during their terms, a sponsor can predict the probability of passage and only propose an 
amendment that is expected to pass. Consequently, the more legislators vote with their ideological 
preference, the more accurate the vote prediction is. Moreover, the more accurate the vote prediction is, 
the more probable an amendment is to pass.  
C. Armed Services Committee and Economic Benefits 
Considering the fact that the authorization and appropriation processes create the federal budgets, 
amendments of this process are supposed to adjust the amount of money in the total budget. These 
adjustments are divided into three categories. First, there are negative adjustments to reduce the amount 
                                                          
535 Ideologies are systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated and coherent, that justify the exercise of power, 
explain and judge historical event, identify political right and wrong, set forth the interconnections between 
politics and other sphere of activity and furnish guides for actions.(Herbert McClosky, “Consensus and Ideology in 
American Politics,” in The American Political Science Review, Vol.58, No.2 (June, 1964) p. 362) 
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of budget or prohibit the use of budget. Second, there are positive adjustments to increase the amount of 
budget. Third, there are cases to transfer a part of budget from one item to another.  
According to the committee based theory, a committee has professional information in its 
jurisdiction, and legislators who are not members of the committee are inclined to rely on the committee’s 
information when they make decisions on issues that are related to the committee’s jurisdiction (Deering, 
1989; Deering et.al., 1997, Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). According to the 
informative and distributive politics theories, each committee has access to valuable information related 
to its jurisdiction that the committee can use to exercise influence on the decision making process, by 
giving information that offers more benefit to committee members. In addition to that, legislators are 
inclined to make enormous efforts to become a member of the committees that are beneficial for their 
constituencies in order to be re-elected.  
Considering the fact that committee membership is closely connected with economic benefit to 
committee members’ districts, the members of military related committees are likely to support the 
amendments that are favorable to defense spending by offering positive information for the amendments, 
while likely to hesitate to act for the amendments that are not favorable to defense spending by offering 
negative information about the amendments. Furthermore, when a legislator comes from the districts 
where its economy relies on defense industries, the legislator is likely to support the amendments 
favorable to defense spending and vote for the amendments.  
 
D. Militarism and Congress 
Moreover, American militarism in the Congress serves as the link between results of legislative 
votes regarding military procurement programs and the traditional factors that explain the voting 
behaviors of members of Congress. The following phenomena indicate the Militarism in Congress. First, 
regardless their general ideological position, members of Congress tend to vote on military bills with 
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more conservative positions than they usually do on other issues (Bacevich, 2005; Lewis, 2012). Second, 
if a defense related bill passes, it is less likely for members of Congress to have voted with their 
ideological position and more likely to be prone to the conservative position (Bacevich, 2005; Lewis, 
2012). Third, considering the fact that defense policy is a professional arena that might not be understood 
by members lacking specialized knowledge, members of Congress might consent to the decisions or 
products of the related responsible committee in both chambers of the United States (Deering, 1989; 
Groseclose, 1994; Krehbiel, 1998). Moreover, the committee consists of more conservative members 
compared to the mean or the median position of the whole chamber (Deering, 1989; Groseclose, 1994; 
Krehbiel, 1998).  
3. Federal Budget Process 
A. Authorization Process and Appropriation Process 
In the United States, in order for the federal government to pursue a certain program or policy, it 
is necessary to obtain Congressional approval on the federal budget.  The budget process consists of two 
different tasks - authorization and appropriation (OMB, 2008). Authorization means the process by which 
the executive branch obtains the authority from the Congress in order to pursue a certain program or 
policy (OMB, 2008). Through authorization, the executive branch can have the authority to include the 
approved programs in the annual budget proposal. Essentially, the authorization is centered on approving 
or disapproving a program and policy, rather than determining a certain amount of budget for the program 
(OMD, 2008).  
The other task in the budget process is appropriation. Appropriation is the process of settling the 
annual budget – how much money to be spent for the programs and policies during a certain year (OMB, 
2008). Appropriation is the task of each chamber’s Appropriation Committee and its subcommittees. 
Through the appropriation process, each agency and department obtains the authority to draw money in 
order to pursue the programs and policies in the appropriation bill.  
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B. Categories in Defense Budget 
As I already described, defense authorization bills and appropriation bills deal with the Federal 
budget— money. In most previous studies, procurement programs and its budget have been the focus of 
research (Lindsay, 1990; Higgs, 1988; Twight, 1989, Rundquist, 2002). Procurement programs have been 
recognized as core research projects, because this is the area of budget where a member of Congress can 
make a difference for her political intent (Rundquist, 2002). Moreover, other budget items such as the 
budget for maintenance and operation have not been under the influence of Congress due to the fact that 
the budget is required to maintain the military organizations for their basic mission.   
Considering that this is an analysis on amendments to annual defense authorization and 
appropriation bills, it is necessary to scrutinize the contents of the budget item. In order to analyze the 
contents of budget items, I sorted the contents of each amendment in accordance with budget categories 
in the defense budget request form; “1” for basic, applied, and advance technology in RDT&E phase; “2” 
for system development, test and evaluation; “3” for procurement; “4” for general operation and 
maintenance536 ; “5” for military constructions and BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure);  “6” for 
general items that are related to the whole budget.  
             <Table 6-1. Budget Categories> 
 All amendments 
(n=327) 
Authorization 
(n=215) 
Appropriation 
(n=112) 
Category 1 21 8 13 
Category 2 23 17 6 
Category 3 23 12 11 
Category 4 197 135 62 
Category 5 9 7 2 
Category 6 54 36 1 
 
Note : 1: basic, applied, advanced technology, 2: system development and evaluation, 3: procurement 
4: operations and maintenance, 5: military construction, 6: etc 
                                                          
536 I included the budget item ‘Personnel’ in ‘Operations and Maintenance’, because  basically the budget for 
personnel is  
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When I reviewed the category of budget items related to each amendment, most of the 
amendments were included in the category of ‘Operation and Maintenance’ (Category IV). It was 
followed by ‘General items’ (Category VI) and others. In percentages, the appropriation bills had more 
amendments that were related to procurement and RDT&E than the authorization bills had. 
In addition, a recent study showed that some significant programs, such as Missile Defense 
System Program or Joint Strike Fighter Program, have been included in RDT&E537 phase even though 
they entered in the stage of procurement. The study also argues that some programs have stayed in the 
phase of RDT&E intentionally to escape from intense budget screening along with the budget process. 
Considering this fact, it is necessary to scrutinize the budget items in the RDT&E phase.  
Consequently, a program or a legislator whose districts are benefitted by defense programs is an 
important area of research to shed light on the relationships between defense budget and choice of 
individual legislators in Congressional budgetary process. Moreover, two separate budget processes need 
to be analyzed individually, due to the fact that their functions and roles are quite different from each 
other. 
C. Annual Budget Process 
 An annual budget process begins with the preparation of a presidential federal budget proposal 
(US Congress, 2007). When the proposal is completed, the White House sends this to the Congress. Once 
the presidential proposal arrives in the Congress, committees of both chambers review, modify, and 
amend the presidential proposal with the cooperation of the federal executive agencies (US Congress, 
2007). After that, each committee releases an authorization bill and sends the bill to the Office of 
Congressional Budget for developing an annual budget resolution (US Congress, 2007).   
Under the guidance of an annual budget resolution, each chamber’s appropriation committee 
allocates the total budget to its subcommittees to review, modify, and amend budget ceilings and related 
                                                          
537 I used the same categories that have been used by DoD. An example of defense budget can be found at this 
URL. http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/fy2012_r1.pdf.  
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programs (US Congress, 2007). After completing the subcommittee’s review and modification, each 
subcommittee sends the result to the appropriation committee. The appropriation committee finalizes the 
appropriation bill and sends it to the floor in order to consider amending the bill with all members of the 
chamber (US Congress, 2007). 
Studies on the federal budget process deal with two aspects: the institutional aspect that defines 
the budget processes, and the process & products (Deering et.al, 1997; Sinclair, 2005). Studies on the 
institutional aspect of the budget process focused on who has the initiative in the budget process and how 
to define the relationship between the three major actors in the congressional budgetary process –House 
Appropriation Committee, House Speaker and the President (Gordon, 2008).  
Moreover, most studies on the budget process and products closely connect to distributive 
politics. Crespin et.al attempted to analyze all floor roll call votes of the 100th -107th Congress 
appropriation bills and concluded that it is necessary to consider particular issue positions, rather than just 
focusing on ideological factors of liberal and conservative (Crespin et. al, 2010). This study confirms that 
the appropriation process can be analyzed from the viewpoint of distributive politics and suggests 
examining the Congressional budget process with a distributive politics framework.  
On the other hand, there are a few studies focusing on the interactions between the executive 
branch (the U.S. President) and the legislative branch (U.S. Congress) in the federal budget process 
(Sinclair, 2005; Gordon, 2008). Kernell et.al focuses on the interaction between specific agencies which 
are in charge of budget process -- OMB (the Office of Management and Budget) for the executive branch 
and CBO (the Congressional Budgetary Office) for the legislative branch (Kernell et.al, 1999).  
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4. Pilot Study: Institutional Level Analysis and Two Budget Processes 
In a pilot study538, I focused on the factors that influence voting of defense budget. In order to 
examine the effect of these factors, I analyzed roll-call votes on amendments to the defense budget bills 
which were included in annual defense authorization and appropriation bills. 
<Figure 6-2. Model 1: Logistics model for estimating the result of roll call vote> 
 
𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑀𝐽)𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑀𝑁)𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐. 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜. 𝑖
+ 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡. 𝑖 
*Roll call Vote Result : a dummy variable (Fail= ‘0’, Pass= ‘1’) 
*Party Unity (MJ)=  RICE𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝐽 𝑖  = |
AYES𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝐽 𝑖−NAYS𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝐽 𝑖
Total Votes 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝐽 𝑖
| 
*Party Unity (MN)=  RICE𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑁 𝑖  = |
AYES𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑁 𝑖−NAYS𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑁 𝑖
Total Votes 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑁 𝑖
| 
*For ‘vote predict. ideo.’, footnote 593.  
 
The dependent variable is the result of each roll call vote on several amendments to the defense 
authorization bills and appropriations bills of the given congressional terms. I considered the dependent 
variable as a dummy variable. The dependent variable was measured in accordance with the result of a 
roll call vote – whether or not each amendment passed. I coded the result as “1” if the amendment passed, 
otherwise I coded as “0”. 
From the previous studies regarding congressional roll-call votes, I drew three possible factors to 
explain the success of amendments to annual defense authorization and appropriation bills: partisanship 
(majority status and minority), ideology, and dollar amount of amendments. I estimated a logistic 
regression model to examine these factors influence on the passage of roll call votes to amendments. 
According to the result, authorization process is more predictable than appropriation process. In 
authorization process, majority party unity, accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology and cost of 
                                                          
538 I attempted to analyze the effect of factors – such as ideology, party, budget categories, and dollar amount in 
each amendments – on the probability of passage of each amendment. The period covers from 1993 to 2012 
which is the 103rd to the 112th Congress in Congressional term. The amendments were drafted to amend the 
annual defense authorization and appropriations bills of the period.   
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amendment show statistical significances while, in appropriation process, only majority party unity shows 
a statistical significance of ‘0.1’.  
            <Table 6-2. Result of Logistic Model> 
 Authorization Appropriation 
 Prob. Pass. Prob. Pass. 
A. Majority Party unity 
3.917 
(1.73×10−5)*** 
2.175 
(0.0769) . 
B. Minority Party Unity 
1.027 
(0.1560) 
1.46 
(0.15362) 
C. Accuracy of Vote 
Prediction based on 
ideology 
1.081 
(4.37× 10−5) *** 
5.368 
(0.14307) 
D. Dollar amount 
($ Million) 
-4.649 
(0.00311 ) ** 
-0.9666 
(0.39046) 
Const. 
-0.5892 
(0.2249)** 
-2.02 
(0.4661)*** 
Obs. 227 112 
                   Note: *** >000, **>0.001, *>0.05 
 
A. Party Status  
I attempted to examine the influence of the Rice Cohesion Score of both parties – the majority 
party and the minority party – on the result of each amendment. As a result, I obtained a positive 
relationship between the majority party’s unification and the probability of passage of each amendment 
(See Figure 6-3.)  
Minority party unity also has a positive effect on the probability of passage but the effect is not 
strong enough when compared to majority party unity. (see Figure 6-3).  The effect of the minority is 
conditional on majority party unity. When the difference between majority party members and minority 
party members is not large enough, the minority party can be more influential. In most cases, a majority 
party should be unified more than 85% for guaranteeing the passage of an amendment (See table 6-2.) 
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<Figure 6-3: Majority and Minority party unity and probability of passage> 
 
 
Note: model = glm (result of roll call vote ~ majority party Rice no, family = binomial, model= ‘logit’)  
 
B. Accuracy of Vote Prediction based on Ideology 
According to Poole and Rosenthal’s argument, more than 85% of all roll call votes have been 
explained by legislators’ ideology. So, if ideology is the primary factor that influences the voting 
behaviors of each legislator, each legislator is likely to vote on the basis of his or her ideology, regardless 
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of the possibility of passage of an amendment. In the pilot study, I generated an index of accuracy of vote 
prediction based on ideology539 to connect the ideological position of individual legislators with the fate 
of amendments. In order to examine the explanatory power of ideology on the result of roll call votes in 
amendments in annual defense authorization and appropriations process, I estimated the effect of 
accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology on the passage of amendments with a logistic model in 
order to examine the effect of ‘accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology’ on probability of passage 
(See Figure 6-4). 
<Figure 6-4: % of votes not predicted by ideology and probability of passage> 
 
Note: Ideology of amendment means the % of votes not predicted by ideology of each amendment.  
                                                          
539 In order to properly reflect the effect of the ideology of each amendment on passage of amendments, I 
operationalized the effect of ideology as the percentage of votes not predicted by ideology – accuracy of vote 
prediction based on ideology. The closer is the predicted result to the actual result, the more precisely does the 
vote result reflect the ideological aspect of each member of Congress. The variable was measured as the 
percentage of ‘total number of wrong predicted votes’ to ‘total number of votes’   
The % of votes not predicted by ideology of each amendment was measured through five steps. First, I extracted 
each roll call vote’s ideology midpoint from Poole and Rosenthal’s data base and each legislator’s ideology position 
that was estimated by DW NOMINATE  number. Second, I estimated the vote of each legislator by comparing his or 
her ideology position to the ideology midpoint of each roll call vote. Third, I compared the estimated result of each 
legislator and the actual one that the legislator voted. If the estimated and actual results are the same, I coded “1”. 
Otherwise, I coded “0”. Fourth, I counted the number of amendments that were coded as “0” and divided the 
result by the total number of House members. The product of this process is the % of votes not predicted by 
ideology. 
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In authorization bills, amendments are less likely to pass as ‘accuracy of vote prediction based on 
ideology’ increases540, while the amendments in appropriation bills do not show a clear relationship 
between two variables. In the authorization process, I predict that an amendment is likely to pass when 
other factors lead the members of Congress not to choose in accordance with their ideological position 
and to agree with the amendments. In the appropriation process, the error boundaries also fluctuate 
significantly. I estimate that ‘no clear relationship’ in the appropriation process is caused by relatively 
narrow difference between nays and yeas of the voting results.  
C. Difference between Authorization and Appropriation  
The result from the pilot study shows that the authorization process and the appropriations 
process are distinguished from each other. First, in the case of the effect of party unity on passage of 
amendments, the amendments in appropriation bills have larger error boundaries that those in 
authorization bills. This result comes from the relatively low level of party unity in a positive direction in 
appropriation bills541 (see top of Figure 6-3).  
In authorization bills, most observations show a high degree of party unity (See the center graph 
of Figure 6-5). It means that most legislators were inclined to vote in compliance with their party. 
Moreover, when considering the fact that most observations are located in the top- left and the bottom-
right parts of the graph, it can be said that members of each party are likely to vote in opposite direction to 
each other. In appropriation bills, most observations are located in the middle of the graph — between -
0.5 and 0.5 (see the right graph of Figure 6-5). It means that most legislators were inclined not to vote in 
compliance with their party in appropriation bills.  
There are some amendments in which legislators of both parties voted in the same direction. (See 
both the center and the right graphs of Figure 6-5. The observations in the top right part and bottom left 
                                                          
540 In accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology, 0 means most accurate and 1 means least accurate.  
541 It can be thought that this symptom was also caused by the relative fewer amendments in appropriation bills 
that were passed with the high level of majority party unification. There was only one amendment that was passed 
with majority Rice no. “1”. 
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part are amendments that both parties voted in the same direction542.) In these amendments, they voted 
favorably for the amendments to authorization bills but voted negatively for the amendment to 
appropriation bills (see the top right part and the bottom left part of each graph). Additionally, when each 
legislator did not vote in compliance with their parties, they were inclined to vote negatively for 
amendments to appropriations bills while they were inclined to vote positively for amendments to 
authorization bills (see the observations between ‘-.5’ and ‘.5’ of the both graphs) 
 
       <Figure 6-5: Rice no. (Dem vs. Rep.)> 
 
  
Second, in the case of the effect of ‘accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology’ on passage of 
amendments, the amendments in authorization bills are less likely to pass as ‘accuracy of vote prediction 
based on ideology’ increases543, while the amendments in appropriation bills do not show a clear 
relationship between the two variables. Moreover, the error boundaries also fluctuated significantly. I also 
speculate that ‘no clear relationship’ was caused by a relatively narrow difference between nays and yeas 
of the results (see Fig. 6-5).  
                                                          
542 The observations in the top right part of each graph means that both parties voted positively to an amendment 
while the observations in the bottom left of each graph means that both parties voted negatively to an 
amendment. 
543 In accuracy of vote prediction based on ideology, 0 means most accurate and 1 means least accurate.  
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In order to trace the causes of these relatively wide error boundaries, I divided both appropriation 
bills and authorization bills into the passed amendments and the failed amendments, and checked the 
distribution of % of votes not predicted by ideology along the number of Yeas (See Figure 6-6 & 6-7). 
Additionally, I examined the relationship between the number of yeas and the accuracy of vote prediction 
based on ideology.  
In the case of passed amendments to authorization bills, there is a clear linear relationship 
between the number of Yeas and ideological differences (Pr(>|t|)>0). Moreover, a large proportion of 
observations are located in both top right and bottom left, which generates a positive linear relationship. 
In the case of failed amendments, most observations are located in the top left and there is no clear linear 
relationship (Pr(>|t|)=0.226)  (See figure 10). 
<Figure 6-6:  % of votes not predicted by ideology of each Amendment in Authorization bills> 
 
When legislators vote in accordance with their ideology, it is difficult to predict whether or not an 
amendment passes, due to the fact most amendments congregate within the space between 150 and 300 
Yea votes. However, when legislators do not vote in accordance with their ideology, the amendments are 
more likely to pass with more than 400 Yea votes. 
 In cases of passed amendments to appropriation bills, most are widely dispersed along the X axis 
and they are located adjacent to the X axis. Only in cases of failed amendments is there a possible positive 
linear relationship with the coefficient of 92.70 (Pr(>|t|)=0.101).   
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<Figure 6-7: % of votes not predicted by ideology of each amendment in Appropriation bills>
 
 
5. Summary : a Pilot Study and Literature Review 
As the result of the pilot study and literature review, I found that traditional factors – such as 
party, ideology, committee, and other budget-related factors – can explain the fate of amendments in the 
congressional budgetary process, even though it has the limitations of not considering the contents of 
amendments and more specific connections between the amendments and benefits to congressional 
districts. However, it is worth emphasizing that the focus of the pilot study is not the drafting process but 
the amendment process. According to the distributive politics theory, a member of Congress is inclined to 
pursue the membership of the committee that is most closely related to her district or state.  The process 
on which the membership of a committee has influence is the drafting process of a bill. In the pilot study, 
the membership of related committees – such as the House Armed Services Committee – does not have a 
critical influence, because I analyzed the amendment process, where the membership has little effect.  
Moreover, the pilot study focused not on the voting behavior of each member of Congress, but on 
the results of the roll call vote for each amendment. Even though the member of Congress will cast a vote 
in the amendment process with a consideration of their constituents’ benefits, the result of the roll call 
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vote is not likely to be determined by one member of Congress and it is rare that one budget item has a 
critical impact nation-wide.    
However, the pilot study does not sufficiently reflect the connection between members of 
Congress and their constituents. Considering the fact that distributive politics theory offers the most valid 
explanation for behavior of members of Congress, it might be a significant limitation. Considering the 
fact that connection with constituency is a significant and influential factor in the drafting process and in 
estimating each member of Congress’s voting behavior, it is necessary to apply this factor for specific 
program analyses and studies on committees.   
The primary reason to focus on individual legislator level as the unit of analysis in Part II is that 
the focus of the dissertation is to examine the influence of factors on the choices of individual legislators 
in roll call votes regarding annual defense budget bills. Even though it is essential to the research to 
understand the process and rules of games in Congress, the central part of the dissertation should be 
factors that influence individual legislators – partisanship, ideology, PAC contributions, and military 
contracts to their districts – and the choices that the legislators make in roll call votes – Yea or Nay. 
Consequently, I will approach the Congressional influence on defense policy from the perspective of 
individual legislators. 
 
6. Factors and hypotheses 
From the results of the literature review on related theories, I drew four possible factors that can 
explain the choice of individual legislators regarding amendments to annual defense authorization and 
appropriation bills – partisanship (majority status), ideology, PAC contributions, and military contracts to 
districts.   
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According to the literature review, there are three significant factors that influence the decision-
making process in U.S. Congress: partisanship, ideology, and influence of committees. Among them, 
partisanship and ideology are factors that determine the vote of each legislator – yea or nay, while 
influence of committees is mostly related to the process (drafting stage) or the product of process (the 
bill). In this part of the dissertation, I focus on partisanship and ideology and two other economic factors 
which have potential influence on legislator’s choice regarding defense budget authorization and 
appropriation, because the main subject of the dissertation is not the process or fate of amendments but 
the choice of individual legislators544. With the frameworks of partisanship and ideology, it is possible to 
predict each legislator’s choice on a roll call vote – yea or nay. If a legislator is compliant with his party, 
he might follow the choice of a majority of his party members. On the other hand, if she mostly follows 
her ideology when voting in a roll call vote, she might choose the one which is ideologically closest 
between the related bill itself and an amendment to it. Furthermore, I contend that economic factors such 
as PAC contributions to legislators and the amount of military contracts to their congressional districts 
can influence on legislators’ choices regarding defense budget bills, considering electoral connection 
between legislators and their constituents and the connection between defense industries and local 
economies where these industries are operating.   
 Previous studies about defense budget in Congress are divided into two groups in accordance 
with the topics they covered. The first group has focused on specific weapon systems and examined how 
each legislator has voted on roll call votes related to the weapon systems (Gates, 1989; Lindsay, 
1990;1991). The second group has focused on general trends about how legislators have chosen to vote 
                                                          
544 It does not mean that the influence of committee can be ignored in the studies regarding congressional decision 
making process. Rather, I attempt to focus on the choices of individual legislators and choose the most probable 
factors that can explain the choices. The influence of committee is covered in the chapter III which explains How 
the Armed Services Committee in both chambers of Congress responded to the military transformation and how 
the committees are composed in the matter of ideology.  
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on items related to defense spending (Dawson, 1962; Wildavsky, 1969; Ostrom, 1978; Bartel, 1991; 
Fleisher, 1993; Prins, 2001). 
 Researches in these two areas are very similar in their methodologies. Both groups typically 
generate an index for the dependent variable (the choice of individual legislators) by calculating the ratio 
of favorable votes to the whole chosen votes (Cobb, 1976; Ray, 1981; Bartel, 1991; Lindsay, 1990; 1991; 
Fleisher, 1993; Prins, 2001). All the votes in the first group are related to specific weapon procurement 
programs (Gates, 1989; Lindsay, 1990;1991), while all the votes in the second group are related to 
general defense spending (Dawson, 1962; Wildavsky, 1969; Goss, 1972; Cobb, 1976; Ostrom, 1978; Ray, 
1981; Bartel, 1991; Fleisher, 1993; Prins, 2001). For the independent variables, both groups of literature 
consider party, ideology (hawkishness), dollar value of military contracts in a member’s district, military-
related PAC contributions, and other variables (Cobb, 1976; Ray, 1981; Bartel, 1991; Lindsay, 
1990;1991; Fleisher, 1993; Prins, 2001).  
 In this part of my dissertation, I consider the following three arguments as basic assumptions. 
First, the ideology and party status is the primary factor to explain the results of roll-call votes related 
to defense spending. Second, other economic factors can influence the choice of individual legislators. 
Third, there are voting differences between the authorization process and the appropriations process. 
Based on these assumptions, I describe individual legislators’ choices in the amendments regarding 
defense budget bills and explain what drives individual legislators to make the choices.  
I consider ‘party status,’ ‘ideology,’ ‘amount of defense contracts to each district,’ and ‘amount 
of PAC contributions to each legislator’ as factors to explain the choice of individual legislators regarding 
amendments to defense budget bills. As mentioned above, the related committee can influence non-
committee legislators by offering professional information. Moreover, the committee is under the 
influence of the majority party. If an amendment is intended to change the original bill into the opposite 
direction of the committee’s choice, the committee may offer negative information against the 
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amendment and persuade the majority party members to vote unfavorably to the amendment. 
Consequently, I predict that a majority party member is more likely to vote favorably for defense 
spending (hypothesis 1).  
          <Figure 6-8. Theoretical Diagram of factors> 
 
 
Ideology is another significant factor that determines each legislator’s voting behavior. 
Institutionally, the amendment process is the process in which legislators choose one of two legislative 
pieces – a bill and its amendment.  When a legislator chooses one of them, he will choose the one that is 
more preferable to the other. If the ideology is the main factor that he considers when making the 
decision, he will choose the one that is closer to his ideology. Consequently, it is possible to predict a 
legislator’s vote by analyzing the relative ideological preference between a bill and its amendment. It also 
means that the prediction of voting behavior of each legislator is the consequence of calculation about 
relative ideological distances from the legislator to two legislations – a bill and an amendment. 
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If ideology of a legislator is the factor that explains the choice of the legislator, the legislator may 
choose the one that is closest to his ideological position. Consequently, I predict that if a legislator is 
more conservative, the legislator is more likely to vote favorably to defense spending (hypothesis 2).  
Considering the fact that most legislators pursue to be re-elected (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; 
Fiorina, 1989), legislators may pay attention on economic interests of constituents in their congressional 
district. Defense contracts to a legislator’s congressional district could be counted as a kind of economic 
interest. Consequently, it can be said that as a congressional district receives more defense contracts, the 
legislator elected from the congressional district is more likely to vote favorably for defense spending 
(Hypothesis 3).  
For the amount of defense PAC contribution to each legislator, I operationalize the variable as the 
amount of defense corporations’ PAC contributions to each legislator. The previous studies show that 
PAC contributions may influence the change of wording rather than directly influence the choice of each 
legislator in a roll call vote (Goss, 1972; Hall, 1990; Lindsay, 1990; Fleisher, 1993). However, I assume 
that defense PAC contributions may affect the general defense view of each legislator.  
As a legislator receives more PAC contributions from defense corporations, the legislator is 
more likely to vote favorably for defense spending (Hypothesis 4). 
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Chapter 7. Method and Data 
1. Scope and the Unit of analysis 
The period that this thesis covers is from 1993 to 2012 and, by administration, it covers from the 
first Clinton administration to the current (Obama) administration. I analyzed both defense authorization 
bills and appropriations bills of this period in order to examine the influence of Congress on defense 
policy. I focused on the amendments to the defense authorization bill and defense appropriations bill in 
each year during the given period. I found 227 amendments for authorization and 112 amendments for 
appropriation545. The unit of analysis of this research is each legislator who was a House member from 
the 103rd Congress to the 112th Congress.  Each Congress had 435 members during the period.  
 This period can be defined with the concept of military transformation546. During the first 
Clinton administration, the literature of military transformation was formed. In the second term of 
President Clinton, this concept evolved into specific programs for realizing its vision. During the Bush 
administration, the U.S. was in a war while the concept of military transformation was being pursued. 
There were efforts to balance between reality and vision during the Bush administration. Now, the Obama 
administration prepares another shift from ‘a state of war’ to ‘a period of peace and preparation’.  
I gathered the data primarily from the Congressional record 547and roll call vote record548 gathered 
by the Library of Congress. I used the vote result of each roll call vote on every amendment, and analyzed 
the contents of each amendment for categorizing each amendment into proper budget categories. 
 
                                                          
545 I counted all roll call votes on amendments to annual defense authorization and appropriation bills. I did not 
include roll call votes on final passage of the bills. 
546 This paragraph was written on the basis of basic knowledge on military transformation. The literature of 
military transformation is highly debatable and enormous in contents. It encompasses wide range of defense 
policy from organizational management, operational adjustment and developing high-technology. I just address 
the period of the military transformation because whole literature review on military transformation is beyond the 
boundaries of this thesis.   
547 http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record 
548 http://thomas.loc.gov/home/rollcallvotes.html  
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2. Estimation Model 
<Figure 7-1. Model 1: Estimation of defense vote index for Authorization process> 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝐴𝑈)𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 
*Defense Vote Index(AU): the ratio of ‘favorable legislator i’s choice toward defense spending’ compared to all other votes in 
roll call votes in authorization process 
*Ideology: legislator i’s ideological position (Liberal: -1, Conservative:1) 
*Party: status of legislator i’s party 
*PAC: Defense related political action committee’s contribution to legislator i’s district 
*Defense Contract: the amount of defense contract to legislator i’s contract  
 
 
<Figure 7-2. Model 2: Estimation of defense vote index for Appropriation process> 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝐴𝑃)𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 
*Defense Vote Index(AP): the ratio of ‘favorable legislator i’s choice toward defense spending’ compared to all other votes in 
roll call votes in appropriation process 
*Ideology: legislator i’s ideological position (Liberal: -1, Conservative:1) 
*Party: status of legislator i’s party 
*PAC: Defense related political action committee’s contribution to legislator i’s district 
*Defense Contract: the amount of defense contract to legislator i’s contract  
  
3. Dependent variables 
The primary dependent variable is the choice of individual legislators in each roll call vote on an 
amendment to the defense authorization bills and appropriations bills of the given years. I defined the 
dependent variable as “% of each representative’s favorable choice to defense spending out of the total 
roll call votes in a congressional term”. For the dependent variable, I generate an index by calculating the 
ratio of ‘favorable choice toward defense spending’ compared to all other votes. For example, in the 103rd 
Congress, there were 20 amendments in the defense authorization bills. If a legislator voted favorably to 
defense spending in the 12 roll call votes that were determined to be favorable to defense spending, he 
would be coded as ‘0.6’ in accordance with the ratio of favorable choice (12 choices) to the entire votes 
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(20 roll call votes) in this term of Congress (the 103rd Congress). This process requires discerning which 
amendment is favorable to defense spending by analyzing the contents of amendments.  
I code an amendment favorable to defense spending as ‘1’ and unfavorable one as ‘0’. Then, I 
calculate the favorableness of a legislator to defense spending in accordance with this coding and his 
choices in the roll call votes of a congressional term.  I do this for both defense authorization bills and 
defense appropriation bills of each Congressional term. For analysis, I gather all the amendments to the 
defense budget bills that had roll call votes on each amendment. After that, I divide the amendments into 
two budgetary processes of the authorization process and the appropriation process549. 
When I focus on the passage of an amendment, the number of failed amendments is twice as large 
as that of passed ones (passed: 121, failed: 206; see table 1). In authorization bills, the number of failed 
amendments is almost the same as that of passed ones (passed: 109, failed: 106; see table 1). However, in 
appropriation bills, the failed amendments are five times larger than the passed ones (passed: 15, failed: 
97; see table 1). I estimate that this difference between authorization bills and appropriation bills comes 
from the difference of attributes of two different budget processes – authorization and appropriations.  
<Table 7-1: Pass or Fail> 
Authorization & appropriation Authorization Appropriation 
Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail 
121 206 106 109 15 97 
N= 327 N=215 N=112 
 
Speaking of the amount of budget changes presented in amendments, there are 185 amendments 
that did not contain the amount of budget changes (See table 5). Most of them are amendments in 
authorization bills, and these amendments contained the redefinitions of terms, special requests to the 
                                                          
549 Previous literature has focused on “only one congressional term” and “amendments on authorization process.’ 
Instead, my dissertation cover 10 congressional terms from the 103rd to the 113th, and amendments in 
appropriation process as well as those in authorization process. 
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Department of Defense or the President, or changes of rules and regulations that were dealing with 
sensitive budget items550.  
When analyzing the standard deviations and the distributions of the budget changes, the amounts 
are so dispersed that it is meaningless to set the average amount and possible boundaries of the expected 
budget changes. 
 
<Table 7-2. Summary of amendments by amount of budget changes> 
 All amendments 
(n=327) 
Authorization 
(n=215) 
Appropriation 
(n=112) 
Amount=0 185 159 26 
Min. 0 0 260 
Median 0 0 22,020 
Mean 725,400 197,000 1,738,000 
Max 35,200,000 12,000,000 35,200,000 
SD 3,411,390 940,904 5,558581 
               Note: the unit is 1,000$ 
4. Independent variables 
I considered four variables as the independent variables that explain the changes of the dependent 
variable.  
A. Party status 
One of the traditional factors that affects voting behavior of members of Congress has been 
majority party status. When a party has the majority status, the party has a relatively strong influence on 
its members. In this case, party members are likely to vote in accordance with the intent of their party 
leadership, and the party status can weaken other factors’ influence on the individual legislators’ choices.   
During the period from 1993 to 2012, the Republican Party had majority status except for the 
103rd Congress and the 111th Congress. When checking the difference between the majority party and the 
                                                          
550 http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record 
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minority party, there have been larger differences when the Democratic Party was the majority party. For 
party status, I code the majority party as ‘1’ or the minority party as ‘0’, regardless of which party is 
majority. 
<Table 7-3: Majority and Minority> 
 103rd 104th 105th 106th 107th 108th 109th 110th 111th 112th 
Republican 176 230 228 223 221 229 232 233 178 242 
Democrat 258 204 206 211 211 205 201 202 256 193 
R-D -82 26 22 12 10 24 31 31 -78 49 
    Note: this table was produced on the basis of the beginning of each Congress; Bold & Italic means Majority status. 
    Source: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=Record 
 
 
(1) Ideology 
According to Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, the ideology of each member of Congress is the 
most influential factor that determines voting behaviors of members of Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 
1991). They argue that it is possible to predict the votes of each legislator from their ideological position. 
For ideology, DW-Nominate scores551 provide the ideological position of each legislator. Considering the 
fact that NSVI score reflects each legislator’s general defense view and NSVI (National Security Voting 
Index) is highly correlated with DW-Nominate scores, a conservative legislator in DW-Nominate score is 
more likely to vote favorably to defense spending. 
 
(2) PAC Contribution  
Each political action committee (PAC) can make contributions to candidates for elections. There 
are three types of candidates: incumbent candidates, challengers, and competing candidates in open seats. 
I focus on incumbent candidates who are able to vote in the House of Representatives during each 
                                                          
551 DW nominate number: http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp 
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election cycle. Using OLS models mentioned above (model 1, and model 2), I examine how the amount 
of PAC contributions to a legislator can affect the legislator’s voting behaviors in the House.  
The data is downloaded from the Federal Election Commission (FEC)’s website. FEC has 
maintained records on registered political action committees’ campaign financial contributions to 
registered candidates in each election cycle. The record has been filed under the title of “Contribution to 
Candidates from Committee.” I found the records of election cycles related to my research in the database 
of “Contribution to Candidates from Committee.” The data in the records includes the title of political 
action committees, the amount of money contributed, and the name of recipient.    
In order to make a dataset for this independent variable (PAC contribution), I follow three steps. 
First, I sort out the candidate who has incumbent candidate status qualifying him to participate in roll-call 
votes. The FEC website offers the data which contains any contribution given to all the candidates who 
were registered in the FEC552. Second, I sort out the political action committees that are categorized as 
political actions committees of defense industries. I consider the committees mentioned as defense PAC 
in the website of ‘OpenSecret.org553’. I made a report that has a list of the amount of defense contracts 
that defense industries made with the Department of Defense during each election cycle. I sorted the 
contracts from the largest to the smallest by election cycles and assigned them to individual industries 
which made each contract. Based on this result, I calculated the total amount of defense contracts that 
each industry made with the Department of Defense. I considered the top 250 defense industries in the 
matter of total defense contract amount. 
 I also included the affiliate companies of each industry and counted them as the part of each 
industry. I downloaded a file regarding industry lobbies from ‘OpenSecret.org’. The file has the data 
which covers the time span from 1998 to this year. For the pre-1998 period, I searched opensecrets.org 
                                                          
552 http://www.fec.gov/ : Federal Election Commission 
553 Http://www.opensecret.org/ 
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and got related information about affiliates of each defense industry. After that, I added all the industries 
that were on the opensecrets.org website but not in the report with defense contracts. Then, I searched the 
PACs of the industries on reports of each election cycle in the defense PAC list. The final product of this 
process is a list of 250 companies that made contracts with the defense department and the amount of 
PAC contributions that these companies made during each election cycle. Third, I calculate the total 
amount of money that a legislator received from political action committees of defense industries by 
adding the money offered by the committees to each legislator. The product is the amount of PAC 
contribution that a legislator received from political action committees in defense industries.  
(3) Military Contract to Congressional Districts 
As I already described, defense authorization bills and appropriation bills deal with the Federal 
budget— money. In most previous studies, procurement programs and its budget have been the focus 
(Lindsay, 1990; Higgs, 1988; Twight, 1989, Rundquist, 2002). The reason why procurement programs 
have been recognized as a core interest is that this is the very area of budget by which a member of 
Congress can demonstrate her political intent (Rundquist, 2002).  
For the amount of defense contract to each district, I obtained the data from the Federal 
Procurement Data System554 for the period from 1993 to 2012. It was a challenging task to extract the 
amount of defense contract to each congressional district from the data. First, the data set does not have 
the data field that directly connects defense contracts with congressional districts. Prior to 2003, the data 
set of ‘Federal Procurement Data System’ did not have the field of Congressional Districts, while the data 
set has had the field of congressional district since 2003. Furthermore, a significant number of errors 
exists in the congressional district field even in the data after 2003. The congressional district is not the 
reliable data field to use in this research. The alternative data field that connects the contract records with 
congressional district is postal zip code.  
                                                          
554 https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/ : Federal procurement data system 
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Second, ‘assigning postal zip codes to congressional districts’ was another challenging task 
because the US Census does not have the relationship file which connects postal zip codes and 
congressional districts before the 2000 census. For the 1990’s I used the data of an appendix included in 
the book of "Congressional Districts in 1990s555" published by the Congressional Quarterly556.  At the 
same time, I used the US Census relationship files between postal zip codes and congressional districts 
for the 2000’s and 2010’s (See Appendix A).  
Third, the congressional districts have been redistricted not only in the beginning of a decade but 
also between the decades due to several reasons. Mostly, redistricting between decades was initiated by 
‘the issue of under-representation of minority races’ in the southern states like Louisiana, North Carolina, 
Florida, Georgia, Texas, and also in Minnesota. The issue of under-representation was caused by massive 
racial movement from northern states to southern states in the 1980’s. When the 1990’s census was 
finished, redistricting did not reflect the right portion of representation of minority races and several law 
suits were filed against state or federal government to make redistricting correct. I found 10 redistricting 
cases in Georgia (1996, 2006), Florida (1994, 1996), Texas (2004, 2006), North Carolina (2000, 2002), 
Minnesota(1998), Louisiana(1998, 2000), New York (2000), and Virginia (1998, 2002) since 1993, when 
the redistricting of the 1990 census took effect. Using "ArcGIS557", I extracted zip codes - Congressional 
Districts relationship files for each congress (See Appendix B).  
Fourth, subcontracting in defense industries may decrease the explanatory power of contract data 
which is based on prime contracts. The literature says that 50% of prime contracts have been 
subcontracted and the data for the primary place of performance of contracts has been limited by various 
                                                          
555 CQ Press, 1993, Congressional Districts in the 1990s: A portrait of America (CQ Press: DC) 
556 There was not a digital media for the book of Congressional Districts in the 1990s: A portrait of America. I 
scanned the appendix of ‘zip code-congressional districts’ and turned it into an editable document. Then, I 
converted the document into a dataset.  
557 First, I put the zip-code map over the plain map of the United States. Then, I overlaid the congressional district 
map of the related Congressional term over the Zip-code & the US map. By geographically matching these three 
maps, I generated zip-code & congressional district dataset.  
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reasons558. The primary reason is that prime contractors have denied submitting the information regarding 
subcontracting. However, there is an opposite argument that overall distribution of subcontracts roughly 
parallels that of prime contracts. Moreover, the political advantage of prime contractor may not be 
reduced by the fact that much of the work will not be performed by prime contractors because prime 
contractors have symbolic influence in the area of defense industries559. However, considering that 
distribution of subcontracts roughly parallels that of prime contracts and that my topic is not program 
specific but dealing with entire defense contracts, it is reasonable to keep using the dataset based on the 
prime defense contract.
                                                          
558 Ken Mayer 1991 The political economy of defense contracting, chapter 2. pp. 33 - 34 
559 Ken Mayer 1995 "Electoral Cycles in Federal Government Prime Contract Awards: State-Level Evidence from the 
1998 and 1992 Presidential Elections."  American Journal of Political Science 39 (No. 1, February 1995) p. 171 
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Chapter 8. Analysis 
 
1. Examination of Models  
In order to examine how factors influence the choice of each legislator in a roll call vote, I 
estimated a linear regression model in which an index of a legislator's choice in roll call votes is a 
dependent variable and other factors are independent variables -such as ideology, party status, defense 
contract to their congressional districts, and defense related PAC contributions to each legislators. Due to 
the fact that authorization process and appropriation process are different from each other in several 
aspects560, I developed separate models for each congressional budgetary process (model 1 for 
authorization process and model 2 for appropriation process).  
<Table 8-1: Result of Linear Regression Model: Authorization bills only, entire period> 
n=4266 Estimate Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 0.546 < 2 ×10−16 *** 
Defense Contracts 
★dollarsum 
($ 100 billion) 
0.187  0.3375  
PAC Contribution 
★cnsum 
($ 100 thousand) 
0.101 4.20 ×10−12 *** 
Ideology 
★dwnom1 
0.140  3.36 ×10−9 *** 
Party 
★party1 
-0.0256  0.0844 . 
Ideology:Party 
 ★dwnom1:party1 
-0.322  < 2 ×10−16 *** 
            Note:  *** >000, **>0.001, *>0.05 ; ★ variable names in database 
                       
In authorization process, the result shows that the PAC contribution (cnsum) and the Ideology of 
each legislator (dwnom1) are the two primary factors that lead each legislator to vote favorably to defense 
spending. Both factors show positive numbers: the PAC contribution has 0.101 as the coefficient, and the 
ideology of each legislator has 0.140 as the coefficient. Besides, within the majority party, the ideology of 
                                                          
560 See previous chapter and literature review.  
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the majority party members has a negative relationship with their favorable voting behaviors to defense 
spending (see table 8-1. “Ideology:Party”). The interaction variable between ideology and majority party 
status has -0.322 as the coefficient.   
<Table 8-2: Result of Logistic Models: Appropriation bills only>    
n=3835 Estimate Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 0.546 < 2 ×10-16 *** 
Defense Contracts 
★dollarsum 
($ 100 billion) 
-0.366 0.007179 ** 
PAC Contribution 
★cnsum 
($ 100 thousand) 
-0.0129 0.196976  
Ideology 
★dwnom1 
0.438 < 2 ×10-16 *** 
Party 
★party1 
0.00915 0.37346  
Ideology:Party 
 ★dwnom1:party1 
0.0732 0.000674 *** 
             Note:  *** >000, **>0.001, *>0.05; ★ variable names in database 
 
In appropriation process, the result shows that the military contract to districts (dollarsum) and 
the Ideology of each legislator (dwnom1) are the two primary factors that influence each legislator’s votes 
on defense spending favorably or unfavorably. The military contract to districts shows a negative 
coefficient, while the ideology of each legislator has a positive one as in the authorization process: the 
military contract to districts has -0.366 as the coefficient, and the ideology of each legislator has 0.438 as 
the coefficient. The ideology of each legislator shows a positive effect on House members’ favorableness 
to defense spending with the highest level of statistical significance (***: > 0.000). In addition, within the 
majority party, the ideology of the majority party members has a positive relationship to their favorable 
voting behaviors to defense spending (see table 8-2. “Ideology:Party”). The interaction variable between 
ideology and majority party status has 0.0732 as the coefficient. 
2. Party Status 
Majority party member is more likely to vote favorably to defense spending (hypothesis 1).  
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Considering that the majority party’s influence on related committee and committee’s favorable 
inclination to defense spending, I predicted a positive relationship between majority party and party 
members’ favorableness to defense spending, and I developed hypothesis 1. Nonetheless, when I estimate 
model 1 with the dataset for authorization process, majority party status does not show a positive effect on 
the favorableness of legislators to defense spending. Furthermore, its statistical significance is below 0.05. 
The estimation result does not support hypothesis 1 in the case of authorization process. This result comes 
from the fact that the amendments to authorization bills are mostly about increase of defense spending, 
and both majority and minority parties are supportive and have a generous position to amendments to 
increase defense spending in authorization process (see the data section in Chapter 6). These facts reduce 
the effect of majority party and bring a negative effect as well as decrease the statistical significance of 
the majority party’s influence.  
Within the majority party, the ideology of the majority party members has negative relationship 
with their favorable voting behaviors to defense spending (see table 8-1. “Ideology:Party”) in authorization 
process. The interaction variable between ideology and majority party status has -0.322 as the coefficient. 
This negative relationship has two interpretations depending on the members’ ideological position – 
whether they are liberal or conservative. When a legislator has a positive value of ideology, the result 
shows that ‘as a legislator of a majority party has more conservative ideology (>0), the legislator is less 
likely to vote in favor of defense spending in roll call votes on amendment to annual authorization bills’. 
On the other hand, when a legislator has a negative value of ideology, the result shows that ‘as a legislator 
of a majority party has more liberal ideology (<0), the legislator is more likely to vote in favor of defense 
spending in roll call votes on amendments to annual authorization bills’. 
When I estimate model 2 with the dataset for appropriation process, the majority party status 
shows positive effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense spending. Nonetheless, its statistical 
significance is below 0.05. The estimation result does not support hypothesis 1 in the case of 
appropriation process, even though it has a positive effect. This result comes from the fact that the 
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amendments to appropriation bills are mostly about decrease of defense spending and neither majority nor 
minority party are supportive to the amendments to decrease defense spending in appropriation process. 
Both parties negatively respond to the unfavorable amendments to defense spending in appropriation 
process (see the data section in Ch. 6). These facts increase the effect of majority party and brings a 
positive effect even though the statistical significance of majority party’s influence is not strong enough. 
Within the majority party, the ideology of the majority party members has positive relationship 
with their favorable voting behaviors to defense spending in appropriation process (see table 8-2. 
“Ideology:Party”). The interaction variable between ideology and majority party status has 0.0732 as the 
coefficient. This positive relationship has two interpretations depending on the members’ ideological 
position – whether they are liberal or conservative. When a legislator has a positive value of ideology, the 
result shows that ‘as a legislator of a majority party has more conservative ideology (>0), the legislator is 
more likely to vote in favor of defense spending in roll call votes on amendment to annual appropriation 
bills’. On the other hand, when a legislator has a negative value of ideology, the result shows that ‘as a 
legislator of a majority party has more liberal ideology (<0), the legislator is less likely to vote in favor of 
defense spending in roll call votes on amendment to annual appropriation bills’. It means that the 
ideology of each legislator has more stable effect in the appropriation process than it has in authorization 
process. This is opposite to the result from the estimation result for the authorization process. 
3. Ideology 
If a legislator is more conservative, the legislator is more likely to vote favorable to 
defense spending (hypothesis 2).  
Considering that conservative ideology generally coincides with favorableness to defense 
spending, I predicted a positive relationship between conservative ideology and legislators’ favorableness 
to defense spending and developed hypothesis 2. When I estimate model 1 with the dataset for 
authorization process, the legislators’ ideological position shows a positive effect on the favorableness of 
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legislators to defense spending (coefficient: 0.140). Furthermore, its statistical significance is beyond 
0.0005 (***,>0. 00). The estimation result supports hypothesis 2 in the case of authorization process. The 
result means that ‘as a legislator has more conservative ideology, the legislator is more likely to vote in 
favor of defense spending in roll call votes on amendment to annual authorization bills’.  
When I estimate model 2 with the dataset for appropriation process, the legislators’ ideological 
position shows a positive effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense spending (coefficient: 
0.438). Furthermore, its statistical significance is beyond 0.0005 (***,>0. 00). The estimation result 
supports hypothesis 2 in the case of authorization process. The result means that ‘as a legislator has more 
conservative ideology, the legislator is more likely to vote in favor of defense spending in roll call votes on 
amendment to annual appropriation bills’.  
Consequently, in both authorization and appropriation process, the legislators’ conservative 
ideology have a positive relationship with legislators’ favorableness to defense spending, and the results 
support hypothesis 2. In addition, the effect of conservative ideology on favorableness to defense 
spending in appropriation process is stronger than in authorization process (authorization: 0.140 < 
appropriation: 0.438).  
4. Military Contracts to Congressional Districts 
As a congressional district receives more defense contracts, the legislator elected from 
the congressional district is more likely to vote favorably to defense spending 
(Hypothesis 3).  
A legislator makes efforts to bring more economic benefit to his congressional district. 
Furthermore, when a congressional district has an economic connection with defense industries, the 
legislator of the district is favorable to increases in defense spending. Based on these assumptions, I 
predicted a positive relationship between annual amount of defense contracts to congressional districts 
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and legislators’ favorableness to defense spending, and I developed hypothesis 3. When I estimate model 
1 with the dataset for authorization process, the defense contract to congressional districts shows a 
positive effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense spending (coefficient: 0.187). However, its 
statistical significance is below 0.05 (0.3375). The estimation result does not support hypothesis 3 in the 
case of authorization process even though the variable has a positive effect on the dependent variable. The 
result comes from two facts: first, subcontract practice in defense industries561 might reduce the effect of 
amount of prime contract to a congressional district; second, congressional district is not an economic 
community but a political community that is based on population, which means economic factors might 
cross over the boundary of congressional districts rather than being contained within the boundary.  
When I estimate model 2 with the dataset for appropriation process, the defense contract to 
congressional districts shows a negative effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense spending 
(coefficient: -0.366). However, its statistical significance is beyond 0.001 (**, >0.001). The estimation 
result does not support hypothesis 3 in case of appropriation process even though the variable has a strong 
statistical significance. In appropriation process, the result means that ‘as a legislator’s congressional 
district receives more military related contracts from the Department of Defense, which bring economic 
benefit to districts, the legislator is less likely to vote in favor of defense spending in roll call votes on 
amendment to annual appropriation bill’. This result comes from two facts: first, legislators are more 
concerned about specific interests for their congressional districts than about the general defense spending 
in appropriation process; second, the amendments to annual appropriation bills are mostly about specific 
items such as JSF F-35’s second engine or V-22 Osprey. 
 
 
                                                          
561 In defense industries, prime contractors make subcontracts with other small companies which are located 
outside congressional districts or states where prime contracts are located.   
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5. PAC Contribution 
As a legislator receives more PAC contributions from defense corporations, the 
legislator is more likely to vote favorably to defense spending (Hypothesis 2-4).  
Defense industries contribute donations to a legislator who has economic ties with their defense 
contracts in order to guarantee investment from the department of defense, and the legislator who has his 
district’s economic interests with defense industries supports increases in defense spending. Based on 
these assumptions, I predicted a positive relationship between PAC contribution from defense industries 
and legislators’ favorableness to defense spending, and I developed hypothesis 4. When I estimate model 
1 with the dataset for authorization process, the PAC contribution from defense industries shows a 
positive effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense spending (coefficient: 0.101). Furthermore, 
its statistical significance is beyond 0.0005 (***,>0. 00). The estimation result supports hypothesis 3 in 
the case of authorization process. The result means that, in authorization process, ‘as a legislator receives 
more contribution from the Political Action Committees which have connection with defense industries, 
the legislator is more likely to vote in favor of defense spending in roll call votes on amendments to annual 
authorization bills’. This result confirms hypothesis 4. 
On the other hand, when I estimate model 2 with the dataset for appropriation process, the PAC 
contribution from defense industries shows a negative effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense 
spending (coefficient: -0.0129). Furthermore, its statistical significance is below 0.05. The estimation 
result does not support hypothesis 4 in the case of appropriation process. This result comes from the fact 
that amendments to annual appropriations bills are mostly about cutting of defense spending and are 
closely related to specific items. This fact reduces the effect of generalized PAC contributions562 on 
favorableness to defense spending.   
                                                          
562 The data I used is neither item centered nor company specific. I considered the total amount of PAC 
contribution from all defense industries to a legislator as a variable.  
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6. Term based analysis  
I also divided the period of research by each congressional term, and examined the effect of the 
factors for each congressional term. Considering the fact that House members are representatives from 
congressional districts and they are chosen by elections, election is an important factor to connect 
constituents and House members. Furthermore, PAC contributions are intended to influence elections, 
and legislators are eager to bring as much benefit as possible to their districts in order to be re-elected. 
Consequently, it is necessary to consider examining the effect of PAC contributions and military contract 
to districts on legislators’ voting behavior by congressional terms.  
<Table 8-3: Result of Linear Regression Model: Authorization bills only, Term by Term> 
 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 
(Intercept) 0.616  
*** 
0.573 
*** 
0.872 
*** 
0.915  
*** 
0.778 
*** 
0.208 
*** 
1.13 
*** 
0.403 
*** 
0.915 
*** 
0.340 
*** 
Defense 
Contracts 
★dollarsum 
($ 100 billion) 
0.129 0.0335 0.733 -0.791 -0.125  -0.397 -0.575 
* 
-0.281 0.135 -0.0729 
PAC 
Contribution 
★cnsum 
($ 100 thousand) 
0.160 
*** 
0.196 
*** 
0.210 
*** 
0.134 
** 
0.0397 0.0718 
* 
0.0328 0.0649 
** 
0.0528 
. 
0.0152 
Ideology 
★dwnom1 
0.187  
** 
0.591 
*** 
0.990 
*** 
0.115 
*** 
0.902  
*** 
0.446 
*** 
1.09 
*** 
0.714  
*** 
-0.382 
** 
0.263 
** 
Party 
★party1 
-0.0627  
. 
0.0566 -0.166  
* 
-0.163 
* 
0.00134  
. 
0.534  
*** 
-0.150  
* 
0.215 
*** 
-0.631  
*** 
0.482 
*** 
Ideology:Party★
dwnom1:party1 
0.448  
*** 
-0.297 
* 
-0.857 
*** 
-0.109 
*** 
-0.930 
*** 
-0.192 
 
-1.15 
*** 
-0.419 
*** 
0.707 
*** 
-0.583 
*** 
 n=429 n=437 n=435 n=431 n=409 n=425 n=430 n=437 n=435 n=398 
Note:  *** >000, **>0.001, *>0.05; ★ variable names in database 
 
In order to examine how these two factors – the effect of PAC contribution and military contract 
to congressional districts – influence legislators' favorableness to defense spending in a congressional 
term, I estimated the same model (Figure 7-1, p  ) with dataset of each congressional term.  
In the case of PAC contributions, all congressional terms have positive coefficients which range 
from 0.0152 (min.: the 112th Congress) to 0.210 (max.: the 105th Congress). Except for four terms, the 
107th, 109th, 111th, and 112th Congress, coefficients of the PAC contribution show statistical significance 
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beyond level of 0.05. It means that more PAC contribution to a legislator lead the legislator to vote in 
favor of defense in a congressional term, a fact proved with statistical significance in six out of ten 
congressional terms.  
For military contracts to districts, the coefficients show that the variable has a negative effect in 
six out of ten congressional terms and a positive effect in four congressional terms. Furthermore, the 
coefficients do not have a statistical significance of 0.05 except for the 109th Congress. It means that the 
military contracts to districts do not have a stable effect on legislators’ favorableness to defense spending 
in a congressional term and the effect also cannot be considered statistically significant.   
As I did for authorization process, I also examined the effect of the factors for each congressional 
term due to the fact that PAC contribution and military contract to congressional district were related to 
the election cycle which was the same as the congressional terms. In order to examine how these two 
factors – the effect of PAC contribution and military contract to congressional districts – influence 
legislators' favorableness to defense spending in a congressional term, I estimated the model (Figure 7-2, 
p. ) with dataset of each congressional term.  
<Table 8-4: Result of Linear Regression Model: Appropriations bills only, Term by Term> 
 103 104 105 107 108 109 110 111 112 
(Intercept) 0.626 
*** 
0.634  
*** 
0.727 
*** 
0.552 
*** 
-0.00810 0.696  
*** 
0.574  
*** 
1.25 
*** 
0.709 
*** 
Defense 
Contracts 
★dollarsum 
($ 100 billion) 
-1.78 0.000924 1.14  0.262  -0.0119  0.0811 -0.138 0.103 0.0759 
PAC 
Contribution 
★cnsum 
($ 100 thousand) 
0.363 
*** 
0.247  
*** 
0.379 
*** 
-0.0707 -0.0005 0.0866  
** 
0.0451 
* 
0.0488  
. 
0.0449 
*** 
Ideology 
★dwnom1 
0.302 
. 
0.884 
*** 
1.08 
*** 
-0.680  
** 
-0.341  -0.215  -0.326  
*** 
-1.09 
*** 
0.482  
*** 
Party 
★party1 
0.114 
 
-0.0731 
 
-0.293 
** 
0.00272  0.00848  0.645  
*** 
0.321  
*** 
-0.479 
*** 
0.00683  
Ideology:Party 
★dwnom1:party1 
0.835 
*** 
-0.604 
*** 
-0.622 
** 
0.175 
 
0.0340 
 
-0.977 
*** 
-0.757 
*** 
1.05 
*** 
-0.869 
*** 
 n=429 n=437 n=435 n=409 n=425 n=430 n=437 n=435 n=398 
    Note:  *** >000, **>0.001, *>0.05; ★ variable names in database 
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In the case of the PAC contribution, all congressional terms except for the 107th and 108th 
Congress have positive coefficients which range from 0.0449 (min.: the 112th Congress) to 0.363 (max.: 
the 103th Congress). Except for three congress terms, the 107th, 108th, and 111thCongress, coefficients of 
the PAC contribution show statistical significance beyond level of 0.05. It means that, in appropriation 
process, more PAC contributions to a legislator lead the legislator to vote in favor of defense in seven out 
of nine congressional terms, a fact proved with statistical significance in six out of nine congressional 
terms.  
For military contract to districts, the coefficients show that the variable has a positive effect in six 
out of nine congressional terms and a negative effect in the other three congressional terms. Furthermore, 
the coefficients do not have statistical significance of 0.05 throughout all the congressional terms. It 
means that even though the military contracts to districts have a positive effect on legislators’ 
favorableness to defense spending in appropriation process, the variable does not have a stable effect on 
legislators’ favorableness to defense spending in a congressional term and the effect also cannot be 
considered statistically significant.  
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
Defense policy deals with two fronts – external and internal fronts. Defense policies dealing with 
the external front search for source of threats and develop military strategies, doctrines and technologies 
to respond to the external threats. These tasks are purely the jobs of professional soldiers, who are 
responsible for developing their own ways to fight against threats. Moreover, the professional soldiers do 
not need to negotiate with their principals while dealing with external threats. What they need to do is 
find a logic that can persuade their principals such as citizens, the President, and members of Congress. 
This is the core of military professionalism.     
Nonetheless, when it comes to building up the foundation of defense policy, the story is quite 
different from dealing with foreign threats. Considering the fact that the foundation of defense policy 
comes from inside the United States, military institutions have to meet the challenge of the internal front 
on the way to building up military institutions’ capabilities to perform their institutional role, which is to 
protect their societies.  
Building up the foundations of defense policy are purely political tasks that require promoting 
public support, making contracts with industries, and mostly, persuading the Congress and the President. 
These are the core tasks in civil-military relations. Defense policies for the internal front seek to create 
favorable political environments, public climates and economic conditions within the society in order to 
build up the necessary military capabilities such as effective weapon systems, high quality human 
resources, and cohesive, sustainable, and well-functioning organization.  
The armed forces are maintained in two ways –in both the military way and the militaristic way. 
The very nature of armed forces – including organization, size, technologies and dispositions – is 
determined by multiple factors such as political structure and situation, economic conditions of the 
country, level and quality of the threat in the security environment, disposition and support of the people, 
expectations of allies, strategic culture of the nation-state, culture of the individual services and 
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technologies available at a given time. It means that any military has some features of military way which 
are ‘scientific and related to military functions’ and ‘other features of militaristic way’ which are too 
much distracted by aspects other than true military purpose. In this sense, every nation which has its own 
military has specific features of militarism, regardless of how dominant these features are over other parts 
of the society. In general, features of militaristic ways are evidenced by “ceremonial appurtenance”, “anti-
revolutionary”, “conservative ideology”, “imaginary individualism”.  
The U.S. has its own type of militarism in the military and the society. In the United States, there 
is a belief that the US military should be number one in the world. Moreover, the belief is further 
extended in the idea that the U.S. Military can be an asset that promotes peace and prosperity in the 
world, and the use of force can be justified by good causes such as democracy and human rights. It has 
been reflected in several poll results asking the US public about the US military. This American public 
belief takes various shapes of military imperatives which connect every part of society with military and 
lead them to cooperate and support the realization of these imperatives. First, the belief asks the society to 
maintain military superiority in every possible environment and circumstance on planet earth. Second, the 
belief asks the society to maintain the industrial bases that produce the weapons and technologies required 
for military superiority. Third, the belief asks the society to advance military science and technology, in 
order to produce the next Revolution in Military affairs. Fourth, the belief asks the society to maintain a 
professional All Volunteer Force which is not dependent on conscription or draft. Fifth, the belief asks the 
society to secure the United States of America without wars in the mainland continent. All these military 
imperatives asks each part of American society to participate in shaping American military forces.   
Military transformation in the post-Cold War era is an example that shows how American 
militarism works in American society. Considering that Military Transformation is a defense policy to 
change the shape of the military into an ideal shape, the final products of the military transformation are 
changes and developments in organization, weapons and equipment, and military doctrines. It is the 
budget - defense budget - that brings all these changes and developments into reality. In a democratic 
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society, public opinion is a significant source of influence on policy. If the public opinion on defense 
spending is positive, the defense budget is likely to increase.  
When I examined the effect of three factors – such as public opinion, the Global War on Terror, 
and the federal deficit – on the defense budget during the post-Cold War era, public opinion and the 
Global War on Terror showed a positive relationship with defense spending. According to the result of 
analysis in chapter 3, public opinion showed a positive and significant correlation with defense spending. 
However, public opinion’s influence is likely to increase in accordance with the intensity of external 
threats and changes of external environment. Public opinion has more impact in the period of transition 
from war to peace or peace to war than in the period of a continuing state of war such as the Cold War 
period. Moreover, considering the fact that the post-Cold War era and the era of the Global War on Terror 
are relatively shorter than that of the Cold War era, it can be concluded that public opinion is more 
influential in the case of short durations of external factors. 
Within the US military, American Militarism has led the Department of Defense and military 
services to competition against the Soviet Union during the Cold War era and endless preparation for a 
future adversary in the situation of strategic uncertainty after the Cold War era. This trend of preparation 
for the future has been sustained even while the US military was engaging in two theater-level military 
operations in the Middle East after the attack of September 11. In order to maintain the top position in 
military affairs, the department of defense and military services have brought new concepts of war 
fighting and have developed weapon systems and military doctrines that realize the new concepts of war 
fighting. These efforts have been best embodied in the continuing pursuit of military transformation since 
the Second World War ended.  
The US military transformation during the post-Cold War era was the attempt to transform the 
US military – including the military strategy, doctrine, force structure, and weapon systems – after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. The military transformation was based on the idea of Revolution in Military 
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Affairs, which focuses on applying revolutionary advance of information technologies of the 1990’s into 
the military sphere. It has been the core defense policy objective of the Department of Defense for longer 
than 20 years, from 1992 to 2014.  
It started with the Base Force Plan in the National Military Strategy published in 1992.  The Base 
Force Plan was the force structure that was required to be maintained in order to conduct two major 
regional contingencies scenarios. The report of the Bottom-Up Review in 1994 assessed the validity of 
the Base Force Plan. While the report of the Bottom-Up Review agreed with the two-MRC scenario as the 
logic of the force planning construct, it also suggested further reducing the size of forces and adjusting the 
force modernization plan to the changing security environment. The report of the Bottom-Up Review 
included initiation of new R&D projects to equip the military forces as well as cancellation of 
unnecessary force modernization programs. Since 1997, the Department of Defense has published the 
report of the Quadrennial Defense Review every four years. These five Quadrennial Defense Review 
Reports contain the core contents of the military transformation. In the QDR 1997, the military 
transformation was presented as the vision plan of the Department of Defense and the military services. 
Through the QDR 2001 and 2006, the military transformation was changed into the major policy 
objective, with a specific time frame and clear goals to be achieved.  As the wars in Southwest Asia 
wound down into the ending phase and the fiscal situation was aggravated, the priority of defense policy 
was moved from the military transformation into the rebalance of forces in the QDR 2010 and QDR 2014. 
In addition, as the time for the military transformation comes due, the Department of Defense and the 
services have been trying to search new concepts for another military transformation in the name of the 
Evolution of Forces and the Innovation & Adaptation of Forces in the QDR 2010 and QDR 2014. 
Defense related industries have strongly supported the military’s effort to be number one in 
military affairs. Defense industries have invested enormous amount of money in research and 
development of advanced military technologies and weapon systems. In return, the US military has 
purchased them and encouraged defense industries to keep investing in Research and Development, even 
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when these technologies were not sophisticated enough and incomplete. In this sense, the relationship 
between military and industries has been symbiotic rather than simple vendor/buyer relationship. When 
the US government planned a large scale build-down of armed forces after the Cold War, one of the main 
concerns was how to preserve the capabilities of producing military equipment and how to save industrial 
bases which enabled the US military to keep military superiority during the Cold War period.   
It is an inevitable fact that the United States industrial bases were the essential foundation of the 
US military power and a driving force for the United States to win the Cold War. During the Cold War, 
the Military-Industry-Congress complex was an indispensable option to maintaining military superiority 
to the Soviet Union and the WARSAW Pact. This concrete complex of the Military-Industry-Congress 
was starting to be reconsidered, as economic conditions worsened in the 1980’s. Defense industries were 
put in a situation in which they should choose one of two options – abandoning the production line, or 
finding other ways to survive the crisis after the Cold War. Congress could not simply choose an ideal 
option that fitted economic conditions – closing the production line –, because defense industries were a 
significant issue to senators and representatives from the states or districts whose local economies were 
closely tied to companies within defense industries.   
When this Military-Industry-Congress complex was about to collapse, the Department of Defense 
requested the defense industries to pursue consolidation between companies. Furthermore, the 
Department of Defense and Congress worked together to lower the bars of restrictions on defense related 
technologies, which were banned to be released to the free market during the Cold War. Congress built 
legislative grounds to release the ban on dual-use technologies which were able to be used in civilian 
businesses. The Department of Defense offered practical guidelines to discern between critical military 
technologies and dual-use technologies.  
In this situation, the military transformation based on the network-centric warfare offered three 
areas of business to defense industries such as development of new platforms and nodes, modification of 
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traditional platforms, and network systems to connect these nodes and platforms. These were valuable 
opportunities for defense industries to survive the serious crisis in the early 1990’s, and for the United 
States government to maintain industrial bases for national defense. The F-35 JSF program clearly 
showed the relationship between defense industries and the military transformation.  
When the Cold War ended, the economy rather than security started to drive defense industries 
and weapon development programs. The services began to initiate weapon development programs jointly. 
When the Navy proposed the A-X/ A/F-X program to replace A-6, the Air Force participated in the 
development program in order to replace F-111. Moreover, the economic environment in the early 1990’s 
did not allow the services to proceed to develop all these jet fighter programs. Furthermore, the security 
environment did not offer specific reasons to develop all legacy jet fighters or to replace outdated weapon 
systems. However, the US government had to maintain the industrial bases that produced military 
equipment during the Cold War era, because the United States still needed to maintain the military forces 
which could engage globally and these industrial bases were also critical economic bases to the US 
national economy.  
The Department of Defense recommendation was that defense industries consolidate companies 
and merge into several representative companies within similar industry fields. Sixteen aircraft 
manufacturing companies were merged into five companies at the end of the 1990’s.  Furthermore, the 
Department of Defense canceled similar defense programs and merged them into fewer representative 
programs. In order to save the merged programs, the Department of Defense put the programs into the 
Research and Development phase and encouraged foreign governments and defense industries to 
participate in these programs.  
The JSF F-35 program is one of the examples that show the connections between defense 
industries, the US military and Congress. These connections led the JSF F-35 program to American 
Militarism, which can be featured as ‘overly ambitious,’ ‘not efficient,’ and ‘not reasonable.’ There are 
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five evidences which show that American Militarism has influenced the development of the Joint Strike 
Fighter. First, the purchasers – Congress and the Department of Defense – have not exercised the proper 
authority over the merchandiser – Lockheed Martin and its associates –, even though there have been 
significant flaws in the program. Second, the program did not satisfy the requirements of the final 
consumers - the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps. Within the Air Force, pilots requested buying 
more F-22s rather than developing the F-35, and the Navy has kept insisting that F-18 E/F would be a 
better choice than the JSF. Third, saving the industrial base and keeping it competitive in the international 
markets has been a critical interest of the U.S. Government, and it was the environment in which the JSF 
program began.  
Fourth and finally, the title “the fifth generation” did not come from any services of the US 
military. The title was the catch-phrase of Lockheed Martin to sell F-35 to customers, including the US 
military and other foreign partners. What the services used to describe a new jet fighter had been ‘a next 
generation’ jet fighter. The US military had not numbered the generation of the jet fighter program before 
the development of F-35. What the Services did was to develop a next generation jet fighter to defeat 
enemies’ current jet fighters. Originally, the title came from Russia, who tried to sell its new jet fighter in 
the market in the late 1990’s. The Russian Weapon Corporation started to use the title “fifth generation” 
jetfighter and the term was widely accepted throughout the international jet fighter market. The Lockheed 
Martin Corporation used this term as a catchphrase for the new jet fighter which eventually would replace 
the legacy jet fighters such as F-16, F-18, A-6, and AV-8. Now, the Department of Defense, Congress and 
military services are using the term “fifth generation jet fighter” to describe a family of advanced jet 
fighters. It means that the US government bought the catch phrase of the fifth generation jet fighter and 
gave it the meaning of advanced jet fighter.  
In the political arena, Congress has been the main source of influence on military affairs. Even 
though foreign policy and use of force have been primarily under the influence of the executive branches 
such as the White House and Department of Defense, Congress has the authoritative power of funding 
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military programs and governmental oversight regarding military and defense policy. Furthermore, issues 
in military affairs are under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committees in both chambers of 
Congress. Most members of both committees have the experience of military service and come from 
regions which are connected with the military in aspects of demography or regional economy. These 
attributes of committee members guarantee proper representation of regional interests and position of 
military services, while they also lead committee members’ decisions to be distracted by other issues such 
as regional economy and inter-service rivalry, rather than effectiveness of military forces, which also can 
be considered signs of militarism.  
Congressional hearings on the official DOD documents regarding military transformation is one 
indicator to read the congressional response to the military transformation. The Base Force Plan was 
evaluated as a “very strategy driven” document in the aspects of force structure and supporting capability 
for the force structure. The committee members understood the security environment of the post-Cold 
War era and the strategy to deal with it in the big picture of national defense policy. During the hearing on 
the report of the Bottom - Up Review in the House, almost every member of the House Armed Services 
Committee did not support the Bottom-Up Review. The criticism was that: the report was budget driven; 
the force structure did not match the strategy; it was based on a higher level of risk than the Department 
assumed; and it did not show a clear picture of how to prepare for the future.  
Differing from the report of the Bottom-Up Review, the QDR 1997 had a clearer vision for the 
future, contained in Joint Vision 2010 and the military transformation. By connecting these two vision 
plans with other issues, DOD satisfactorily defended the QDR 1997 and defense programs, and persuaded 
the committee to approve the policy directions in the QDR 1997. In 2001, even though the focus of 
discussion was tilted to the response in the Senate to the September 11 attack, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee found that the military transformation also included policy initiatives to prevent asymmetrical 
and irregular threats from terrorists and confirmed that the military transformation was headed in the right 
direction, as the House Armed Services Committee had confirmed before the September 11 attack. Even 
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though several items are directly addressing the follow-up responses to the September 11 attack, 
testimonies of witnesses in both hearings and the QDR 2001 itself show a solid consistency in the policy 
regarding military transformation. The hearings on the QDR 2006 covered two main issues: the military 
transformation and the Global War on Terror. The focus of the hearings was how to balance between 
these two issues under the situation of resource constraint, rather than abandoning either. Differing from 
the hearings on previous QDRs, the military transformation was not the focus of the hearings on QDR 
2010. Even though the items related to the military transformation were covered and discussed during the 
hearings, the primary concern was how to manage the defense program under the budget constraint. 
Committee members of both chambers examined the situation of the growing federal deficit and its 
impact on defense programs including various weapon systems which were part of the military 
transformations. In sum, both committees responded positively to the military transformation and showed 
the tendency to support strategy driven plans – the Base Force Plan, the QDR 1997, 2001, 2006 –, which 
presented a blueprint for the coming years and guaranteed more investment in Research and 
Development, while criticizing the report of the Bottom-Up Review and the QDR 2010 as budget driven 
plans.   
The composition of committees is another indicator that predicts possible legislative outcomes in 
a policy jurisdiction in Congress. Members of a congressional committee are likely to be most interested 
in the related policy area as well as to be considered as professionals among members of Congress. In this 
case, the committee can lead the legislative process to the preference of the committee and can draft a bill 
that appropriately reflects the preference of the committee. Since the ideology of legislators is an 
important factor in legislative voting and the fate of a roll call vote in House is determined by a simple 
majority, it is possible to measure the ideological composition of committees and further to predict 
possible legislative outcomes. During the period, the median voter of committee members is more 
conservative than the median voter of House members, except for the 108th, 109th, and 112th Congress; 
the median voter of committee Republicans is more conservative than the median voter of House 
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Republicans, except for the 110th and 112th Congress; the median voter of committee Democrats is more 
conservative than the median voter of House Democrats. Considering the fact that conservative ideology 
coincided with an increase in defense spending, in most cases the House Armed Service Committee 
members/Republicans/Democrats are likely to act or vote more favorably to defense spending than the 
non-committee House members/Republicans/Democrats do, respectively. 
When comparing Democrats and Republicans, the Democratic Party has wider gaps of median 
values between the House and the House Armed Services Committee than the Republican Party does. It 
means that the Democratic members of the House Armed Services Committee are likely to pursue their 
own position rather than representing their party in the matter of defense policy, while Republican 
members of the House Armed Services Committee are likely to represent their party with slightly more 
conservative legislative products. 
In summary, militarism is a type of ideology that gives more value to military ideas than to 
civilian life. In general, militarism coincides with conservativism and individualism.  Considering the 
political environment inside Congress and the public mood reflected in public opinion, it is highly 
probable that there has been a unique type of militarism in the United States. In the political arena, the 
congressional committee which is responsible for national defense seems inclined to be conservative in 
the matter of ideology – more conservative than the median in the House of Representatives. Speaking of 
public opinion, the US public has shown a relatively high level of confidence in the military compared to 
other public service organizations. The Gallup polls asking about public confidence in the military since 
the year 2001 have shown that the US public has maintained their support for their military, even after the 
twelve years of military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The level of public support to the military 
has positively influenced defense budget increases.  
However, these arguments do not explain what happens in each congressional district but rather 
what happens at the national level due to the following reasons. First, the committee does not represent 
201 
 
 
 
the choices of each member of the House of Representatives. Second, the participants in the polls in the 
previous chapter do not represent the position of each congressional district’s constituents. Both the 
ideological composition of the committee and polls at the national level are not the proper units of 
analysis to examine the effect. 
As the result of the pilot study and literature review, I found that traditional factors – such as 
party, ideology, committee, and other budget-related factors – can explain the fate of amendments in the 
congressional budgetary process, and the authorization process and the appropriations process are quite 
different from each other in the aspects of vote result and voting patterns. On top of these results, I 
attempted to analyze which attributes of each House member determine the choice in roll call votes 
regarding defense budget and how differently each House member votes in authorization process as 
compared to appropriations process. In order to examine how factors influence the choice of each 
legislator in a roll call vote, I estimated a linear regression model in which an index of a legislator's 
choice in roll call votes is a dependent variable and other factors are independent variables – such as 
ideology, party status, defense contract to their congressional districts, and defense related PAC 
contributions to each legislator. Due to the fact that the authorization process and the appropriation 
process are different from each other in several aspects, I developed separate models for each 
congressional budgetary process.  
In the authorization process, the result shows that the PAC contribution (cnsum) and the ideology 
of each legislator (dwnom1) are the two primary factors that lead each legislator to vote favorably to 
defense spending. Both factors show positive numbers: the PAC contribution has 1.01×10−6 as the 
coefficient, and the ideology of each legislator has 1.40 ×10−1 as the coefficient. In the appropriation 
process, the result shows that the military contract to districts (dollarsum) and the ideology of each 
legislator (dwnom1) are the two primary factors that favorably or unfavorably influence each legislator’s 
votes on defense spending. The military contract to districts shows a negative coefficient, while the 
ideology of each legislator has a positive one as it has in the authorization process: the military contract to 
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districts has -3.66 ×10−12 as the coefficient, and the ideology of each legislator has 4.38 ×10−1 as the 
coefficient. The ideology of each legislator shows a positive effect on House members’ favorableness to 
defense spending with the highest level of statistical significance (***: > 0.000).  
Considering that the majority party’s influence on the related committee and the committee’s 
favorable inclination to defense spending, I predicted a positive relationship between majority party and 
party members’ favorableness to defense spending. In the authorization process, majority party status 
does not show a positive effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense spending. In the 
appropriation process, majority party status shows positive effect on the favorableness of legislators to 
defense spending. Nonetheless, its statistical significance is below 0.05 in both authorization and 
appropriation process. This result comes from the fact that the amendments to authorization bills are 
mostly about increase of defense spending, and both majority and minority parties are supportive and 
have a generous position to amendments to increase defense spending in the authorization process. 
Moreover, the amendments to appropriation bills are mostly about decrease of defense spending, and 
neither majority nor minority party are supportive of amendments to decrease defense spending in the 
appropriation process.  
Considering that conservative ideology generally coincides with favorableness to defense 
spending, I predicted a positive relationship between conservative ideology and legislators’ favorableness 
to defense spending. In both authorization and appropriation process, the legislators’ conservative 
ideology has a positive relationship with legislators’ favorableness to defense spending with statistical 
significance. In addition, the effect of conservative ideology on favorableness to defense spending in the 
appropriation process is stronger than in the authorization process (authorization: 1.40 ×10−1<; 
appropriation: 4.38 ×10−1).   
A legislator works to bring more economic benefit to his congressional district. Furthermore, 
when a congressional district has an economic connection with defense industries, the legislator of the 
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district is favorable to increases in defense spending. Based on these assumptions, I predicted a positive 
relationship between annual amount of defense contracts to congressional districts and legislators’ 
favorableness to defense spending. In the authorization process, the defense contract to congressional 
districts shows a positive effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense spending (coefficient: 1.87 
×10−12). However, its statistical significance is below 0.05 (0.3375). The result comes from two facts: 
first, subcontract practice in defense industries might reduce the effect of the amount of prime contract to 
a congressional district; second, the congressional district is not an economic community but a political 
community that is based on population, which means economic factors might cross over the boundary of 
congressional districts rather than being contained within the boundary.  
In the appropriation process, the defense contract to congressional districts shows a negative 
effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense spending (coefficient: -3.66 ×10−12). However, its 
statistical significance is beyond 0.001 (**, >0.001). The estimation result does not support hypothesis 3 
in the case of the appropriation process even though the variable has a strong statistical significance. In 
the appropriation process, the result means that ‘as a legislator’s congressional district receives more 
military related contracts from the Department of Defense, which bring economic benefit to districts, the 
legislator is less likely to vote in favor of defense spending in roll call votes on amendments to the annual 
appropriation bill’. This result comes from two facts: first, legislators are more concerned about specific 
interests for their congressional districts than about the general defense spending in the appropriation 
process; second, the amendments to annual appropriation bills are mostly about specific items such as JSF 
F-35’s second engine or V-22 Osprey. 
Defense industries contribute donations to a legislator who has economic ties with their defense 
contracts in order to guarantee investment from the department of defense, and the legislator who has his 
district’s economic interests with defense industries supports increases in defense spending. Based on 
these assumptions, I predicted a positive relationship between PAC contribution from defense industries 
and legislators’ favorableness to defense spending. In the authorization process, the PAC contribution 
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from defense industries shows a positive effect on the favorableness of legislators to defense spending 
(coefficient: 1.01×10−6). Furthermore, its statistical significance is beyond 0.0005 (***,>0. 00). In the 
appropriation process, the PAC contribution from defense industries shows a negative effect on the 
favorableness of legislators to defense spending (coefficient: -1.29 ×10−7). The result in the appropriation 
process comes from the fact that amendments to annual appropriations bills are mostly about cutting of 
defense spending and are closely related to specific items. This fact reduces the effect of generalized PAC 
contributions on favorableness to defense spending.   
In sum, conservative ideology has a positive impact with statistical significance in both the 
authorization and the appropriation processes. Majority party status does not have significant influence on 
legislators’ favorableness to defense spending in both the authorization and the appropriation processes. 
Regarding economic factors such as PAC contribution and military contracts to congressional districts, 
each congressional budgetary process showed different results. PAC contribution has a positive and 
significant impact on legislators’ favorableness to defense spending in the authorization process, while 
military contract to congressional district has a negative and significant influence. Considering the fact 
that PAC contribution and conservative ideology has a positive and significant impact on legislators 
favorableness to defense spending in the authorization process, the authorization process is more likely to 
be under the influence of American militarism which has features of conservative ideology and support 
for Research & Development and weapon procurement programs. Moreover, the factor of military 
contracts to congressional districts needs to be modified because the problem of subcontract practice still 
has not been solved clearly. It is also necessary to find a proper political community, other than 
congressional districts, which can reflect the economic influence of military contracts. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to attempt program-based analysis for the appropriation process because the appropriation 
process is closely related to specific defense programs rather than covering general issues of defense 
policy.   
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Appendix A. Zip code for the 1990’s 
 
1. Scan the appendix of “Congressional District of the 1990’s” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Conversion the PDF file into Word 2013 File 
 
 
                   
3. Producing the zip code data, state by state, by Cross-checking with the original text 
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Appendix B.  Capturing the redistricting by using ArcGIS 
 
1. Congressional districts of California             2. Zip Codes Tabulation Areas of California  
 
3. Intersecting Congressional Districts map        4. Generating geographic data table by using  
   and Zip Code Tabulation Area of California        the map in “3.”  
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Appendix C. the List of Amendments 
Abbreviations 
a. cong: Congress 
b. year: year 
c. rc: roll call number 
d. admt: amendment number 
e. amount: dollar amount included in each amendment 
f. Aye: number of Aye 
g. Nay: Number of Nay 
h. note: explanation. 
 
1. Amendments in Authorization bills 
cong Year rc admt amount Aye Nay note 
103 1993 412 282 -1,500,000 159 272 Missile defense 
103 1993 413 283 467,000 118 311 Missile defense 
103 1993 414 284 -229,000 201 227 Missile defense 
103 1993 415 285 -1,200,000 182 240 Trident 
103 1993 416 286 -1,200,000 187 240 Trident 
103 1993 417 288 0 194 231 SOFA 
103 1993 418 289 0 285 137 BRAC 
103 1993 419 290 -580,000 423 0 overseas operation and maintenance 
103 1993 420 291 -500,000 209 216 Europe stationed forces 
103 1993 421 292 40,000 171 250 community  
103 1993 422 293 40,000 255 160 community adjustment 
103 1993 423 294 300,000 151 260 Defense technology investment  
103 1993 426 296 30,000 198 211 overseas emergency fund 
103 1993 427 297 33,000 198 210 PKO center 
103 1993 428 298 0 155 256 civil access to National guard 
103 1993 429 299 300,000 149 262 overseas operation and maintenance 
103 1993 460 316 0 168 264 don't ask don't tell 
103 1993 461 317 0 144 290 foreign relations 
103 1993 462 318 0 301 133 insert concern of homosexual 
103 1993 463 319 0 405 26 require report 
103 1993 468 289 0 291 138 BRAC 
103 1993 469 290 -580,000 426 0 overseas operation and maintenance 
103 1993 470 293 40,000 265 162 community adjustment 
103 1993 471 318 0 295 132 insert concern of homosexual 
103 1993 472 319 0 404 23 require report 
103 1994 179 555 -200,000 154 271 Missile defense 
103 1994 180 556 0 162 250 NATO 
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103 1994 187 565 0 267 144 NATO 
103 1994 188 566 0 226 168 permit for SECDEF 
103 1994 189 567 -700,000 165 229 Trident 
103 1994 190 568 0 174 217 Army school of America 
103 1994 191 569 0 271 125 
no fund for university who denied 
ROTC program 
103 1994 192 569 0 124 273 selective service 
103 1994 194 572 -84,890 68 361 BRAC 
103 1994 195 573 447,000 330 99 C-17 
103 1994 196 575 0 190 236 Haiti 
103 1994 198 576 0 191 220 PKO 
103 1994 217 604 0 414 1 north Korea 
103 1994 218 605 0 262 156 CNTB 
103 1994 219 608 0 226 192 clarify of language 
103 1994 220 609 0 67 349 IAEA 
103 1994 221 610 0 413 3 sense for improving ROK 
103 1994 222 611 200,000 244 177 budget on Bosnia 
103 1994 223 612 0 180 242 
urge president to take a necessary step 
about Bosnia 
103 1994 224 574 0 195 225 Haiti 
104 1995 369 423 0 244 179 
prohibit use of fund until cooperation 
with Russia 
104 1995 370 424 -533,000 202 219 buying B-2 
104 1995 371 427 0 212 207 organizational bill 
104 1995 372 426 0 419 1 organizational bill 
104 1995 373 428 0 184 242 
clarify of amendment that compliant to 
ABM treaty 
104 1995 374 429 -470,000 177 250 cut the budget of MD 
104 1995 375 430 0 272 156 
reduce of personnel, transfer the cost to 
host countries 
104 1995 376 431 0 302 124 
restrict use of fund for university that 
denied to implement ROTC 
104 1995 377 432 0 151 276 delete a provision 
104 1995 378 433 0 214 213 use of military facilities 
104 1995 379 434 0 293 132 
exempt of military base from a 
coverage 
104 1995 381 435 -50,000 213 208 Ttritum 
104 1995 382 436 0 195 230 overseas abortion 
104 1995 383 437 25,900 410 14 sensor, optic, joint targeting  
104 1996 167 1054 0 191 225 overseas abortion 
104 1996 168 1055 0 352 62 
require president to seek other options 
for stopping FMS 
104 1996 170 1057 0 202 219 
 prohibit use of fund for Russia and 
soviet union 
228 
 
 
 
104 1996 171 1058 0 249 170 
uniformed services university of the 
health science / phase out 
104 1996 172 1059 0 82 342 
various amendment for Foreign 
assistance and other international issue 
105 1997 214 184 -1,231,000 88 332 5% reduction  
105 1997 215 185 0 404 14 defense reform act 
105 1997 216 186 0 331 88 expert of supercomputer 
105 1997 217 187 0 195 224 oversee abortion 
105 1997 221 189 -341,400 144 253 eliminate trident 
105 1997 222 190 0 248 145 
transfer of authority dealing with naval 
oil  
105 1997 223 191 0 289 100 
request of report ballistic missile 
targeted to USA 
105 1997 224 192 0 269 118 border mission 
105 1997 225 194 0 415 0 prohibit military funeral for criminal 
105 1997 226 196 0 414 2 revise authority 
105 1997 227 197 4,500 416 0 gulf war illness 
105 1997 228 198 -331,000 208 216 Eliminate  B-2 
105 1997 229 199 0 144 278 change of provision 
105 1997 230 200 0 215 205 
no cooperation with Russia if transfer 
ssn22 to china 
105 1997 233 204 0 195 231 prohibit use of fund for Bosnia 
105 1997 234 203 0 277 148 prohibit use of fund for Bosnia 
105 1997 235 204 0 204 218 prohibit use of fund for Bosnia 
105 1998 167 639 0 416 4  no satellite tech to china 
105 1998 168 640 0 413 7 prevent espionage from china  
105 1998 169 641 0 411 6 no transfer missile tech to china 
105 1998 170 642 0 363 54  prohibit satellite to china 
105 1998 171 643 0 189 232 overseas abortion 
105 1998 172 644 0 419 1 avoid Tokyo protocol 
105 1998 173 645 0 250 171 
prohibit us serviceman in UN rapid 
deployment 
105 1998 178 647 0 419 2 Medicare adjustment 
105 1998 179 649 0 178 243 reconnaissance border assignment 
105 1998 180 648 0 288 131 border assignment  
105 1998 181 650 0 404 9 
establish reporting requirement related 
to nuclear export 
106 1999 180 145 0 427 0 counter intelligence 
106 1999 181 150 0 159 265 limit of lab by foreigner 
106 1999 182 154 0 283 143 no military exchange with PLA 
106 1999 183 155 0 227 197 
prohibit use of fund for stationing in 
Haiti 
106 1999 184 156 0 202 225 oversea abortion 
106 1999 185 157 0 424 0 
authorize to participate military 
members in Thrift saving program 
229 
 
 
 
106 1999 186 158 0 242 180 assign border 
106 1999 187 160 0 97 327 change of language PKO in Yugo 
106 1999 188 164 7,300 302 118 space launch facility 
106 1999 189 161 0 269 155 change of language PKO in Yugo 
106 1999 190 162 0 115 307 reduce Europe forces by 2002 
106 2000 193 714 0 262 153 
change of condition to station in 
Kosovo 
106 2000 194 715 -3,090,000 87 330 1% reduction from the bill 
106 2000 195 716 0 413 8 
shortened the period of waiting of super 
computer 
106 2000 196 717 -472,900 111 312 no more trident 
106 2000 197 718 0 242 182 assign border mission 
106 2000 198 719 0 424 0 
adjustment of healthcare for nuclear 
worker  
106 2000 199 721 0 56 366 repeal the law to convey surplus to local 
106 2000 202 725 0 217 200 
adjustment of healthcare for nuclear 
worker  
106 2000 203 722 0 194 220 overseas abortion 
106 2000 204 723 -20,000 202 214 close the school of America 
106 2000 205 724 0 332 85 
prohibit contract with agencies related 
to NK 
106 2000 206 728 0 95 321 adjustment of healthcare to military 
106 2000 207 727 0 404 10 adjustment of healthcare to military 
107 2001 356 316 0 241 171 assign border mission 
107 2001 357 317 0 198 216 oversea abortion 
107 2002 141 474 0 171 242 permanent elimination of program 
107 2002 142 472 0 361 52 cooperation with Russia 
107 2002 145 475 -54,000 158 252 spaced based missile defense 
107 2002 153 478 0 201 214 oversea abortion 
107 2002 154 479 0 231 182 assign border mission 
107 2002 155 480 0 263 151 no fund for ICC 
107 2002 156 481 2,500 410 2 national guard athletic fund 
108 2003 205 139 0 252 174 change of the act  
108 2003 206 140 0 250 178 
dispatch service members to border 
conflict 
108 2003 215 141 0 200 227 abortion overseas 
108 2003 216 142 -21,000 198 226 transfer of money for RDT&E 
108 2003 217 144 0 411 11 
require of report on attacks on US 
armed service member 
108 2003 218 146 0 302 122 repeal the statutory for attach in France 
108 2003 219 151 0 207 216 
repeal the regulation about computer 
export 
108 2004 196 532 0 231 190 
dispatch service members to border 
conflict 
108 2004 197 533 0 201 221 abortion overseas 
230 
 
 
 
108 2004 199 534 0 415 4 sense for abuse of person in custody 
108 2004 200 539 0 162 258 eliminate the delay of BRAC 
108 2004 201 535 0 307 114 
sense for helping Iraq to destroy Abu 
Grharib  
108 2004 202 538 0 409 0 
request a plan for preventing sexual 
harassment 
108 2004 203 540 -36,577 203 214 transfer of money for RDT&E 
108 2004 204 543 0 289 132 
require a program for exchange military 
official with Taiwan 
109 2005 214 206 0 245 183 
dispatch service members to border 
conflict 
109 2005 215 208 0 412 16 clarify of term related to boy scout 
109 2005 216 209 0 193 233 abortion overseas 
109 2005 217 210 10,000 427 1 for supersonic cruise missile 
109 2005 218 211 0 336 91 
prohibit grant for the Univ. denying 
ROTC program 
109 2005 219 213 0 112 315 delay of procedure 
109 2005 220 214 0 127 300 request of plan for withdrawal from Iraq 
109 2006 136 805 0 190 237 
epidemiological study on human living 
in munition disposal area 
109 2006 141 814 0 252 170 
dispatch service members to border 
conflict 
109 2006 142 819 -4,747,000 123 301 missile defense 
109 2006 143 806 0 414 9 consideration of duration of reservist 
110 2007 364 186 0 202 216 no more Iraqi war operation 
110 2007 365 187 0 136 388 clarify of term 
110 2007 366 188 0 119 303 request a test cold war weapon 
110 2007 367 193 -1,084,000 127 299 missile defense funding reduce 
110 2007 368 194 746,000 199 226 missile defense funding increase 
110 2007 369 196 0 201 219 clarify of term 
110 2007 370 197 0 220 208 request a report about Guantanamo  
110 2007 371 198 0 199 229 videotaping interrogation 
110 2008 355 1048 193,000 128 287 future combat system 
110 2008 356 1050 719,000 186 229 missile defense agency 
110 2008 357 1051 -966,200 122 292 missile defense system 
110 2008 358 1052 10,000 145 271 nuclear warhead 
110 2008 359 1055 0 234 183 no sofa with Iraq 
110 2008 360 1057 0 245 168 request a report about Iraqi operation 
110 2008 361 1061 0 240 168 legal definition of contract 
110 2008 362 1062 0 218 192 video and recording interrogation 
110 2008 363 1063 0 220 189 release information 
111 2009 453 262 0 138 278 request for report about exit strategy 
111 2009 454 263 0 224 190 disclosure of information  
111 2009 455 266 12,000,000 171 244 missile defense by offsetting from c1 
111 2009 456 267 0 186 226 disclosure of information  
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111 2009 457 270 0 224 193 video taping 
111 2009 458 274 0 416 0 
clarify the limit with other agencies 
policy 
111 2010 310 654 0 421 0 clarify the terms 
111 2010 311 657 0 424 0 consideration for special uniform 
111 2010 312 659 0 341 85 
consideration for obesity for 
recruitment  
111 2010 313 662 0 410 8 sense for fair competition bid 
111 2010 314 665 0 372 52 restrict on contract with BP  
111 2010 315 666 0 218 210 
request for cooperation of international 
community to GAO 
111 2010 316 661 -489,000 193 231 F-35 second engine 
111 2010 317 672 0 234 194 don't ask don't tell 
111 2010 318 667 0 253 172 change of rule for contract 
111 2010 333 676 0 416 1 11 program enactment  
112 2011 343 302 -564,682 83 334 V22 for navy and AF 
112 2011 344 305 -10,000 203 213 fund for veterans kid 
112 2011 345 308 0 198 225 change of the Contractor rule 
112 2011 346 309 0 208 212 change of the Contractor rule 
112 2011 347 310 0 261 163 change of the Contractor rule 
112 2011 348 311 0 168 256 change of the Contractor rule 
112 2011 349 312 0 176 248 change of the Contractor rule 
112 2011 350 313 0 184 240 change of the Contractor rule 
112 2011 351 314 0 191 232 change of the Contractor rule 
112 2011 352 315 0 178 246 change of the Contractor rule 
112 2011 353 317 -310,000 177 246 prohibit use of fund for a shipyard 
112 2011 354 318 0 260 160 rules of engagement 
112 2011 355 320 0 246 172 for national guard in SW 
112 2011 356 322 0 165 253 
prohibit use of fund for transfer accused 
personnel other than us citizen 
112 2011 357 323 0 246 173 military tribune for terrorist 
112 2011 358 324 0 91 329 
for full maintenance of military aircraft 
in civilian cite 
112 2011 359 325 0 227 193 clarify of term 
112 2011 360 326 -1,500,000 172 246 adjust for cyber command fund 
112 2011 361 327 0 187 234 strike one section 
112 2011 362 328 -14,923 63 354 termination of program 
112 2011 363 329 0 98 321 reduce the personnel 
112 2011 364 330 0 123 294 about troop withdrawal (plan) 
112 2011 365 332 -1,300,000 96 323 cut personnel in Europe 
112 2011 366 333 0 416 5 do not use fund for Libya 
112 2011 367 334 -348,256 269 151 Mission Force Enhancement Transfer 
112 2011 368 335 -2,018,619 176 241 termination of program 
112 2011 369 336 -100,000 184 234 missile defense 
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112 2011 370 339 0 419 0 designated day 
112 2011 371 342 0 300 120 request a report 
112 2011 372 343 -43,000 226 194 fund for USIP 
112 2011 373 344 0 204 215 
giving authority to the president to track 
down Al Qaeda 
 
2. Amendments in Appropriation bills 
cong year rc admt amount Aye Nay note 
103 1993 477 326 -1,200,000 177 248 trident 2 
103 1993 478 333 -2,900 173 256 army school of America 
103 1993 479 334 -2,400 190 241 
national board for the promotion of 
rifle practice 
104 1995 639 750 -493,000 209 213 airplane procurement 
104 1995 640 751 -1,000,000 125 293 delay of development of F22 
104 1995 641 753 0 193 224 
detailed or modified version of 
abortion prohibit 
104 1995 642 752 0 226 190 
prohibit of abortion in military 
medical center 
104 1995 643 768 -2,500,000 92 325 10% reduction for NFIP 
104 1995 644 769 -7,500,000 123 296 3% reduction 
104 1995 645 767 0 181 238 
contractor not use fund for political 
purpose 
104 1996 239 1156 -508,000 395 25 cut the budget 
104 1996 240 1158 -404,000 142 285 navy shipbuilding 
104 1996 241 1160 -314,100 125 299 c-130 
104 1996 242 1161 -1,000,000 118 307 f-22 
104 1996 243 1162 0 100 319 set the limit of amount of money 
104 1996 244 1163 -6,572,000 147 265 cut the budget 
104 1996 245 1164 -11,000,000 193 219 limit to 1996 level 
104 1996 246 1167 -144,000 189 208 spaced based missile defense 
105 1997 336 290 -331,000 199 222 stop buying B-2 
105 1997 337 300 -4,300,000 136 290 limit budget to level of FY 1997 
107 2002 269 515 -121,800 111 313 construction of missile silo 
108 2003 334 205 -370,427 57 357 prohibit use of fund for BRAC 
108 2004 283 598 0 201 218 prohibit use of fund for a certain rule 
109 2005 283 328 0 197 210 
request of report on proselytizing 
AFA cadet 
109 2005 284 330 0 83 329 prohibit use of fund for Uzbek 
109 2005 285 331 0 135 280 
prohibit use of fund for additional 
conflicts 
109 2005 286 333 0 179 235 relinquish limit set biome demo act 
233 
 
 
 
109 2006 295 1065 0 206 219 
prohibit use of fund for unauthorized 
e-surveillance  
109 2006 296 1059 0 50 375 
prohibit use of fund for further 
negotiation about basing in Iraq 
109 2006 297 1062 -50,000 141 284 prohibit use of fund for DTS 
109 2006 298 1066 -1,000 77 346 
prohibit use of fund for mystic aqua 
center 
109 2006 299 1067 -1,400 69 351 
prohibit use of fund for Jason 
foundation 
109 2006 300 1072 0 157 262 limit the purpose of operation in Iran 
109 2006 301 1074 -100,000 152 268 
prohibit use of fund for Lincoln 
group, PR 
109 2006 302 1075 -2,500 56 368 
prohibit use of fund for NW 
manufacturing initiative 
109 2006 303 1077 -4,000 50 372 
prohibit use of fund for Lewis 
education center 
109 2006 304 1079 -20,000 62 362 
prohibit use of fund for Leonard 
wood research institute 
110 2007 456 255 -79 379 45 fund for secretary 
110 2007 457 256 -300 381 41 fund for secretary 
110 2007 466 258 -8,961 108 300 fund for secretary 
110 2007 467 257 -1,241 216 198 fund for secretary 
110 2007 468 259 -138 248 168 fund for secretary 
110 2007 838 769 0 148 259 delete anti competition clause 
110 2007 839 770 -2,500 94 311 reduction in presidio fund 
110 2007 840 772 -97,200 161 249 missile defense 
110 2007 841 775 0 126 284 
restrict use of fund based on race and 
other reasons 
110 2007 842 776 -2,000 91 317 paint shield 
110 2007 843 780 -1,500 98 312 Doyle center 
110 2007 844 781 -3,000 57 353 Lewis education center 
110 2007 845 782 -39,000 109 301 national drug intelligence center 
111 2009 661 392 -368,800 269 165 for more F-22 
111 2009 662 394 -160,000 48 373 prohibit use of fund for drug 
111 2009 663 396 -80,000 124 307 for requiring submitting report 
111 2009 664 397 -5,000 77 347 
Enhanced Navy Shore Readiness 
Integration 
111 2009 665 398 -5,000 69 351 
reduced manned situation awareness 
system 
111 2009 666 400 -3,000 76 350 gulf range instrumental 
111 2009 667 401 -1,500 82 341 ultra low ear 
111 2009 668 402 -2,500 78 348 
AARGM Counter Air Defense Future 
Capabilities 
234 
 
 
 
111 2009 669 403 -2,500 83 338 an/slq 25 
111 2009 670 404 -200,000 118 241 mostly  
111 2009 671 405 -1,300,000 82 342 533 amendment  
111 2009 672 406 -3,000 81 353 for rapid deployment shelter 
111 2009 673 407 -1,500 99 338 for medal of green laboratory 
112 2011 43 13 -415,038 105 326 navy:21985, AF: 393098 
112 2011 44 14 -115,520 109 320 alterative energy program 
112 2011 46 16 -450,000 233 198 navy:225000, AF: 225000 (R&DTE) 
112 2011 48 18 -1,500,000 133 299 eliminate Iraq Security Force Fund 
112 2011 59 37 -24,032 130 301 Selective Service System 
112 2011 80 77 -511,515 91 339 
##prohibit use of fund for EFV, V-22 
Osprey(415038+12000+84477) 
112 2011 90 92 -800 148 281 
Prohibit DoD sponsor NASCAR 
racing 
112 2011 91 93 -500,000 98 331 
Limit of fund for operation in Afghan 
to no more than 10000000 
112 2011 102 109 -31,931 123 306 
Prohibit use of fund for EFV and 
Missiles 19931+12000 
112 2011 105 115 -18,000,000 68 357 3.5% of defense/ Homeland Security 
112 2011 106 116 -91,000 74 348 
Prohibit use of fund for beach 
replenishment-Army Engineering 
Corp 
112 2011 116 128 -240,000 241 184 Prohibit use of fund for USJFC 
112 2011 118 130 -278,000 74 351 
Prohibit use  and reduce of fund for 
maintaining military personnel 
strength 
112 2011 128 150 -35,200,000 76 344 
Prohibit use of fund for DoD in 
excess of amount available 2008  
112 2011 495 506 -10,000 175 241 for RDT&E 
112 2011 496 507 -216,556 87 328 for secretary  
112 2011 497 508 -15,000 152 266 for Environ Sec tech  
112 2011 498 509 -3,600 253 167 for gulf war illness from o/m 
112 2011 499 516 -197,023 98 322 next generation bomber 
112 2011 500 520 0 212 208 change of rule 
112 2011 501 522 0 217 204 change the rule 
112 2011 502 525 -33,000,124 97 322 combat operation in Afghan 
112 2011 503 526 -20,887,651 133 295 combat operation in Afghan 
112 2011 504 528 -15,000 174 251 for insulating shelter 
112 2011 505 529 -1,000,000 131 297 reimburse to Pakistan 
112 2011 506 530 -5,000,000 114 314 overseas contingency plan 
112 2011 507 531 -200,000 210 217 Afghan infra fund 
112 2011 508 532 -475,000 145 283 Afghan infra fund 
112 2011 509 534 -4,000,000 119 306 Afghan infra fund 
235 
 
 
 
112 2011 510 537 -1,000,000 140 285 Counter insurgency in Pakistan 
112 2011 511 538 -124,800 226 201 
reduce from all bill including army 
band 
112 2011 512 539 -20,000 167 260 NASCAR 
112 2011 513 542 0 225 201 change of the purpose (Libya) 
112 2011 514 543 0 199 229 prohibit fund for commissary in NJ 
112 2011 515 544 0 176 249 prohibit fund for Libya 
112 2011 516 546 0 248 175 prohibit use of fund for guy marriage 
112 2011 517 550 -17,192,000 135 290 
cut from this act not to be derived 
from title ix (COP) 
112 2011 518 553 0 316 111 
prohibit use of fund in contravention 
with war power act 
112 2011 519 554 0 89 338 prohibit use of fund for Pakistan 
112 2011 520 555 0 162 265 prohibit use of fund for Libya 
112 2011 521 559 -200,000 169 257 
commanders emergency response 
fund 
112 2011 522 562 0 256 170 change of rule 
112 2011 523 563 -8,500,000 181 244 cut from this act  
112 2011 525 566 -250,000 39 380 cut from the act 
112 2011 526 567 -3,577,192 118 295 cut form COP 
112 2011 527 569 -730,000 100 321 RDT&E but not specific  
112 2011 528 573 0 236 184 prohibit use of fund for chaplain 
112 2011 529 575 -482,046 113 307 
not use fund for Europe end strength 
over 30000 
112 2011 530 579 0 169 251 
prohibit use of fund for operation in 
Libya 
 
 
 
 
 
